




The Dissertation Committee for Premkishore Shivakumar
certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:
Techniques to Improve the Hard and Soft Error Reliability of
Distributed Architectures
Committee:






Techniques to Improve the Hard and Soft Error Reliability of
Distributed Architectures
by
Premkishore Shivakumar, B.Tech., M.S.
Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
The University of Texas at Austin
August 2007




I would like to thank and remember numerous people who have contributed to thisresearch
and my experience at UT with heartfelt gratitude. I am deeply indebted to my guide, mentor,
and thesis advisor Steve Keckler. Under his guidance, I feel that I have matured tremen-
dously in my approach to thinking about research problems and system building. I would
also like to thank my co-advisor, Doug Burger. Doug gave me an opportunityto work on
reliability, and much of the combinational logic soft error rate modeling work wasdone as
part of a project in his graduate computer architecture course. I have always been inspired
by Doug’s quick thinking, and his ability to extract key insights from results.I cannot thank
them enough for the things that I have learned from them, but I am sure what I have learned
will guide me through the rest of my professional career.
I would also like to gratefully acknowledge the rest of my committee, Calvin Lin,
Norm Jouppi, Steve Reinhardt, and Nur Touba, who have helped me in innumerable aspects
of my research. I had the opportunity of working with Calvin on some of the initial work
on hard error reliability in the TRIPS architecture, and his comments were very us ful in
shaping the direction of this research. I was also fortunate to work with Norm in the summer
of 2001 on CACTI 3.0. I was fascinated by his wide range of expertise, and I still remember
his words of advice about keeping an open mind and remembering that solutions which did
not apply in an earlier context might be applicable again in a new context in thefuture. I
am also very grateful to Steve Reinhardt, and Nur Touba for their commentswhich have
substantially improved the quality of this dissertation.
v
Mike Kistler was great to work with on the soft error modeling work, and both
of us gained an incredible amount of knowledge in those two years. I wouldhave loved
to continue working with him on the rest of this research. Special thanks to Heather for
the help with all our SPICE related questions then! Most of this research would have not
been possible without the TRIPS hardware and software infrastructure, and for that I am
thankful to the entire hardware and software team. In particular, I would like to thank
Ramdas, Karu, Simha, and Nitya for answering all my questions regarding TRIPS and
computer architecture in general, and Katie and Xia for helping me understand the TRIPS
scheduler. I was extremely fortunate to be part the TRIPS hardware design t am. It was an
incredible learning experience that is rarely possible in graduate schoolor in industry, and I
had a wonderful time working closely with Nitya and Divya on the Execution Tiledesign.
I also gained invaluable industry perspective by working with Chuck Moore on multiple
things including reliability, and the TRIPS design, and have had innumerable conv rsations
with him asking for advice regarding my professional career. Thanks Chuck!
I would also like to thank all the past and present members of the CART lab includ-
ing Karu, Ramdas, Simha, Heather, CK, Sibi, Hrishi, Nitya, Haiming, Jay, Vikas, Divya,
Xia, Behnam, AK, Sadia, Raj, Katie, Bert, Aaron, Hadi, Dong, Paul, and Mark who helped
create a very friendly and interactive environment for useful research related and general
discussions. Their feedback on my research, comments at practice talks,and feedback on
paper drafts was an invaluable help to me. I have grown tremendously, bothtechnically and
otherwise, from my association with them.
I would also like to thank the friendly, patient, and efficient staff in the Computer
Science department. In particular, special thanks to Gem, Gloria, and Katherine who helped
me tackle the maze that is graduate school, and took care of all the deadlines,requirements,
and travel arrangements.
I also made some very good friends during my stay at UT who have made graduate
school an even more memorable experience for me. I could not have succeded at graduate
vi
school without the upbringing, encouragement, and support from my dear parents, brother,
and sister. In these few years at UT, I also found two things that have deeply touched my
heart. One of them is Simrit, my wife, who enriches my life beyond measure, andthe other
has given a deeper meaning to my existence and given my life a purpose.
PREMKISHORESHIVAKUMAR
The University of Texas at Austin
August 2007
vii




The University of Texas at Austin, 2007
Supervisor: Stephen W. Keckler
Aggressive technology scaling, rising on-chip integration, and the continued increase in mi-
croprocessor power and thermal density threaten both the hard and soft error reliability of
future microprocessor designs. Therefore, designing low overheadm chanisms for improv-
ing reliability will be a critical requirement at future technologies. Technology constraints
of wire-delay and power consumption, and limits on deep pipelining, have impelled a shift
to distributed architectures that rely on modularity in design, and on-chip interconnection
networks for communication, and place a greater burden on software forexploiting concur-
rency from the application to achieve high performance on the distributed substrate [1]. The
focus of this dissertation is on architectural techniques for improving the hard and soft error
viii
reliability of future technology-scalable distributed architectures. We make the key obser-
vation that these underlying principles of distributed architectures have important synergies
that can be exploited to improve the hard and soft error reliability of microprocessors at low
overhead.
Using a detailed end-to-end model for chip yield, we demonstrate that with just
redundant rows and columns in memory arrays and caches the yield of chipmult rocessors
drops substantially from 85% at 250nm to 60% at 50nm. We exploit the three principles
of modern and future distributed architectures: the abundant microarchitectural redundancy
provided by modular design, the natural redundancy in communication pathsrovided by
multi-hop, routed, on-chip networks, and the availability of greater software assistance; for
efficiently managing the redundancy to improve yield at low performance overhead. Using
just modular redundancy at the intra- and inter-processor granularity,we improve the yield
of chip multiprocessors to 99.6% at 50nm, with a maximum reduction in performance in
any chip of less than 20%. Further, we extend this technique to take advantage of the block-
atomic, and static-placement-dynamic-issue execution model in the TRIPS architecture to
efficiently manage the redundancy provided by modular design and on-chip networks. Our
evaluation of this compiler-assisted yield enhancement technique in the TRIPSarchitecture
shows significant yield improvement with less than 4% impact on performance.
This dissertation also quantitatively demonstrates through detailed modeling that
the raw soft error rate, especially that of combinational logic, will increase substantially at
future technologies. This emphasizes the need for innovative solutions that extend soft er-
ror protection to latches, and combinational logic, while appropriately balancing the power
consumption, area, and complexity overhead. We propose a new class ofbetter-than-worst-
case soft error reliability techniques called AVF throttling, that trade concurrency for reduc-
ing the amount of processor state vulnerable to soft errors. Since futurarchitectures must
increasingly rely on exploiting concurrency for achieving high performance, they aggres-
sively bring future program state into the processor and mine them for available parallelism,
ix
thus increasing the amount of vulnerable state. AVF throttling is based on the key observa-
tion that while exploiting concurrency on the critical path can significantly improve perfor-
mance, the majority of the program has abundantslackand can be deferred to substantially
reduce the amount of vulnerable state with negligible effect on the executiontime. Our
evaluation in the TRIPS architecture shows that around 90% of the vulnerab e state is due
to slack. We design a hybrid AVF throttling technique that uses the compiler to estimate
slack and the hardware to dynamically exploit it. Using the compiler for static slack esti-
mation considerably reduces the complexity of the technique. Further, it takes advantage
of the TRIPS execution model and on-chip networks to exploit slack more efficiently, and
significantly improves reliability by 25-42% for a set of SPEC and EEMBC benchmarks.
We also present a detailed comparison of AVF throttling with prior approaches including
redundant execution, and selective redundant execution. Based onthe comparison, we ar-
gue that while AVF throttling may provide a smaller absolute reliability improvement, it
significantly reduces the power consumption and complexity overhead, making the three
techniques appropriate in systems with different reliability requirements.
Overall, this dissertation establishes that distributed architectures provide agood
foundation for building a reliable system from unreliable components, and our res lts set a
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The bulk of the performance improvement in microprocessors has come froaggressive
scaling of devices coupled with innovations in architecture. Smaller feature sizes lead to
faster transistors and permit a greater number of transistors in a given chip area. During
the last sixteen years, feature sizes have scaled from 1000nm to 65nm, and the amount of
logic per pipeline stage has decreased from 84 to 12 FO4 contributing to a 60-fold increase
in clock frequency and performance improvement in the Intel family of processors. Ar-
chitects have taken advantage of the decreasing feature sizes to increase on-chip transistor
count from about 1 million at 1000nm to approximately 300 million at 65nm. Succes-
sive processor designs have used the larger number of transistors to enable greater on-chip
computation and storage capacity for higher performance. To maintain a competitive edge,
semiconductor manufacturers have thus constantly used processes thatare still immature
and have undergone tremendous changes over time, and forecasts project continued geom-
etry shrinks to at least 22nm within the next decade [3].
However, shrinking lithography, new materials and process technologies, stricter
design tolerances, constant or increasing die sizes, and higher levels of on-chip integration
make integrated circuits more susceptible to manufacturing defects [4]. Further, relentless
scaling, and rising power and thermal densities are expected to significantlyaffect processor
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lifetimes [5]. Finally, smaller feature sizes and higher levels of on-chip integra ion are also
expected to increase the rate of soft errors, which are errors in process r execution due
to external radiation or noise rather than design or manufacturing defects. Together these
factors increase both the vulnerability of individual transistors, and the total number of
transistors that can have errors. Based on these projections, the International Roadmap
for Semiconductors has outlined processor hard and soft error reliability s key emerging
technology challenges that must be solved effectively at multiple levels of thedesign [4].
1.1 Approaches to Achieving Reliability
Achieving system reliability requires effort at all levels of the design. Whiletechniques at
the device and circuit level have finer control over the susceptibility of individual circuits
to errors, architectural techniques may have lower overhead since theyare amortized over a
larger amount of state, and hence can also exploit the fact that not all errors affect the final
program outcome. Further, reliability cannot be based only on one-time factory testing at
future technologies, and dedicated mechanisms that operate during the lifetimeof the chip
will be required [6]. Heimerdinger et al. proposed a conceptual framework for system
reliability [7], and divided the approaches for improving reliability into four categories:
fault avoidance, fault removal, fault tolerance, and fault evasion. The next few paragraphs
explain each of these categories. We discuss techniques from each of the categories, some
that are already used in modern designs, and some that have been proposed in research.
Fault Avoidance and Removal: Fault avoidance refers to techniques that are used at
design time to reduce the system’s baseline susceptibility to faults. Design rule indced
systematic yield losses can be avoided by filling otherwise unused tracks in thelayout with
metal to establish a regular pattern and enable better equipment calibration durng man-
ufacturing [6]. Most modern chip designs use silicon-on-insulator (SOI) technology that
provides many advantages including significantly reduced susceptibility to soft err rs due
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to the smaller volume for charge collection [8, 9]. Judicious gate sizing and capacit nce
insertion at the layout and CAD level can improve the tolerance to soft errors with neg-
ligible cost in performance [10, 11]. Burn-in is a fault removal techniquethat weeds out
defective chips after manufacturing time, so that chips actually used in systems have a very
low failure rate [12, 13]. Chips also typically include sign for test(DFT) structures such
as scan-chains to aid in fault removal.
Fault Tolerance: Fault tolerance refers to techniques that maintain the the availability of
the system, perhaps at a degraded level, in the presence of a fault. White et al. defined four
necessary and sufficient conditions that a technique must meet in order toprovide a system
with fault tolerance [14]:
• Redundancy: In general, there are three types of redundancy - spatial, information,
and temporal redundancy. In spatial redundancy, duplicate units are used to either
verify original execution, or replace defective units to improve system reliability.
Information redundancy uses dedicated hardware to generate extra code bits that can
be used to check the integrity of the data. Depending on the sophistication of the
code, information redundancy can be used both for error detection andcorrection.
Unlike spatial and information redundancy, temporal redundancy verifies ex cution
by performing it multiple times on the same hardware, and hence cannot toleratea
permanent defect in the unit.
Therefore, only spatial and information redundancy are relevant in thecont xt of hard
errors in which a particular device becomes permanently defective. For instance,
redundant rows and columns are typically included with memory arrays to takethe
place of defective ones, with modest extra logic in the address decoder toperform this
reconfiguration. Similarly, information redundancy in the form of ECC and parity
are commonly used to handle bit defects within a single row [15]. Today’s systems
typically provide fail-in-place capabilities at the system level by including hotspares
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for power supplies, processor chips, memory modules, and disks [16].
Spatial, temporal, and information redundancy are all applicable to soft errrs since
they are transient in nature, and don’t have any permanent effect onthe device func-
tion. Several architectural techniques for redundant execution havebeen proposed in
research taking advantage of these three types of redundancy [17–19]. Redundancy
can also be applied at the circuit or device level in the form of radiation-hardening,
but can incur up to 100% overhead [20]. On the other hand, architectural techniques
such as ECC and redundant execution typically have fewer overheadsof 13% and
30% respectively [19,21].
• Fault detection and annunciation: A key component of fault tolerance is to de-
tect the fault and communicate the defective configuration to the rest of the syst m.
External testers or built-in-self-test (BIST) hardware can be used to detect and com-
municate information regarding hard errors to hardware or firmware to perf rm fault
reconfiguration [22–24]. Structures which use ECC or parity performerror detection
by checking the integrity of the data bits using the code bits on every access [15]. The
advantage of error correcting codes is that they can detect both hard and soft errors.
Finally, redundant execution has been used for fault detection in systemsthat require
very high reliability [18,25].
• Fault isolation: Fault isolation ensures that a detected fault is contained and not
allowed to propagate to the rest of the system. For hard errors, this is typicallyim-
plemented using BIST controllers which detect errors in a specific module. For soft
errors, mainstream server processors use many techniques including bt ot limited
to machine check aborton double bit errors in SEC-DED ECC protected state, or
single bit errors in parity protected state before the bad data is consumed, and ata
poisoning of cache lines that store data with double-bit ECC errors from the sys-
tem bus [15]. Data poisoning helps to only terminate processes that consumethe
erroneous data, while keeping the rest of the system functioning. Aggarwal et al.
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propose important changes that can be made to commodity multi-core architectures,
with modest additions in hardware, to significantly improve fault isolation and in-
crease their availability [26].
• On-line repair: Fault recovery or repair is the final step in achieving fault toler-
ance once the fault has been detected and isolated. There are many techniqu s used
in systems today for fault recovery. Commonly used SEC-DED ECC is capable of
both detecting and correcting single bit hard and soft errors. As describ d earlier,
the reconfiguration logic in address decoders enable the use of redundant rows and
columns in memory arrays. Many high end systems also support disabling an entire
memory module or cache if they are affected by unrecoverable errors in the mod-
ule [15,27]. Further, high end IBM servers also use a technique calleddynamic pro-
cessor sparing to transparently replace a defective processor with a fully functional
spare processor [28]. Such fault recovery techniques typically alsorequire periodic
checkpointing of processor state, so that execution can be restarted from a known,
error-free, checkpoint when a hard or soft error is detected [24,28–30].
Fault Evasion: Fault evasion is similar to fault avoidance, but is applied during the pro-
cessor lifetime. Fault evasion techniques observe the dynamic behavior ofthe system for
periods of high vulnerability to hard or soft errors, and trigger preventi reconfiguration
to reduce the probability of occurrence of an error. Dedicated hardware or software moni-
tors for symptoms that are either direct indicators of an error that has already occurred, or
indirect indicators that signal periods of high vulnerability to errors. In the context of hard
errors, fault evasion may involve preventively isolating the failure-prone resource; and for
soft errors the system may proactively transition to a more reliable executionmode. IBM
multiprocessor systems monitor processor failures using firmware routines,a d trigger re-
configuration if the number of errors exceed a particular threshold [28]. Srinivasan et al.
proposed dynamic reliability management (DRM) as a fault evasion techniqueto improve
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the lifetime reliability of a processor [31]. Wang et al. proposed symptom based soft er-
ror detection using symptoms such as exceptions, and mispredictions on high-confidence
branches to trigger checkpoint-based fault recovery [29]. Fault evasion can also be applied
at the circuit level by monitoring circuit wear out [32].
1.2 Shift toward Distributed Architectures
Several technology trends have become first order processor design constraints, and have
impelled a shift toward distributed architectures with smaller peak frequenciesand pipeline
depths.
Global wire delays: The delay of long wires used to access large storage structures, or
that communicate across multiple modules, or pipeline stages, and whose lengthsdo not
correspondingly scale with feature size, will increase relative to gate delays with each suc-
cessive technology generation [33, 34]. Therefore, the clock frequency of an architecture
that uses such global communication will be limited by these wire delays at futuretech-
nologies.
Power consumption: Without explicit power management techniques, aggressive tech-
nology scaling, higher frequencies, and greater on-chip integration willlead to increasing
dynamic and static power consumption every generation. Dynamic power consumption
will increase both because of the greater number of transistors switching every cycle, and
the larger capacitive load per transistor. Similar to dynamic power, static power consump-
tion increases with greater on-chip integration, but is also exponentially depen nt on the
operating temperature. Since operating temperature is itself a function of the total power
consumption, static power becomes part of this dangerous feedback loop.
Limits on deep pipelining: Hrishikesh et al. established that reducing the logic depth
of a pipeline stage below 6-8 FO4 gate delays, and thus increasing the overall pipeline
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depth, leads to negative returns in performance. They demonstrated thatthis effect is due
to both increased latency of the critical loops (branch mispredict loop, load-to-use loop,
and issue-wakeup loop), and the increased overheads of the latching window, clock skew,
and jitter that limit the useful work per clock cycle [35]. Architectures with deep pipelines
also traditionally employ complex all-to-all bypass networks between interactingpipeline
stages, and speculative control and data flow techniques to manage the increased latency of
the critical loops [36]. Hence, they exacerbate the issues of global wiredelays, and high
power consumption.
Based on these technology trends, we identify three main principles on whichdis-
tributed architectures must be built to achieve technology scalability with respect to per-
formance, power consumption, and design complexity. The three main principles are the
following which are developed in greater detail in Chapter 4:
Modular design: Employ resource partitioning at different granularities to eliminate ac-
cess to large centralized resources, and limit wire lengths and pipeline depths within each
module. Microarchitecture is composed by connecting the different modulesas necessary,
and high performance is achieved by exploiting concurrent execution acr ss the modules.
The emphasis on concurrency reduces the pressure on clock frequency and can decrease
power consumption.
On-chip interconnection networks: Utilize well-defined, scalable networks for com-
munication between the different modules. These networks will likely be point-t -point or
have restricted connectivity, and multi-hop with each hop taking a clock cycle. Th y must
also implement explicit communication protocols for managing the global latency between
modules, and techniques for concurrency such as pipelining to improve network through-
put.
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Cooperative hardware / software techniques: Distributed architectures must also rely
on greater cooperation between the hardware and the software to mine parall lism from the
application and convey it efficiently to the distributed hardware, which can the concur-
rently execute the parallel components. Using a hybrid approach instead of pure hardware
techniques to extract parallelism can potentially improve the power consumptionand per-
formance scalability of distributed architectures.
We observe that there is synergy between the principles of distributed architectures
and the conditions that a system must meet for being reliable. Modular design, on-chip
networks, and hybrid execution models are useful building blocks for improving hard and
soft error reliability. Further, these features can also be used to configure the tradeoff be-
tween reliability and the overhead in performance and power consumption to suit a range
of reliability requirements.
1.2.1 The TRIPS Architecture
The TRIPS architecture is a technology scalable distributed architecture that we use in this
dissertation for evaluating our mechanisms. While Chapter 4 describes the architecture in
detail, some salient features of the architecture are presented here:
Tile-based design: The TRIPS architecture uses a tile-based modular design. All major
processors structures including but not limited to the register file, the instruction window,
and on-chip caches are partitioned into multipleti s. Each type of tile is used multiple
times as necessary, and connected together to compose the overall microarchitecture.
On-chip networks: The tiles are inter-connected using point-to-point, multi-hop, nearest-
neighbor networks for improved scalability of communication.
Block-atomic execution model: Unlike conventional architectures that use an instruction-
atomic execution model, TRIPS treats a block of instructions together as a singleatomic unit
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in the pipeline to amortize the per-instruction bookkeeping and logic overheads. Within a
block the TRIPS ISA provides explicit support for direct communication betwe n depen-
dent instructions, eliminating the need for conventional associative look-up hardware for
instruction wake-up that does not scale to large windows at future technologies.
1.3 Thesis Statement
This dissertation proposes architectural techniques to improve the hard and soft error relia-
bility of modern and future technology-scalable distributed architectures. Thi dissertation
demonstrates with the help of detailed end-to-end models that both chip hard and soft error
rates increase substantially at future technologies, and emphasizes the need for innovative
solutions to maintain chip reliability at acceptable levels with low overhead. It idenifies key
synergies and extra demands placed by important new features of distributed architectures
including on-chip networks and the greater reliance on software, that must be considered
to achieve high reliability at low overhead. Specifically, the dissertation presents a detailed
evaluation and comparison of the reliability improvement, performance overhead, and other
design tradeoffs of hard and soft error reliability mechanisms in a distributed architecture.
1.4 Dissertation Contributions
This dissertation makes the following main contributions.
Impact of Technology Trends on Hard and Soft error rate: Based on detailed models
for defect distribution, yield, chip area, and available redundancy in different chip compo-
nents we project the random defect limited yield at future technologies in the cont xt of
both a uniprocessor and a chip multiprocessor. We show that with only redundant rows and
columns in memory arrays yield drops significantly from 85% at 250nm to 60% at 50nm.
We describe and validate an end-to-end model that enables us to compute thesoft error rates
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(SER) for existing and future microprocessor-style designs. The model captures the effects
of important masking phenomena, electrical masking and latching-window masking, which
inhibit soft errors in combinational logic. We quantify the SER due to high-energy neutrons
in SRAM cells, latches, and logic circuits for feature sizes from 600nm to 50nm and clock
periods from 16 to 6 fan-out-of-4 inverter delays. Our model predicts that the raw SER per
chip of combinational logic circuits will increase three orders of magnitude from 180nm
to 50nm, and at that point will be comparable to the SER per chip of latches, and will be
within two orders of magnitude of unprotected memory elements.
Synergy between Principles of Distributed Architectures and Reliability: We identify
three key underlying principles of distributed architectures that enable technology scala-
bility: a) modular design, b) on-chip interconnection networks, and c) cooperative hard-
ware/software techniques. Modular design and on-chip networks provide the foundation
for abundant spatial redundancy for computation and communication, thatcan be used to
improve reliability. Further, the greater reliance on software to expose concurrency in the
application, and the microarchitectural protocols for exploiting the concurrency in the dis-
tributed architecture together provide a natural foundation for managing the available redun-
dancy efficiently to improve reliability at low overhead. We present a detailedqualitative
analysis of the synergies between these three principles and the design requirements for
fault avoidance, fault tolerance, and fault evasion. Specifically, we identify the salient fea-
tures of the TRIPS architecture that can be exploited to improve reliability at lowoverhead,
tile-based modular design, multiple dedicated point-to-point on-chip networksf r different
processor functions, block-atomic, and static-placement-dynamic-issue (SPDI) execution
model, and direct instruction communication.
Yield Enhancement Techniques for Dynamic and Static Architectures: We propose
to use the inherent redundancy available in existing and future distributed architectures to
improve yield and enable graceful performance degradation in fail-in-place systems. We
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advocate pushing fail-in-place inside the boundaries of a single chip or processor, and show
that mechanisms already exist in dynamic architectures that can easily disablethe defective
components from being used during program execution. We introduce a new yield metric
calledperformance averaged yield (YPAV ) which accounts both for fully functional chips,
and those that exhibit some performance degradation due to defective components that have
been disabled. By exploiting microarchitectural redundancy we demonstrate thatYPAV can
be improved to as high as 99.6% at 50nm, with a maximum reduction in performancein
any chip of less than 20% on a suite of SPEC benchmarks, a substantial improve ent from
a yield of 60% achieved when only considering the defect-free parts.
While defects in dynamically scheduled architectures can be tolerated using mecha-
nisms that are transparent to software, static architectures create differnt opportunities and
challenges for reliability management. This dissertation proposes to expose the d fective
hardware configuration in a static architecture to the compiler, which can perform efficient
fault reconfiguration through intelligent fault-aware instruction scheduling. We conducted
our studies on the TRIPS architecture, and demonstrate that for two specific fault models,
the fault-aware scheduling heuristics we propose exploit the redundancy in the TRIPS hard-
ware to successfully reschedule the full set of SPEC and EEMBC benchmarks, with less
than 4% impact on performance. While we primarily focus on hard error reliability in the
context of static chip yield, we also discuss how these techniques can be applied to improve
processor lifetime reliability [31,37].
Soft Error Reliability Regimes: The soft error reliability requirement and the accept-
able overhead of reliability mechanisms vary depending on the application andm rket seg-
ment. Based on this understanding, we provide a systematic methodology for quantifying
the soft error reliability improvement needed every technology generation, and discuss the
performance-reliability tradeoffs of achieving it at different levels of the design including
device techniques, error correcting codes, and architectural mechanisms. We propose Re-
liability Performance Ratio (RPR), a new metric which a designer can use to measure the
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performance-reliability tradeoff, and achieve the reliability target with the least xcessive
protection and overhead.
Traditionally, systems have achieved high soft error reliability using sophisticated
error correcting codes (ECC), or redundant execution on duplicate processors or pipeline
stages, but have also incurred correspondingly high cost. Building on this new frame-
work, we present two better-than-worst-case soft error reliability regim s, one called AVF
Throttling, a class of microarchitectural fault evasion techniques that efficiently reduce the
amount of vulnerable processor state, and Selective Redundant Execution which relies on
redundant execution of specific sub-portions of the program to provide high reliability at
low overhead. We demonstrate that both AVF throttling, and selective redundant execu-
tion achieve reasonable reliability improvement, but with significantly better performance-
reliability tradeoff than redundant execution. We also demonstrate the effectiveness of RPR
by configuring the AVF throttling techniques to two different operating points; to a system
for which performance and reliability are equally important, and a second performance-
centric system.
1.5 Dissertation Organization
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the yield
modeling framework and projections at future technologies. Chapter 3 builds an end-to-end
model for estimating the soft error rate of combinational logic, and presentsthe oft error
rate projections for SRAM cells, latches, and combinational logic for different technologies
and pipeline depths. Chapter 4 describes the TRIPS architecture in detail, and presents a
detailed analysis of the synergies between the principles of distributed architectures and
reliability. In the rest of the chapters, we explore a subset of these synergies to build and
evaluate mechanisms for improving hard and soft error reliability.
Chapter 5 describes architectural techniques for improving yield that capi alize
on the inherent redundancy of distributed architectures, and some specific f atures of the
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TRIPS architecture. It also qualitatively discusses how these mechanisms can be adapted to
improve processor lifetime reliability. Chapter 6 builds a systematic framework for comput-
ing the chip-level soft error rate accounting for microarchitectural andarchitectural masking
factors, and extends this analysis to quantify the performance-reliability tradeoff of a relia-
bility technique. Building on this framework, it presents four soft error reliability regimes
with different performance-reliability tradeoffs. Chapter 7 evaluates specific techniques
from each of these regimes in the TRIPS architecture, and presents a comprison of their
performance-reliability tradeoff and other overheads. Finally, Chapter8 concludes with




Impact of Technology Trends on
Hard Error Rate
While technology trends suggest chips with clock frequencies in the multi-gigahertz range
containing over a billion transistors by the end of the decade, two substantialchallenges
must be addressed to enable practical deployment of such systems. First,shr nking lithog-
raphy, new materials and process technologies, lower design tolerances, constant or in-
creasing die sizes, and higher levels of on-chip integration make integratedcircuits more
susceptible to manufacturing defects, requiring substantial investments to maintain chip
yield at acceptable levels. The Semiconductor Industry Association has set target of 75%
(75 good chips for every 100 manufactured) for overall microprocessor yield [38]. While
manufacturing engineers have made substantial innovations in materials and cle rooms
to achieve this target at current technologies, realizing this target in future processes may
prove extremely costly. Modern fabrication facilities cost more than $10 billionto build
and equip, in part because of the need to reduce and eliminate contamination inthe factory
caused by workers, equipment, materials, and the air supply. Second, some manufactur-
ing defects are latent and manifest themselves only after the chips have been deployed and
run for some period of time. As larger commercial and scientific systems are constructed
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from hundreds or thousands of processors, the probability and frequency of latent failures
increase. Thus, hard errors can be divided into two main categories:
Extrinsic failures are caused by process or manufacturing defects, and have no
direct relation to the processor microarchitecture. For example, contaminants on silicon or
metal layers can lead to defective device operation, open, or short circuits. A technique
calledburn-in is used to test the manufactured devices at elevated operating temperatures
and voltages to accelerate the occurrence of extrinsic failures [12, 13]. Traditionally, chips
that pass burn-in will have very low extrinsic failure rate, but researchers ave recently
questioned whether a one-time testing methodology using burn-in will be viable at future
technologies [6,39].
Intrinsic failures are caused by processor wear out due to repeated use of the de-
vice [31]. For example, a wire narrowed by a manufacturing defect may function correctly
during manufacturing and burn-in testing, but may degrade and break under repeated use.
While the intrinsic failure rate is dependent on the process parameters and device mate-
rials, it is also very dependant on the operating temperature which is a function of the
processor microarchitecture. Once an intrinsic failure occurs, succeeding rrors will likely
occur at the same location probably with increasing frequency unless corrective action is
taken. Electromigration, and time dependent electric breakdown are examples of intrinsic
failures [31].
Chip yield is becoming a significant problem with the increasing demand for on-
chip resources that maintains die sizes relatively constant despite aggressive reductions in
feature size. In this Chapter, we study the impact of technology scaling on chip yield in
the context of both a uniprocessor and a chip multiprocessor (CMP) design. We acknowl-
edge that intrinsic failures are also a growing concern [5], and recognize that many of the
techniques developed in later chapters for reducing yield loss due to extrinsic failures can
be adapted and applied at runtime to tolerate intrinsic failures and improve lifetime reliabil-
ity [31].
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The remainder of this Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 providesback-
ground on the different kinds of yield loss. Section 2.2 describes the details of our yield,
and area models, and Section 2.3 presents the projected yield at future technologies for dif-
ferent defect characteristics. Section 2.4 summarizes our findings and discusses possible
ways to improve yield in future distributed architectures.
2.1 Background
Understanding yield loss is a critical activity in semiconductor device manufacturing. The
overall yield is influenced by many factors, including the maturity of the fabriction process,
the ability of a particular design to tolerate defects, and the ability to identify usable p rts
from unusable ones.
2.1.1 Sources of Yield Loss
Yield loss can befunctional, that occurs when a device fails to meet the intended function-
ality from a logical point of view. Even a single functional defect in the critical ircuitry
of a chip can cause the entire chip to be considered bad. Alternatively, yield loss can be
parametric, which occurs when otherwise functional devices fail to fall within the allowed
range of acceptable electrical characteristics. Although the specifications typically allow
for some margin in the acceptable electrical characteristics to account for normal process
variation, any devices that fall outside of this proven range are considered unusable. Both
types of yield loss can be caused by eithersystematicdefects orandomdefects. Systematic
defects result from problems in the manufacturing process such as contamina ion of mate-
rials or imprecise calibration of the equipment. Random defects, on the other hand, are the
result of inevitable particle impurities in the air and are much more difficult to overc me.
Figure 2.1 classifies yield loss into its different components.
Yield loss over time can be divided into an initial phase of technology deploy-
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Figure 2.1: Yield loss components.
dominated by random defects [38]. Systematic defects can typically be overcom as yield
learning occurs and the technology matures. Modern fabrication facilities inv t enormous
amounts of money into clean rooms to minimize particle density and size, but the ulti-
mate yield is still limited by these random defects. Figure 2.2 illustrates the two phases
of yield loss. Future technology advances are expected to involve continued shrinking of
feature sizes, and the introduction of new process steps and materials increasi g the yield
sensitivity to design features, introducing new sources of systematic defets, and requiring
a feature-based methodology to quantify yield loss [40]. As a result, manufacturers must
either invest in more aggressive process control mechanisms and decreas th defect sen-
sitivity of the designs, or accept elongated yield learning curves and lower final yields at
future technologies. In general, as technology advances, the complexityand expense of
yield management increases dramatically.
2.1.2 Design for Yield
The ground rules define the basic allowable structures in a particular technology. There
are several ways in which they can be modified to incorporate additionaldesign for yield































Figure 2.2: Yield VS time curve of a typical product.
circuit level, guidelines that discourage the use of tall stacked transistor structures and noise
sensitive structures can help reduce parametric yield losses. In layout, filling otherwise un-
used tracks with metal to establish a regular pattern can enable better equipment calibration
during manufacturing. Further, the use of redundant vias and fingeredtransistors form
some degree of low-level defect tolerance in the design. For high volume manufacturing,
feedback from yield analysis and iteration of the design to address these detractors is an
important aspect of yield management. In designs with a high degree of regularity, such
as DRAMs and SRAMs, it is common to make use of explicit redundancy to help improve
yield. By including a small number of redundant rows and columns in the structure, along
with steering logic in the decoders, the yield losses that could result from random defects
in the main array can be minimized. A good overview of the different defect tolerance
techniques used in VLSI circuits is provided in [41].
2.2 Yield Modeling
Our methodology for calculating overall chip yield integrates a basic yield model, and a
microprocessor area model, with the redundancy model of the chip components. Thebasic
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yield model is a probability distribution that calculates the random yield of a given ara of
silicon. The area of the chip components themselves are estimated using am croprocessor
areamodel. Theyield with redundancymodel breaks a component into its redundant and
non-redundant pieces before computing the component yield. The remainder of this section
describes each of these models in greater detail.
2.2.1 Random Defect Limited Yield Model
Yield loss is a function of the size, material, location and the process step in which a defect is
introduced. The Poisson and the Negative Binomial models are among the mostcommonly
employed in the literature to relate the defect parameters to the resultant yield [41,42]. The
Poisson model assumes that the defects are completely independent. On the other hand,
the Negative Binomial model uses aclustering factorto describe the degree of clustering
of defects. It requires a specification of the microarchitectural granularity below which
clustering of defects must be modeled, and above which defect occurren es can be assumed
to be completely independent of one another.
In this study, we have adopted the Poisson Yield model for modeling the random
yield component, because it allows us to simplify the mathematical treatment and focus
more on the interaction between the redundancy models and the resulting yield trends.
Since in reality the defects are not completely independent of one another,there is some
error in the absolute values of yield that we predict in the study, though the magnitude of
the error is not significant enough to undermine the usefulness of our res lts. The Poisson




whereD0 is the defect density measured in defects percm2, A represents the area
of the component incm2, andKR is the kill ratio or the fraction of the total component
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The kill ratio models the interaction between the defect size and the layout feat re
size, and increases as the ratio of defect size to the feature size increases. The Poisson Yield
model equation exhibits an exponential dependence of die yield on component area, defect
density, and the kill ratio. Hence yield can be improved by either reducing thechip area
or by reducing the defect density, and yield tends to get worse with smaller feature sizes
because the kill ratio increases. The ITRS has set a target of 83% for the random-defect
limited yield of microprocessors [38]. We obtain aYBASE of 85.4% at 250nm using the
defect density provided by the ITRS, for a normal defect to feature size ratio, and a chip
area of320mm2, thus validating our input parameters to the Poisson Yield model.
2.2.2 Chip Area Model
The baseline uniprocessor architecture we use is modeled on the Alpha 21264 [43]. The
only modification we make is to add an on-chip L2 cache with an associated shrink in the
feature size. Figure 2.3 illustrates the uniprocessor model with the L2 cacheoupled to the
processor core. Estimation of individual component yield requires detailed rea models of
the processing cores and caches. To model the area of memory structures we used CACTI
3.0 [44], which accounts for the capacity, line size, associativity, numberof ports and the
technology generation, and returns the area and the area efficiency1 of the structure. We
configured CACTI 3.0 to derive area estimates of L1 and L2 caches, TLBs, register files, and
all on-chip queues. To model the area of functional units we used an empirically derived,
technology-independent area model [45]. We used a method of simple manual l youts to
1 The area efficiency of a memory structure can be defined as the ratio of the area of the memory










Figure 2.3: Uniprocessor Model: Baseline model of the uniprocessor. Pr cessor core simi-
lar to the Alpha 21264.
estimate the area of random control logic components including the select, rename and
instruction wakeup logic, based on the logic level block diagrams that are avilable in the
literature [46]. To estimate the area of miscellaneous blocks such as I/O padsand clock
distribution trees, we developed an empirical model based on our analysis of the Alpha
21264 floorplan [43].
The area model is designed to calculate the area of a processor hierarchically from
the area of its individual components and uses the technology independent unit lambda
for expressing the area. This design makes it easy to scale the model to different pro-
cessor architectures and technology generations. We validated our area model against the
Alpha 21264 microprocessor whose detailed floorplan statistics are available in [43]. The
16.7x18.8mm2 Alpha 21264 die was designed for a 350nm process and has15.2 million
transistors [47]. There is no on-chip L2 cache and both the L1 caches are 64KB. Alpha
21264 area from the floorplan is314mm2, and the estimated area using the area model is
302mm2, an error of 3.8%. The source of this difference comes from unmodeledcompo-
nents of the chip that are not obvious from the die photos and floor plans.We believe that
the areas of these components are so small that statistically their yield will be near perfect.
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Structure Percentage of total area
L2 cache 49.0%
L1 D cache 12.7%
L1 I cache 5.5%
Integer functional units 6.3%
Floating point functional units 6.7%
On-chip storage structures 11.1%
(except caches)
Misc. components 6.0%
(BIU, PLL,I/O pads etc.)
Random control logic 2.7%
Total Area at 250nm 325mm2
Table 2.1: Uniprocessor Area Model: Percentage contributions of the different microarchi-
tectural structures to the total area.
Using the area model, we calculated the area of the chip in Figure 2.3 to be325mm2 at
250nm. Table 2.1 shows the area of the processor model, and its distribution among its
most significant components.
2.2.3 Overall Chip Yield Model
To compute the yield of a component requires breaking it into its redundant and non-
redundant pieces. For example, redundant rows and columns in memory structures provide
coverage over defects that occur in the area occupied by the data cells,but a defect in the
decode logic would still be fatal. This ability to distinguish between the regions included
in the redundancy model and those that are still vulnerable to defects is fundamental to
calculating the component yield.
In the current configuration, the chip shown in Figure 2.3 only supports Array Re-
dundancy (AR) in the set associative L1 and L2 caches, and does not have any otherpro-
tection against hard errors. When defects are detected in rows or columns of bit cells in
the main body of the array, theAR mechanisms can be configured to effectively steer the
decode towards the redundant entry rather than towards the bad row orcolumn. This tech-
nique is already commonly used in many types of RAM chips as well as in the embedded
RAM structures found in more general purpose chips such as microprocess rs. From a
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yield perspective,AR is attractive because a relatively small investment in area can offer
excellent defect tolerance for the entire structure. In many cases, this can drive the yield
loss due to these structures to very low levels with no loss in performance. Consistent with
accepted design practice [48], the redundant rows and columns are about 2.5% of the base
cache capacity.
Calculating Yield of caches withAR
Since defects in the Poisson Yield model are considered to be completely independent, the
yield of the caches that have partial redundancy can be described by the equation:
Y = YNR × YR (2.3)
whereYNR represents the yield for the area of the cache that has no redundancy,
andYR is the yield of the cache array that is covered byAR. We use the efficiency metric
for the SRAM array reported by CACTI 3.0 to evaluate the fraction of areadevoted to the
peripheral logic, the data, and tag arrays. The chip area model, and the poisson yield model
can be directly used to compute the yield of the area without redundancy. The yield for the
data and tag arrays, covered by theAR model are computed using a modified version of the
Poisson model that accounts for the spare rows, and is described below.
The redundant rows in a cache are used only in the face of defects, and do ot
provide extra performance. The total number of rows in a cache is the sumof its base
number of rows and the number of spare rows. In the Array Redundancy model, the cache
is considered functional as long as it maintains its baseline capacity. Cache yield is then
simply the probability that it has at least its baseline number of rows working out of the
total number of rows including the spares. A particular cache configuration is specified
by the number of functional rows, and can be achieved in multiple ways depen ing on
exactly which of its rows are functional. The number of possibilities can be calculated
using thecombinations(Cnr ) operator. The overall cache yield is therefore the sum of
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the probabilities associated with all the configurations in which it has at least the baseline
number of functional rows, out of the total number of rows including spares. TheYR from










whereCnr is thecombinationsoperator,minr is the minimum subset of rows re-
quired for correct functionality,br represents the base number of rows in the cache, and
sr is the number of spare rows. The probability of a entry being functional orinvalid is
computed using the Poisson Yield model. For caches withAR, minr is equal tobr, and
the value ofsr is dependent on the cache capacity.
2.3 Yield Projection
This section presents our yield projection at future technologies and chip microarchitectures
as a function of the defect characteristics. These results assume that thedefect densities
will remain constant at their value at 250nm with substantial investments in process control
mechanisms. We begin by describing the two different chip topologies that weinvestigated,
and then present the projected yield for both chip topologies.
2.3.1 Chip Topologies
Chip microarchitectures at future technologies have substantial flexibility in using the larger
number of transistors that can fit in a given chip area. If the desired functionality and perfor-
mance remain fairly constant with time, successive designs require few additional features
in the processor architecture. In this study, we use the same uniprocessor architecture shown
in Figure 2.3 across successive technology generations. As shown in Figure 2.4a, the area
of the chip in the constant-architecture scheme decreases rapidly with decreasing feature

















b) Constant−area chip multiprocessor scaling
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Figure 2.4: Chip topologies: a) Constant-architecture model has decreasing chip area with
reducing feature size, b) Constant-area model uses a chip multiprocessor d ign method-
ology with greater number of cores at smaller feature sizes occupying relatively constant
area
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However, with successive microprocessor generations, the dominant trend in gen-
eral purpose processor design has been to add microarchitectural features that enhance the
processor’s functionality and consume the extra silicon area. While this appro ch main-
tains a constant chip area, technology constraints and limits on available instruction level
parallelism will lead to diminishing returns in performance if we naively scale theunipro-
cessor model across technologies. These technology scaling trends and considerations of
multi-threaded performance have influenced many modern and emerging architectures to
include multiple processors within a single chip to use the chip area more efficiently. While
the design and configuration of each processor can change with time, in thisstudy we use
the uniprocessor shown in Figure 2.3 as the building block without loss of generality. Fig-
ure 2.4b illustrates the chip multiprocessor (CMP) model used in this study. Thenumber of
processors that can be accommodated per chip increases from 1 at 250nm to 24 at 50nm,
given that the fraction of chip area consumed by L2 caches is kept approximately constant
between 51-55% across all technologies. Table 2.2 lists all the CMP configurations we
consider.
Technology 250nm 180nm 130nm 100nm 70nm 50nm
Processors 1 2 4 6 12 24
(L2cache Area)/(Chip Area) 51.23% 53.42% 52.47% 55.15% 52.60% 55.15%
Table 2.2: Multiprocessor configurations: Increasing number of processor cores with de-
creasing feature size. Since each core has a private L2 cache, it occupies a relatively con-
stant fraction of the total chip area across technologies
2.3.2 Results
Since mainstream processors already employ redundant rows and columns in caches [16],
we compute thebaseline yield(YBASE) as the yield of a processor withAR in the L1
and L2 caches. Figure 2.5 plotsYBASE of the chip multiprocessor (CMP) assuming that
the defect characteristics are kept constant at their value at 250nm. The YBASE for the


























constant-area normal defect 
constant-arch normal defect 
Figure 2.5: Impact of technology scaling and processor model on chip yield
characteristics are assumed to be constant, the kill ratio, which is inversely poportional to
feature size, increases linearly with decreasing feature size and contributes to the substantial
loss in yield. On the other hand,YBASE for a uniprocessor with constant architecture
increases from 85% at 250nm to 93% at 50nm. This increase in yield is because the gain
from the rapidly decreasing chip area outweighs the increased susceptibility to yield loss
due to the higher kill ratio.
Figure 2.6 shows how defect densities must scale with technology to achievet e tar-
get 83% yield. While aggressive reductions in defect densities are required in the constant-
area CMP model, larger defect densities can be tolerated at future technologies in the
constant-architecture uniprocessor model. The reasons for this trend ar logically the same





































constant-area normal defect 
constant-arch normal defect 
Figure 2.6: Defect densities required to achieve 83% ITRS target for random-defect limited
yield
ers must either invest in more aggressive mechanisms to decrease the defect sensitivity in
the designs or accept lower final yields at future technologies.
2.4 Summary
Section 2.3 showed that chip yield drastically reduces from 85% at 250nm to60% at 50nm,
demonstrating that just having array redundancy in the caches will be insufficient at future
technologies. Traditionally, to prevent lower yields as we move to newer process technolo-
gies fabrication plants put substantial effort into the reduction of baselinedefect densities
and prevention of defect excursions. As we move to smaller device dimensions and larger
number of devices per chip, it is questionable whether a methodology basedon d fect avoid-
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ance or precise defect detection would scale well enough to provide us thmaximum yield
we can hope to achieve at that technology generation.
DRAM and on-chip storage structures such as caches have long taken advant ge of
their regular structure by supplying redundant rows and columns which could be switched
over to take the place of bad cells to increase the chip yield. Many structuresin mod-
ern chip design, beyond just DRAM and SRAM, already contain some degree of regular-
ity. Motivated by technology trends such as wire delays, limits on deep pipelining, a d
power consumption, several researchers have proposed architectures which employ exten-
sive partitioning, regularity, and adaptivity in all major microarchitectural comp nents [34].
Multi-banked caches and register files have been proposed and implemented in current day
processors to achieve higher bandwidth and lower access times. Recentwork in design-
ing large on-chip L2 caches makes use of a large number of banks connected by a 2D
mesh network and simple routers/switches [49]. Proposals for future wire-delay scalable
microprocessor architectures like the Grid Processor Architecture use aregular array of
functional units connected by a light-weight operand network to achieve high parallelism
and low operand latencies [50]. Research in power-aware microarchitectures have pro-
posed fine grained adaptivity in the sizes of on-chip structures and execution resources to
save dynamic power. Chip multiprocessor architectures are becoming popular providing
opportunities for hierarchical redundancy within the chip.
Based on these architectural trends, we advocate pushing fail-in-placestrat gies
inside the boundaries of a single chip or processor, by exploiting the microarchitectural
redundancy available in modern and future designs. In Chapter 4, we willdiscuss the
salient features of future distributed architectures that provide the foundation for building
mechanisms for hard error reliability. Building on these features, we will discuss both
hardware and software based hard error reliability enhancement techniques in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 3
Impact of Technology Trends on Soft
Error Rate
Two important drivers of microprocessor performance have been scali g of device feature
sizes, and increasing pipeline depths. In this chapter, we explore how these trends affect the
susceptibility of microprocessors to soft errors. Device scaling is the reduction in feature
size and voltage levels of the transistors, which improves performance because smaller
devices require less current to turn on or off, and thus can be operated at higher frequencies.
Pipelining is a microarchitectural technique of dividing instruction processing into stages
which can operate concurrently on different instructions. Pipelining improves performance
by increasing instruction level parallelism (ILP). Five to eight stage pipelines are quite
common, and modern processor designs use between 12-20 pipeline stages [36, 51]. Such
designs are commonly referred to assuperpipelineddesigns.
Our study focuses onsoft errors, which are also called transient faults or single-
event upsets (SEUs). These are errors in processor execution thatare due to electrical noise
or external radiation rather than design or manufacturing defects. Transient faults can arise
from multiple sources: external radiation, capacitive coupling, leakage,power supply noise,
and temporal circuit variations. In particular, we study soft errors caused by high-energy
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neutrons resulting from cosmic rays colliding with particles in the atmosphere. Th ex-
istence of cosmic ray radiation has been known for over 50 years, and the capacity for
this radiation to create transient faults in semiconductor circuits has been studied since the
early 1980s. As a result, most modern microprocessors already incorporate mechanisms
for detecting soft errors. These mechanisms are typically focused on protecting memory
elements, particularly caches, using error-correcting codes (ECC), parity, and other tech-
niques. Two key reasons for this focus on memory elements are: 1) the techniques for
protecting memory elements are well understood and relatively inexpensivei terms of the
extra circuitry required, and 2) caches take up a large part, and in some cases a majority, of
the chip area in modern microprocessors.
Past research has shown that combinational logic is much less susceptible tosoft
errors than memory elements [52, 53]. Three phenomena provide combinational logic a
form of natural resistance to soft errors: 1) logical masking, 2) electrical masking, and 3)
latching-window masking. We develop models for electrical masking and latching-wi dow
masking to determine how these are affected by device scaling and superpipelining. Then
based on a composite model we estimate the effects of these technology trendson the soft
error rate (SER) of combinational logic. Finally, using an overall chip area model we com-
pare the SER/chip of combinational logic with the expected trends in SER of memory ele-
ments.
The primary contribution of this study is an analysis of the trends in SER for SRAM
cells, latches, and combinational logic. Our models predict that by the 50nm technology
generation, the raw soft error rate of combinational logic will be comparable to that of
latches, and will be within two orders of magnitude of unprotected memory elements. This
result is significant because current methods for protecting combinationallogic from soft
errors have significant costs in terms of chip area, performance, and/or power consumption
in comparison to protection mechanisms for memory elements.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 provides background on
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the nature of soft errors, and a method for estimating the soft error rate of m mory circuits.
Section 3.2 introduces our definition of soft errors in combinational logic, and examines the
phenomena that can mask soft errors in combinational logic. Section 3.3 describes in detail
our methodology for estimating the soft error rate in combinational logic. We present our
results in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 discusses the implications of our analysis andimulations.
Section 3.6 summarizes the related work, and Section 3.7 concludes the chapter with ideas
for improving the soft error reliability of future processors.
3.1 Background
3.1.1 Particles that Cause Soft Errors
Cosmic rays are particles that originate from outer space and enter the ear’s atmosphere.
These particles may collide with other particles in the atmosphere, which may in turnbe
accelerated toward earth. A measure of this form of radiation is the flux, orrate of flow,
expressed as the number of particles passing through a a given area per unit of time. The
final flux of particles that reaches a location on the earth depends on a number of factors,
including:
• Altitude: Higher altitudes see higher rates of particles. The flux at an altitude of
3100m (Leadville, CO) is approximately 13 times greater than at sea level.
• Geomagnetic region (GMR):This factor relates to the shielding from cosmic rays
that results from the magnetic field around the earth. This shielding effect isstrongest
around the equator and weakest at the poles. GMR is a measure of this shielding
effect, and is expressed in units of volts. Measurements of GMR have been performed
at various locations on the earth, and these measurements range from 1.0 GV near the
poles to as high as 17 GV at the equator.




















Figure 3.1: Particle flux: Energy distribution of neutron flux from cosmic rays, with energy
level on the x-axis and the flux on the y-axis. The most important aspect is that, particles of
lower energy occur far more frequently than particles of higher energy.
of active sun see up to a 30% lower rate of particles compared to periods ofquiet
sun. This is somewhat contrary to the common belief that an active sun increases
the flux of cosmic particles. In fact, the magnetic field around the earth strengthens
during periods of active sun, increasing the shielding effect and thus reducing cosmic
particle flux. Solar flares can temporarily generate increased particle rates, but the
increase in magnetic shielding during the active sun period outweighs these events.
In the early 1980s, IBM conducted a series of experiments to measure the particle
flux from cosmic rays [54]. The graph in Figure 3.1 presents their findings. This graph
shows the energy distribution of the neutron flux, where the energy levelis given on the
x-axis and the flux is shown on the y-axis. Only neutrons are shown in the graph since
they account for more than 97% of the cosmic particles to reach sea level [55]. The data
is normalized to a sea level location with a GMR of 1.2GV in 1985 (quiet sun period).
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The total flux of particles greater than 10MeV is 0.00565/cm2-s. For this study, the most
important aspect of these results is that particles of lower energy occur far more frequently
than particles of higher energy. In particular, a one order of magnitude difference in energy
can correspond to a two orders of magnitude larger flux for the lower energy particles. As
CMOS device sizes decrease, they can be affected by particles with lowerenergy levels,
potentially leading to a much higher rate of soft errors.
This chapter investigates the soft error rate of combinational logic causedby at-
mospheric neutrons with energies greater than 1 mega-electron-volt (MeV). This form of
radiation, the result of cosmic rays colliding with particles in the atmosphere, is known to
be a significant source of soft errors in memory elements. We do not consider atmospheric
neutrons with energy less than 1 MeV since we believe their much lower energi s are less
likely to result in soft errors in combinational logic. We also do not consideralpha particles,
since this form of radiation comes almost entirely from impurities in packaging material,
and thus can vary widely for processors within a particular technology generation. The con-
tribution to the overall soft error rate from each of these other radiation sources is additive,
and thus each component can be studied independently.
3.1.2 Soft Errors in Memory Circuits
High-energy neutrons that strike a sensitive region in a semiconductor device deposit a
dense track of electron-hole pairs as they pass through a p-n junction. Some of the deposited
charge will recombine to form a very short duration pulse of current atthe internal circuit
node that was struck by the particle. The magnitude of the collected charge depen s on the
particle type, physical properties of the device, and the circuit topology.When a particle
strikes a sensitive region of an SRAM cell, the charge that accumulates could be large
enough to flip the value stored in the cell, resulting in a soft error. The smallest charge that
results in a soft error is called thecritical charge(QCRIT ) of the SRAM cell [56]. The rate
at which soft errors occur is typically expressed in terms ofFailures In Time (FIT), which
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measures the number of failures per109 hours of operation. A number of studies on soft
errors in SRAMs have concluded that the SER for constant area SRAM arrays will increase
as device sizes decrease [57–59], though researchers differ on the rate of this increase.
A method for estimating SER in CMOS SRAM circuits was recently developed
by Hazucha & Svensson [60]. This model estimates SER due to atmospheric neutrons
(neutrons with energies> 1MeV) for a range of submicron feature sizes. It is based on a
verified empirical model for the 600nm technology, which is then scaled to other technology
generations. The basic form of this model is:








K is a constant independent of device technology with the value2.2∗
10−5,
F is the neutron flux with energy> 1 MeV, in particles/(cm2·s),
A is the area of the circuit sensitive to particle strikes, in cm2,
QCRIT is the critical charge, in femto Coulomb (fC), and
QS is the charge collection efficiency of the device, in fC
Two key parameters in this model are the critical charge (QCRIT ) of the SRAM cell,
and the charge collection efficiency (QS) of the circuit.QCRIT depends on characteristics
of the circuit, particularly the supply voltage and the effective capacitanceof the drain
nodes.QS is a measure of the magnitude of charge generated by a particle strike. These
two parameters are essentially independent, but both decrease with decreasing f ature size.
From Equation 3.1 we see that changes in the value ofQCRIT relative toQS will have
a very large impact on the resulting SER. The SER is also proportional to the area of the
sensitive region of the device, and therefore it decreases proportional o the square of the
device size. Hazucha & Svensson used this model to evaluate the effect of d vice scaling on
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the SER of memory circuits. They concluded that SER-per-chip of SRAM circuits should
increase at most linearly with decreasing feature size.
3.2 Soft Errors in Combinational Logic
A particle that strikes a p-n junction within a combinational logic circuit can alter thvalue
produced by the circuit. However, a transient change in the value of a logic circuit will not
affect the results of a computation unless it is captured in a memory circuit. Therefor , we
define a soft error in combinational logic as a transient error in the resultof a logic circuit
that is subsequently stored in a memory circuit of the processor.
A transient error in a logic circuit might not be captured in a memory circuit because
it could bemaskedby one of the following three phenomena:
Logical masking occurs when a particle strikes a portion of the combinational logic
that is blocked from affecting the output due to a subsequent gate whoseresult is
completely determined by its other input values.
Electrical masking occurs when the pulse resulting from a particle strike is attenu-
ated by subsequent logic gates due to the electrical properties of the gatesto th point
that it does not affect the result of the circuit.
Latching-window masking occurs when the pulse resulting from a particle strike
reaches a latch, but not at the clock transition where the latch captures its inpu value.
These masking effects have been found to result in a significantly lower rate of soft errors
in combinational logic compared to storage circuits in equivalent device technology [53].
However, these effects could diminish significantly as feature sizes decrease and the number
of stages in the processor pipeline increases. Electrical masking could bere uced by device










Figure 3.2: Simple model of a pipeline stage used as the primitive circuit for estimating
SER of combinational logic
on a pulse. Also, deeper processor pipelines allow higher clock rates, meaning the latches
in the processor will cycle more frequently, which may reduce latching-window masking.
The direct consequences of device scaling are that the supply voltage,threshold
voltages and the dimensions of the device decrease. These have the effects o reduced
ON currents in the transistors, decreased values of node capacitancesand a lower input to
output delay. Since the ON currents of the device are lower the transient current pulses
due to particle strikes are of comparable magnitude making the device less stable. Sinc
the transistors are now faster, an input pulse’s rise time, fall time, and width don’t egrade
significantly as the pulse propagates through the gates, increasing the chances of an error
pulse successfully propagating to the latch. So device scaling trends tend tomake the
transistors more susceptible to soft errors.
The datapath of modern processors can be extremely complicated in nature,typi-
cally composed of 64 parallel bit lines, and divided into 12-20 pipeline stage. We eval-
uate the effects of electrical and latching-window masking using the simple model for a
processor pipeline stage illustrated in Figure 3.2. This model is just a one-wide chain of
homogeneous gates terminating in a level-sensitive latch. For the results presented in this
chapter we use static 3-input NAND gates with a fan-out of 4.
The number of gates in the chain is determined by the degree of pipelining in the
microarchitecture, given as the number of fan-out-of-4 inverter (FO4)gates that can be
placed between two latches in a single pipeline stage. We use the FO4 metric because
it allows us to characterize pipeline depth in a way that is largely independentof device
scaling [33]. During the last sixteen years, technology has scaled from1000nm to 65nm
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Figure 3.3: Circuit diagram of a pipeline latch
and the amount of logic per pipeline stage has decreased from 84 to 12 FO4contributing to
a total of 60-fold increase in clock frequency in the Intel family of processor . For a given
degree of pipelining, the number of gates in the pipeline stage is the largest number that
does not exceed the total delay of the corresponding FO4 chain.
Figure 3.3 shows the circuit diagram of the latch we used in our simple pipeline
model. The forward inverter is about 6 times larger than the feedback inverter and the
transistors are all of minimum length. We use level sensitive latches in our pipeline model
because they occupy less area than edge triggered flip-flops and so are more suitable for
superpipelining. They also allow for time borrowing techniques and offer less load to the
clock distribution network thus reducing the clock skew in the chip.
We used 3-input NAND gates with a fan-out of 4 because they are a commongate
used in many logic designs and result in a conservative estimate of chip SER.The critical
charge of a circuit increases with the capacitance associated with it. For example, the output
node of a 3-input NAND gate has a much larger capacitance than an inverter with the same
drive strength and so has a greater critical charge. By the same reasoning, a NAND gate




In most modern microprocessors, combinational logic and memory elements areconstructed
from the same basic devices – NMOS and PMOS transistors. Therefore, we can use tech-
niques for estimating the SER in memory elements to assess soft errors in combinational
logic. We will also use these techniques directly to compute the SER in memory elements
for a range of device sizes, and compare the results to our estimates of SERfor combina-
tional logic.
Our methodology for estimating the soft error rate in combinational logic consid-
ers the effects of CMOS device scaling, and the microarchitectural technique of processor
pipelining. We determine the soft error rate using analytical models for eachst ge of the
pulse from its creation to the time it reaches the latch. Figure 3.4 shows the various stages
the pulse passes through and the corresponding model used to determine the eff ct on the
pulse at that stage. In the first stage, the charge generated by the particle st ike produces
a current pulse, which is then converted into a voltage pulse after travelingthrough a gate
in the logic chain. The electrical masking model simulates the degradation of the pulse as
it travels through the gates of the logic circuit. Finally, a model for the latching window
determines the probability that the pulse is successfully latched. The remainder of this sec-
tion describes each of these component models and how they are combined toobtain an
estimate for the SER of combinational logic.
3.3.1 Device Scaling Model
We constructed a set of Spice Level 3 technology models corresponding tothe echnology
generations from the Semiconductor Industry Association 1999 Technology R admap [38].
Values for drawn gate length (LDRAWN ), supply voltage (VDD), and oxide thickness (TOX)
are taken directly from the roadmap. With the exception of threshold voltage (VTH ), the
remaining parameters were obtained using a scaling methodology developed by McFar-































Figure 3.4: Process for determining the Soft Error Rate in a logic chain
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Technology Generation 600nm 350nm 250nm 180nm 130nm 100nm 70nm 50nm
LDRAWN (nm) 600 350 250 140 90 65 45 32
VDD (V) 5.0 3.3 2.5 1.8 1.5 1.2 0.9 0.6
TOX (nm) 11 7.6 4.0 2.5 1.9 1.5 1.2 0.8
VTH (V) 1.0 0.735 0.596 0.466 0.407 0.344 0.277 0.205
Table 3.1: Key characteristics of CMOS device models
scales better to technologies with very low supply voltages. In the McFarlandmodel,VTH
was set to0.40 × V 0.56DD + 0.2. The constant term of0.2 volts led to poor scaling for small
values ofVDD, so instead we use the formulaVTH = 0.30 × V 0.75DD . Table 3.1 presents the
key characteristics of our CMOS device models. The supply voltages in ourm del roughly
scale by 0.7-0.8X every generation, and track the published voltage values for the Intel
family of processors quite well. Modern processor designs however hamultiple versions
with different supply voltages, and often come with the capability to dynamically adjust
the supply voltage to be able to configure the power-performance tradeoff. We analyze one
supply voltage at each generation, while recognizing that the SER depends on the supply
voltage used.
3.3.2 Charge to Voltage Pulse Model
When a particle strikes a sensitive region of a circuit element it produces acurrent pulse with
a rapid rise time, but a more gradual fall time. The shape of the pulse can be approximated















Q refers to the amount of charge collected due to the particle strike. The parameter
T is the time constant, in units of nanoseconds, for the charge collection process and is a
property of the CMOS process used for the device. IfT is large, it takes more time for
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the charge to recombine. IfT is small, the charge recombines rapidly, generating a current
pulse with a short duration. The rapid rise of the current pulse is captured in the square root
function and the gradual fall of the current pulse is produced by the negativ exponential
dependence. Figure 3.5 illustrates the pulse waveform generated by this equation for the
100nm technology generation and a charge valueQ = 100 fC.
The time constantT scales approximately linearly with feature size in a natural log-
log scale [62]. We constructed a model forT for any CMOS technology, characterized by
the minimum gate lengthg (in µm), by fitting a straight line through the values ofT for
600nm, 350nm and 100nm from [60]. This model is given in Equations 3.3 and 3.4. The
curve fitting was done using Matlab and the correlation coefficients were high enough for
the errors to be insignificant.
NMOS:T = exp(0.97 × ln(g) + 5.5) (3.3)
PMOS:T = exp(0.81 × ln(g) + 5.2) (3.4)
whereg is specified inµm, and the resultingT value is in picoseconds.
The current pulse produced by a particle strike results in a voltage pulse at th
output node of the device. We use a Spice simulation to determine the rise time, falltime
and effective duration of this voltage pulse. The effective duration is theelapsed time the
pulse exceeds half the supply voltage. These three values are the final result of this stage
and become the input for the next phase, the electrical masking analytical mode .
3.3.3 Electrical Masking Model
Electrical masking is the composition of two electrical effects that reduce the strength of



















Q = 100 fC
T = 0.018 ns
Figure 3.5: A current pulse resulting from a particle strike at a device nod
the transistors cause the rise and fall time of the pulse to increase, reducingits effective
duration. For short duration pulses, pulse duration is further reducedbecause the gate may
start to turn off before the output reaches its full amplitude. As pulse duration decreases,
this second effect becomes greater, and thus these effects cascade from one gate to the next,
and can eventually degrade the pulse to the extent that it cannot affect the result latch.
We define therise timeof a pulse to be the time for the pulse to rise fromGND to
VDD. For pulses that do not actually rise all the way toVDD, we extend the rising edge and
measure rise time to the point where this edge crossesVDD. Fall time is defined similarly.
Using these definitions, rise time and fall time are best thought of as describing the slope
of the rising and falling edge. For the experiments reported in this chapter, we model a
pipeline stage as a chain of static, 3-input, fan-out-of-4 NAND gates. Oneoutput of each
gate feeds one input of the next gate in the chain, with the other inputs fixed at a logical 1.
In this model, each gate in the chain inverts the signal on its one non-fixed input, so a rising
pulse entering the gate becomes a falling pulse leaving the gate, and vice-versa.
We constructed a model for electrical masking based on the propagation delay of
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an electrical signal through a logic gate. Gate delay is determined using a composition of
two existing models. The Horowitz gate delay model [63] determines the normal gate delay
based on the rise or fall time of the input signal and the gate switching voltage. This normal
gate delay is then adjusted to account for short duration input signals using a model by
Bellido-Diazet al. [64].
Determining gate delay
In the Horowitz gate delay model, the delay of a gate is defined as the time betweenthe input
reaching the switching voltage of the gate and the output reaching the switching voltage of
the following gate. The switching voltage of a gate determines the point at whichthe output
of the gate is affected by the input(s) to the gate. We use a form of the Horowitz gate delay
model that allows the switching gate and the following gate to have different switching
voltages, as described in [65]. This model is given by the following equations f r a rising
and falling input:




























































tf is the output time constant (assuming a step input),
trise is the rise time of the input signal,
tfall is the fall time of the input signal,
VTH1 is the switching voltage of the switching gate,
VTH2 is the switching voltage of the following gate,
b is the fraction of the swing in which the input affects the output
(we usedb = 0.5 for rising inputs andb = 0.4 for falling inputs).
We calibrated the Horowitz gate delay model to our CMOS design parameters by
adjusting the gate switching voltage parameters to achieve close agreement between the
model outputs and corresponding Spice simulation results. The gate switchingvolta es are
determined using an iterative bisection method. This procedure adjusts the swi ching volt-
ages until the rise and fall times predicted by the model are within 15% of valuesobtained
from Spice simulations. In general, the values obtained from this procedure differ from the
actual gate switching voltages, which can be determined by measurements in Spice. Nev-
ertheless, calibration significantly improves the rise and fall time estimates of the mod l, s
we chose to treat switching voltages as “one degree of freedom” for the sake of improved
accuracy. Table 3.2 shows the switching voltages (normalized toVDD for each technology)
determined using this procedure for the NAND gate used in the experiments. To calculate
the delay for a rising edge, we setVTH1 to Vrise andVTH2 to Vfall; for a falling input,VTH1
is set toVfall andVTH2 to Vrise.
Technology Generation 600nm 350nm 250nm 180nm 130nm 100nm 70nm 50nm
Vrise/VDD 0.16 0.50 0.38 0.31 0.31 0.38 0.38 0.38
Vfall/VDD 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Table 3.2: Switching voltage of the gates for the rise and the falling transitions at different
process technologies
The pulse generated by a particle strike typically has a short duration. Thus, w en a





















Figure 3.6: The delay degradation effect
in response to the pulse before it disappears from the gate input. If the ouput has not fully
switched, the gate can respond to the new state of its inputs more quickly, and thus the gate
delay is reduced. This effect is know as thedelay degradation effect[64]. In this situation,
the value generated at the gate output begins switching in the opposite direction before
reaching the peak amplitude of the input, which results in an output signal with reduced
amplitude. We use a model by Bellido-Diazet al. to simulate this effect on an error pulse
as it passes through a logic gate.
Figure 3.6 illustrates the delay degradation effect. At timet0, the gate input crosses
the gate switching voltage,VTH , and the gate output starts to rise. At timet1 the gate output
crossesVDD/2, and thus has logically transitioned to the new output value. Then the gate
input begins rising and crosses back above the gate switching voltage at timet2, and as a
result, the gate output begins to fall before it could rise completely toVDD. Since the output
did not reach it’s full amplitude, it requires less time to fall back belowVDD/2, resulting
in a smaller than normal propagation delaytp. If the input had remained low until timet4,
the output would rise fully toVDD, and a subsequent input transition will result in a normal
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tp0 is the normal propagation delay with zero degradation effect, which we determin using
the Horowitz model. The rest of the equation captures the degradation effect. The time
between the output transition and the next input transition is (T -T0), andτ is a parameter
proportional to the time needed for the gate to fully switch,Tlimit.
Determining output pulse characteristics from gate delay
We approximate the input and output of the gate as piecewise-linear signals,a d use a
simple linear model to determine the rise and fall time of the gate output based on rise and
fall time of the input and the gate delay. Figure 3.7 illustrates the model for the fall time of
the gate output. In this figure, the rising edge of the pulse is passing througha gate, causing
the output to fall fromVDD to GND. Thus, the delay of a gate also determines the time
required for the output signal to rise(fall) to the switching voltage of the next gate. Using
a simple linear model, we can extend this rising(falling) edge toVDD(GND) to determine
the rise/fall time of the output pulse. Figure 3.7 illustrates this calculation. The rise time
for this rising edge istrise. When the input pulse crossesVTH1, the switching voltage of
the gate, the output begins to fall. The output reaches theVTH2, the switching voltage of
the following gate, after timedelayrise, the gate delay for the rising edge of the pulse. Thus
we can determine the base and height of trianglea b c. The fall time of the output pulse,


























Figure 3.7: Model to compute rise/fall time based on gate delay
We assume that the input to the gate is stable when the pulse arrives, and thusthere
is no delay degradation for the leading edge (which could be either a rising or falling edge).
However, when the pulse is short, the gate delay for trailing edge could be significantly
smaller than that of the leading edge, and this reduces the duration of the output p lse.
Thus, we determine the duration of the output pulse as
durationoutput = durationinput − (delayleading − delaytrailing) (3.7)
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3.3.4 Pulse Latching Model
Recall that our definition of a soft error in combinational logic requires anerror pulse to be
captured in a memory circuit. Therefore, in our model a soft error occurs when the error
pulse is stored into the level-sensitive latch at the end of a logic chain. We onlyc sider
a value to be stored in the latch if it is present and stable when the latch closes,since this
value is passed to the next pipeline stage.
When a voltage pulse reaches the input of a latch, we use a Spice simulation to
determine if it has sufficient amplitude and duration to be captured by the latch.The simu-
lation is done in two steps. First we determine the pulse start time, the shortest time be ween
the rising edge of the pulse and clock edge in which the pulse could be latched. T is is sim-
ilar to a setup time analysis for the latch, except that the input data waveform has the slope
of the pulse at the latch input. The second step is to determine the minimum duration pulse
(measured at the threshold voltage) that could be latched. For this step, weposition the
rising edge of the pulse at the point determined in the first step, and then vary the duration
until the minimum value is determined. We studied the nature of the pulse start time and
minimum duration using separate experiments and found that the pulse start time can b
modeled by a linear function of the rise time of the pulse, and the minimum duration can
be modeled by a linear function of the rise time and fall time. For example, the pulsestart
time (in ps) of our pipeline latch in our 600nm technology can be computed as follows:
start= 65.8 + 0.375 × trise
and the minimum duration (in ps) is given by
duration= 106 + 0.323 × trise + 0.448 × tfall
In our method for computing SER for combinational circuits, the start time and
minimum duration of an error pulse must be computed very frequently. Therefor , it is
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important that we determine these values using a simple model rather than with Spice sim-
ulations so that run times for the overall model are reasonable. The pulse start time and
minimum duration given by these models correlate very highly with the pulse starttime
and minimum duration determined from Spice simulations, and therefore allow us tore-
place an expensive simulation with a very inexpensive calculation without significant loss
in accuracy.
Given the rise and fall time of a pulse at the latch input, the simulation determines
the minimum duration (measured at the threshold voltage) required for the pulsto be
latched. If the duration of the pulse at the latch input exceeds this minimum duration, the
pulse has the potential to cause a soft error. This method determines if a particle-induced
pulse in an otherwise stable, correct input signal is strong enough to be latch d. It is also
possible that a particle-induced pulse could delay the correct input signal from arriving at
the latch input in time to be latched, thus causing an error. This type of error isreferred to
as adelay fault. Due to the complexity of modeling these faults, we have chosen to exclude
them from our study. Bernstein found that delay faults are negligible in current technologies
due to the common design practice of incorporating a 5%-10% safety margin intothe clock
cycle [66]. However, such faults could become much more common as clock frequency
increases and safety margins are squeezed to increase performance.
3.3.5 Latching-window Masking Model
A latch is only vulnerable to a soft error during a small window around its closing clock
edge. The size of thislatching windowis simply the minimum duration pulse that can be
latched, which depends on the pulse rise and fall time. A pulse that is present at the latch
input throughout the entire latching window will be latched and causes a soft err r. In our
model, any pulse with a duration smaller than the duration of the latching window cannot
cause a soft error. Figure 3.8 illustrates our model of latching window masking. Only a







Figure 3.8: Latching-window masking
arrives after the latching window has opened, terminates before the latching window closes,
or does not have sufficient duration to cover the whole window, we assume that the pulse
will be masked.
Let d represent the duration of the pulse on arrival at the latch input at timet. The
pulse arrival timet can occur at any point in the clock cycle with equal probability. Letw
represent the size of the latching window for this pulse, and letc r present the clock cycle
time. If a latching window for the latch starts after timet and ends before timet + d, the
pulse is present at the latch input throughout the entire latching window and results in a soft
error. Otherwise the pulse is masked and no soft error occurs.
We can determine the probability that the pulse causes a soft error by computing the
probability that a randomly placed interval of lengthd overlaps a fixed interval of lengthw
within an overall interval of lengthc. This probability is given by the following equation:










0 if d < w
d−w
c
if w ≤ d ≤ c + w
1 if d > c + w
(3.8)
Note that whend < w, the probability of a soft error is zero, but this is not an
effect of latching window masking, since the pulse does not have sufficient duration to be
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latched. On the other hand, when the pulse duration exceedsc+w, it is assured to overlap at
least one full latching window of sizew and hence has probability 1 of causing a soft error.
Note that a smaller pulse could partially overlap the latching windows in two consecutiv
clock cycles without fully containing either one. Since pulse arrival times ardistributed
uniformly at random over the clock cycle, the probability of an error for apulse with any
intermediate duration is a simple linear function between these two endpoints.
3.3.6 Estimating SER of Combinational Logic
We assume that the probability of concurrent particle strikes in a single logic cha n is negli-
gible, and thus the SER for the circuit is simply the sum of the SER’s for a particle s rike at
each gate in the logic chain. To compute the SER contribution for a given gate inth logic
chain, we simulate a particle strike to the drain of the gate using our charge to voltage pulse
model. Then we apply our electrical masking model to determine the characteristi s of the
voltage pulse when it reaches the latch input. We use the pulse-latching modelto determine
if the pulse that reaches the latch input has sufficient amplitude and durationto cause a soft
error. As in memory circuits, the smallest charge that can generate a pulse that r sults in a
soft error is the critical charge (QCRIT ) for the circuit. In memory circuits, soft errors are
essentially deterministic, in that no charge less thatQCRIT can cause a soft error, and every
charge ofQCRIT or larger results in a soft error with probability 1.0. In combinational
logic, we need to consider the probability of latching-window masking when computing
SER. This is done by considering a range of charge values. The lower bound of this range
is QCRIT , and the upper bound of the range isQCMAX , which is the smallest charge that
has probability of 1.0 of being latched according to our latching-window masking model,
or which has a probability within epsilon of all greater charge values. Charge values be-
tweenQCRIT andQCMAX have the potential to be masked by latching-window masking,
but charge values ofQCMAX or greater always result in a soft error.
To complete the calculation of SER for a given gate in the logic chain, we dividethe
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charge values betweenQCRIT andQCMAX into m equal-size intervals. We usedm = 20
for the results presented in this chapter; using separate experiments we validated that using
a higher granularity has only a marginal effect on the resulting SER estimates. We compute
the SER corresponding to each interval using the model of Hazucha & Svensson. All our
experiments use a value for the neutron flux ofF = 0.00565, corresponding to sea level in
New York City.
The charge collection efficiencyQS scales approximately linearly with feature size
in a natural log-log scale [62]. We constructed a model forQS for any CMOS technology,
characterized by the minimum gate length(in µm), by fitting a straight line through the
values ofQS for 600nm, 350nm and 100nm from [62]. This model is given in Equations3.9
and 3.10. The curve fitting was done using Matlab and the correlation coefficients were high
enough for the errors to be insignificant.
NMOS:QS = exp(0.77 × ln(g) + 4.3) (3.9)
PMOS:QS = exp(1.0 × ln(g) + 4.2) (3.10)
whereg is specified inµm, and the resultingQS value is in fC.
Since the Hazucha & Svensson model gives a cumulative SER value, we compute
the SER for an interval by subtracting the SER of the right endpoint of the interval from
that of the left. The SER for the interval is then weighted by the probability thata soft error
occurs as given by our latching-window masking model. The contribution to SER for the
gate is then the sum of the weighted SER’s for each interval plus the SER forQCMAX .
This calculation is summarized in Equation 3.11.

































































Figure 3.9: Computing SER using a range of charges with varying probabilityof latching.
where SER(Q) denotes the SER value for chargeQ obtained from Hazucha & Svensson’s
model,Li andRi are the left and right endpoints of intervali, andPrLi is the probability
that chargeLi causes a soft error (is not latching-window masked). This computation is
illustrated in Figure 3.9. The contribution of the shaded region to overall SERis the SER
for charges greater thanQ3 minus the SER for charges larger thanQ2, multiplied by the
soft error probability associated with chargeQ3.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Circuit Soft Error Rate
The circuits of a modern microprocessor fall into three basic classes: SRAM cells, latches,
and combinational logic. We estimated the SER for an individual SRAM cell, latch, nd
logic chain using the methodology described in Section 3.3. Figure 3.10 showst e predicted
SER by technology generation and pipeline depth. The x-axis plots the CMOStechnology
generation, arranged by actual or expected date of adoption. The y-axis plots the SER for a
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Figure 3.10: SER of individual circuits
per109 hours of operation – on a log scale. Also shown in this graph are the resultsreported
by Hazucha and Svensson for SRAM SER, using their scalable SER model[60].
The SER of a single SRAM cell declines gradually with decreasing feature size.
There are three basic factors that combine to produce this trend. The drain are of each
transistor, which is the region sensitive to particle strikes, decreases quadratic lly as feature
size decreases. Critical charge also decreases significantly with decreasing feature size, pri-
marily due to lower supply voltage levels, but also due to reduced capacitance n the smaller
circuit nodes. Finally, charge accumulation in the transistor decreases due to reduced volt-
ages and smaller node sensitive volume. In SRAM cells, the decrease in critical charge is
effectively offset by reduced charge accumulation, and thus the decrease in sensitive area
leads to a decrease in circuit SER. Our results show good correlation with those of Hazucha
and Svensson; both results show the same basic trend, and the absolute err r is l ss than
one order of magnitude for all technologies, which can be attributed to differenc s in CMOS
parameters.
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The SER of a single latch stays relatively constant as feature size decreas s. For
latches, the effect of the decreasing area of the sensitive region is offset by the decrease in
critical charge, as explained below. In contrast, the SER for a single logicchain changes
dramatically as feature size decreases – increasing over six orders of magnitude from 600nm
to 50nm. In logic circuits, the electrical effect of decreasing critical charge far outweighs the
effect of decreasing area of the sensitive region. The effect of superpipelining is illustrated
by the larger SER for logic circuits at higher pipeline depths (smaller clock period in FO4
delays) within each technology generation.
Decreasing critical charge: Recall that the empirical model for SER (Equation 3.1) has
an exponential dependence on the ratio−QCRIT /QS . When this ratio is large, this factor
dominates the SER expression, but its influence decreases rapidly as the value ofQCRIT
approachesQS . Figure 3.11 plotsQCRIT , in femto-Coulombs, for an individual SRAM
cell, latch, and logic circuit, along withQS , the charge collection efficiency, by technology
generation. For combinational logic, the graph showsQCRIT values for a particle strike 0,
4, and 16 FO4 gate-delays from the latch. Note that the y-axis of the graphis log-scale. This
data is also presented in Table 3.3. The values shown are for NMOS devices. Also, note
that the data presented in Figure 3.11 differs somewhat from that contained in our earlier
conference paper [67]. This is due to a minor problem in our technique for determining
Qcrit which overstatedQcrit values wheneverQcrit was less thanQS . Fortunately, this
error has virtually no significant impact on the results shown in the rest of the paper.
For a single SRAM cell,QCRIT is only slightly larger thanQS in the 350nm and
250nm technology generations, and falls belowQS at 180nm. Even thoughQCRIT contin-
ues to fall as feature size decreases, the effect on SER is relatively smal in comparison to
the decreasing area of the sensitive region.
For a single pipeline latch,QCRIT is nearly an order of magnitude larger thanQS
in the 600nm technology generation, but declines steadily as feature size decr ases, and
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Figure 3.11: Critical charge for a single SRAM cell/latch/logic chain
to QS , the electrical effects of decreasing feature size diminish, and SER is moreheavily
influenced by the area of the sensitive region.
For a single logic chain,QCRIT decreases in a similar fashion to that of memory
circuits, but at all points is much larger in absolute terms. Logic transistors are typically
wider than transistors used in memory circuits, where density is important, and therefore
are less sensitive to small charge values. Thus, the electrical effect ofdecreasingQCRIT is
much larger than the area effect in all technology generations. Figure 3.11 also illustrates
the effect of electrical masking on the SER of logic circuits. For all featuresiz s below
600nm, theQCRIT for 16 FO4 logic gates is consistently about twice that of the 0 FO4
circuit, and this difference is the result of degradation of the error pulseas it passes through
the 16 FO4 gates. Contrary to our expectations, our results do not show any reduction in
this effect with decreasing feature size. We conclude that the primary effect o electrical
masking is to screen out marginal pulses; the degradation effect on pulses with sufficient
strength to be latched is minimal.
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600nm 350nm 250nm 180nm 130nm 100nm 70nm 50nm
logic, 16 FO4s N/A 676 489 250 116 61.3 24.0 10.4
logic, 4 FO4s 4160 509 336 131 63.9 35.2 16.0 7.02
logic, 0 FO4s 1130 386 265 99.3 48.8 27.3 13.2 5.57
latches 360 120 82.4 31.9 15.0 7.96 3.73 1.66
SRAM 146 48.8 33.7 12.9 6.31 3.43 1.52 0.670
QS 52.3 34.6 26.8 17.2 12.2 9.53 7.19 5.54
Table 3.3: Critical charge for an SRAM cell/latch/logic chain by feature size and pipeline
depth
The effect of the decliningQCRIT /QS ratio can be directly observed in Figure 3.12,
which plots this ratio for a single SRAM cell, pipeline latch, and logic chain by technology
generation. This graph shows thatQCRIT /QS of SRAMs is relatively small for all feature
sizes, confirming that reductions inQCRIT due to device scaling will have only a secondary
effect on SER for SRAM circuits. TheQCRIT /QS ratio for latches is significantly larger
than SRAMs in the 600nm technology, but decreases to nearly the same level as SRAMs by
the 180nm technology generation. Device scaling in memory elements affects thcritical
charge and charge collection efficiency almost equally because smaller transis ors are more
sensitive to a particle strike but have very little sensitive volume for charge collection. Logic
shows the largest decrease in theQCRIT /QS ratio, but remains above the level of SRAM
cells and latches even in the 50nm technology generation.
Effects on latching-window masking: We also performed experiments to determine the
effects of technology trends on latching-window masking. We recomputed the SER of
combinational logic with the assumption that any charge larger thanQCRIT will result in a
soft error. Then we divided this new value for SER by the original SER value to obtain a
ratio that indicates the effect of latching window masking for a given technology generation
and pipeline depth. Figure 3.13 presents the results of this analysis. The basic trend in these
results is that the effect of latching-window masking decreases with decreasing feature size.
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Figure 3.12: Ratio of critical charge to charge collection efficiency for SRAM/latch/logic
is an anomaly caused by our model for electrical masking. The source of this anomaly
appears to be the unusually low value of 0.16 for theVrise gate switching voltage for the
600nm technology, which comes from our calibration procedure for the Horowitz gate delay
model. We confirmed through separate Spice simulations that the latching-window masking
effect for the 600nm technology is significantly higher than indicated in the graph, and in
agreement with the trend for the remaining technology generations.
As feature size decreases, latching-window masking decreases becaue latches have
much shorter response times and so have smaller latching windows. This increases the
probability that a pulse of a given duration will overlap the window (see Equation 3.8), and
hence reducing the effect of latching-window masking. Within a technologygeneration,
the latching-window masking effect decreases with decreasing number ofgates between
latches. This is because at lower clock rates the latching window occupies asmaller fraction
of the clock period. In summary, our results demonstrate that latching windowmasking is













































Figure 3.13: Effect of latching-window masking. The y-axis plots the ratio of SER without
accounting for latching-window masking and the SER with latching-window masking. The
SER without latching-window masking is computed assuming that any charge greater than
QCRIT results in a soft error.
3.4.2 Processor Soft Error Rate
Now we determine how soft errors in SRAM cells, latches, and logic circuits contribute
to the SER of the entire processor chip for future microprocessor technologies. As feature
sizes decrease, the number of transistors that can be placed on a fixed size die increases
quadratically, creating significantly greater opportunity for soft errors.Since the rate of soft
errors is different in SRAM cells, latches and logic, the SER of the processor will depend
on the chip area devoted to each type of device. To estimate the SER of the entire chip we
have developed a chip model that describes the transistor decomposition intolog c, SRAMs
and latches. From the chip model we determine the total number of SRAM bits, latches and
logic chains and then scale the per unit SER of each circuit by their number on the chip to
obtain the SER/chip.
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Device size Total SRAM Latches Logic gates
600nm 5.17 M 4.07 M (78.8%) 0.06 M ( 1.2%) 1.03 M (20.0%)
350nm 15.2 M 11.9 M (78.8%) 0.19 M ( 1.2%) 3.04 M (20.0%)
250nm 29.7 M 23.4 M (78.8%) 0.37 M ( 1.3%) 5.95 M (20.0%)
180nm 95.0 M 74.8 M (78.8%) 1.18 M ( 1.2%) 19.0 M (20.0%)
130nm 229 M 181 M (78.8%) 2.87 M ( 1.3%) 45.9 M (20.0%)
100nm 440 M 347 M (78.8%) 5.50 M ( 1.2%) 88.1 M (20.0%)
70nm 919 M 724 M (78.8%) 11.4 M ( 1.3%) 183 M (20.0%)
50nm 1818 M 1431 M (78.8%) 22.7 M ( 1.3%) 363 M (20.0%)
Table 3.4: Transistors per chip for 16 FO4 pipeline using quadratic scalingssumption
Pipeline depth SRAM bits Latches Logic gates
16 FO4s 1995 K (78.8%) 32 K ( 1.2%) 507 K (20.0%)
12 FO4s 1984 K (78.3%) 42 K ( 1.7%) 507 K (20.0%)
8 FO4s 1963 K (77.5%) 63 K ( 2.5%) 507 K (20.0%)
6 FO4s 1942 K (76.7%) 84 K ( 3.3%) 507 K (20.0%)
Table 3.5: Chip model for 350nm device size
Chip Model: We used the Alpha 21264 microprocessor as the basis for constructing our
chip model. The Alpha 21264 was designed for a 350nm process and has15.2 million
transistors on the die [47]. Based on a detailed area analysis of die photosof the Alpha
21264 [43], we concluded that approximately 20% of transistors are in logc circuits and
the remaining 80% are in storage elements in the form of latches, caches, branch p edictors,
and other memory structures. Our chip model applies this basic allocation to all feature
sizes. The total number of transistors per chip is scaled quadratically fromthe baseline
Alpha 21264 based on feature size. Table 3.4 presents the total number oftransistors per
chip, and the transistors devoted to each circuit class for each technology based on this
assumption.
A typical SRAM bit requires 6 transistors, the level sensitive latch we use inour
model consists of 6 transistors, and we assume each logic gate also uses 6 transisto s. These
assumptions are realistic and using slightly different values for these numbers will not affect
the overall trend noticeably.
The allocation of memory element transistors to SRAM cells and latches dependson
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the number of latches required by the processor pipeline, which dependson pipeline depth.
We allocate one latch for each logic chain, and the remaining memory element transistors
are allocated to SRAM cells. Table 3.5 illustrates how our model allocates transistors to
SRAM bits, latches, and logic gates in the 350nm feature size for four pipeline depths. Our
chip model is summarized in the following equations:







gatesper logic chain× transistorsper gate
latches = logic chains
SRAM bits = ((total transistors× .80) − (latches× 6))/6
Results: Using the SER of individual elements shown in the previous section and our
chip model, we computed the SER/chip for each class of components for eachtechnology
generation and pipeline depth of our study. The results are presented in Figure 3.14. As
discussed above, SER/chip of SRAM shows little increase as feature size decr ases. To
simplify the graph we only plot SRAM data for one pipeline depth. Pipeline depthhas
no noticeable effect on the SRAM SER/chip, since the percentage of chip area allocated
to SRAM changes very little. SER/chip in latches increases only slightly for all pipeline
depths, a combined effect of the relatively constant SER/latch and the increasing number
of latches at smaller feature sizes. SER/chip of latches increases for deeper pipelines, due
solely to the greater number of latches required for deeper pipeline microarchitectures.
SER/chip in combinational logic increases dramatically from 600nm to 50nm, fro
10−7 to approximately 102, or nine orders of magnitude. This is simply the composition
of a 106 increase in SER per individual logic chain and more than 100 times increase in
logic chains per chip. At 50nm with 6 FO4 pipeline, the SER per chip of logic exce ds
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Figure 3.14: SER/chip for SRAM/latches/logic
memory elements. Mainstream microprocessors from Intel [68] and other vendors [43]
have employed ECC to reduce SER of SRAM caches at feature sizes of upto 350nm. For
processors that use ECC to protect a large portion of the memory elements onthe chip,
logic will quickly become the dominant source of soft errors.
3.5 Discussion
In this chapter, we have explored the impact of device and pipeline scaling on the soft error
rate of processor building blocks: SRAM cells, latches, and combinationall gic. The pri-
mary focus of our study has been to establish the basic trend in SER of combinational logic
and the major influences on this trend. Our model considers the effects of device scaling
and superpipelining trends, and the corresponding effects on electrical and latching window
masking. This section discusses other factors that influence the SER of these circuits and
combinational logic in particular, but are not considered in our model to simplify the model
construction and analysis.
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System level SER: In this chapter, we have only considered the device and circuit level
masking effects that lead to an observed SER that is lower than the raw SER based only on
the particle flux. These masking factors can be together referred to as theelectrical masking
factor or theelectrical vulnerability factor. Analogously, there are several other masking
factors at the microarchitectural, architectural, and application level whichfurt er reduce
the actual SER observed by the user or the application. We did not consider thes masking
factors in this chapter since our goal was to understand the impact of technology trends on
SER. Chapter 6 explores these masking factors in greater detail.
Circuit Implementations: We restricted our analysis to static combinational logic cir-
cuits and level-sensitive latches. Modern microprocessors frequently employ a diverse
set of circuit styles, including dynamic logic, and latched domino logic, and a variety of
latches, including edge-triggered flip flops, with different combinations of per ormance,
power, area, and noise margin characteristics. We believe our model couldbe extended to
include these additional circuit styles and latch designs.
Figure 3.15a illustrates the static 3-input NAND gate used in our model. The tran-
sistors are sized so that the worst case rise/fall time of the gate is equal to aninverter with
NMOS width ’W’ and PMOS width ’2W’ which makes its drain area larger than that of the
equivalent inverter. In this gate there are 3 nodes where a particle can strike and have an
effect on the output, but due to capacitive charge sharing only a directhit to the output node
has a significant contribution to soft error rate.
The use of dynamic logic could substantially increase the SER, since each gate
has built-in state that can reinforce an error pulse as it travels through a logic chain. Fig-
ure 3.15b shows a NAND gate implemented in latched CMOS domino logic. Note that the
cell contains a feedback inverter whose purpose is to hold the value of theu put constant.
Typically this inverter is designed with a low switching voltage to reduce delay through the
circuit, lowering its noise margin and making it more susceptible to soft errors.



















a) Static 3−input NAND gate b) CMOS domino logic: latched version
Figure 3.15: Circuit implementations: a) Static 3-input NAND gate, b) CMOS domin
logic : latched version
than edge triggered flip-flops and so are more suitable for superpipelining. However, the
critical charge for this type of latch is typically smaller than that of a static edge-tri gered
latch. If we had used an edge-triggered, we expect that the estimated SERfor both latches
and logic would be reduced.
For superpipelined microarchitectures, latches should be designed to be very fast
and occupy minimal area. A common technique for increasing latch speed is to increase
the widths of the latch transistors, but this increases the area of the sensitive reg ons in the
latch, thus increasing the potential for soft errors. One approach to reducing latch area is
to eliminate the passgate typically placed within the feedback loop of the latch. Thisalso
increases the positive feedback in the loop which makes the latch faster andmore capable
of latching weak input pulses, but increases the likelihood of latching an error pulse caused
by a particle strike. These points illustrate the importance of design choices onthe verall
SER.
Logical Masking: Logical masking is another masking effect that inhibits soft errors
in combinational logic and could have a significant effect on the SER. Sinceour model
65
places every logic gate on an active path to a latch, we do not account forthe the effect
of logical masking. Incorporating logical masking would increase the complexity of the
model significantly, since the model would need to consider actual circuits and associated
inputs. Massengillet al. developed a specialized VHDL simulator that could analyze soft
faults in an actual circuit and model the effects of logical masking [69]. They found that
effect of logical masking on SER depends heavily on circuit inputs. Morerec ntly, both
Zhang et al. [70], and Constantinides et al. [71] show that failure to model l gical masking
can over-estimate SER by over an order of magnitude.
Effects similar to logical masking can also occur in memory elements. For example,
if a soft error occurs in a memory element that holds dead data – data that willnot be
used again – it is in some sense logically masked. Another example is a soft error in a
memory structure such as a branch predictor, which may lead to reduced performance but
not produce incorrect results. Due to the difficulty in modeling these effects, we have chosen
to exclude all forms of logical masking in memory elements or logic from this model. In
Chapter 6, we extend this analysis to take in into account such microarchitectural masking
factors that reduce the vulnerability, and improve the accuracy of process r SER estimation.
Alpha Particles: Our study only considers soft errors resulting from high-energy neu-
trons. Another important source of soft errors in microprocessors is alpha particles that
originate from radioactive decay of uranium or thorium impurities in chip andpackaging
materials. In sub-0.25um technologies with decreasing supply voltage and node capaci-
tances, the SER due to alpha particles presents a major reliability concern to logic pr cesses
because of the quadratically decreasing critical charge [72–74]. Packaging alternatives such
as lid coat or flip chip strongly influence the soft error rate induced by alpha particles. Alpha
particle SER increases more rapidly with decreasing critical charge than neutro induced
SER [74–76]. For circuits withQCRIT in the range of 10-40 fC, the alpha particle SER be-
comes comparable to that of neutron SER [8]. In our experiments, this range corresponds
to SRAM cells and latches in 180nm and later technologies and logic circuits in 50nm and
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later technologies. Our model could be adapted to estimate the SER due to alpha prticle
radiation. This would require a technology-scaled alpha particle model forthe charge col-
lection efficiency and the time constant for the NMOS and PMOS transistors. Akey input
to this model would be the expected flux of alpha particles, which is determined mainly by
package design.
Fabrication Technology: The process used to manufacture a semiconductor device has
a significant effect on the SER of the device. New process technologiessuch as silicon-
on-insulator (SOI) have been shown to significantly reduce SER [8, 9].The SOI process
embeds an oxide (insulator) layer in the substrate which significantly decreases the volume
available for charge collection. This reduces the amount of charge collected due to a particle
strike, which decreases the probability of soft errors. However, the floating body of the
device can charge up to considerable voltages leading to a reduction in effective threshold
voltage, making the circuit more susceptible to noise. Substantial design effort is required
to avoid the negative effects of the changing body voltage.
In this study, we used a model proposed by Hazucha et al. (Equation 3.1)to project
the SER of combinational logic at future technologies. One of the critical components is
the scaling model used forQS captured in Equations 3.9 and 3.10. Since the model in
Equation 3.1 has an exponential dependence onQS , deviations inQS from the scaling
model, due to differences in device parameters, can make dramatic difference in the SER at
future technologies.
3.6 Related Work
Although ours was the first study to model the effect of both technology scaling and super-
pipelining on the soft error rate of combinational logic [67], previous experimental work
had been done to estimate the soft error rate of storage and combinational logic in existing
technologies [53,58,59,77,78].
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Soft error models: While we used the model proposed by Hazucha et al. [67], another
method for estimating the neutron-induced SER uses the Modified Burst Generatio Rate
model [79]. This method uses nuclear theory to calculate the collected charge resulting from
a particle strike. IBM developed the SEMM (Soft-Error Monte Carlo Modeling) program
to determine whether chip designs meet SER specifications [80]. The program calculates
the SER of semiconductor chips due to ionizing radiation based on detailed layout, pr cess
information and circuit (QCRIT ) values.
Prior work in SER estimation of logic circuits: Prior to this study, some research had
also been done to estimate the SER in combinational logic. Lidenet al. compared the soft
error rate due to direct particle strikes in latches with the soft error rate from error pulses
propagating through the logic gates [53]. They considered a circuit implement d in 1000nm
technology clocked at 5MHz. They conclude that the errors are predominantly due to direct
strikes to latches and only 2% of the total observed errors are from the logic chain. We have
shown how technology trends will lead to a significant increase in the SER atlow feature
sizes and high clock rates. Bazeet al. studied electrical masking in a chain of inverters
and concluded that for pulses that successfully get latched electrical masking does not have
any significant effect on SER [81]. They also allude to various parameters such as the chip
model and the clock rate as factors that might affect the impact of this effect on the overall
SER. Our results show that electrical masking does have a significant effec on the SER,
and this effect is not diminishing with decreased feature size. Buchneret al. investigated
latching window masking in combinational and sequential logic [82]. They concluded that
while the SER of sequential logic is independent of frequency, combinational l gic SER
increases linearly with clock rate. Our results confirm that the trend of increasing clock rate
due to increased processor pipelining increases the SER of logic circuits.
Improving the speed and accuracy of logic SER estimation: Our study triggered a lot
of research in this area, specifically focused on increasing the accuracy of the different mod-
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els used to estimate the SER, and increasing the speed of SER estimation without sacrificing
accuracy. Seifert et al. demonstrate that latching-window masking is a strong function of
the propagation delay of combinational logic, and can be significantly less than 50% for
high frequency latch designs [83]. Wang et al. proposed a table lookupbased scheme to
accurately model the non-linear behavior of submicron devices, and achieve almost an or-
der of magnitude increase in the precision of electrical masking [84]. Constantinides et
al. analyzed both logical masking and latching window masking accurately andshowed
that they account for more than 50% of the masked errors [71]. Zhang et al. used circuit
simulation to accurately account for electrical masking under different operating conditions
such as supply voltage, clock frequency, latch design, setup and hold time, gate sizing,
logic depth, and fan-out. They used a combination of logic simulation, and probability and
graph theory to account for logical masking. Using this hybrid methodology they compute
combinational logic SER within 4% accuracy and with a million-fold speedup [85]. Zhang
et al. proposed FASER, a fast static analysis technique for estimating combinational logic
SER, that achieves over 90,000X speed-up [70]. The efficiency is ach eved by using binary
decision diagrams for propagating error pulses, and the accuracy is maintained by using
Spice based cell library characterization. Rao et al. also propose an efficient algorithm
for computing combinational logic SER, accounting for all the three masking factors, and
achieve linear runtime with the size of the circuit [86]. A good overview of several other
techniques proposed for estimating logic SER is provided in [85].
Latch SER scaling: Several recent studies have focused on analyzing the scaling trends
of latches at future technologies. Seifertt al. used experiments and simulation to determine
the trend of soft error rate in the family of Alpha processors [87]. Theyconclude that the
alpha particle susceptibility of both latches and memory circuits has decreasedover the
last few process generations. Karnik et al. conservatively project SER-per-latch to either
increase by 8% every generation if supply voltage scales linearly (0.7x) across technologies,
or remain constant if voltage scaling slows down, and supply voltage decreases only by 0.8x
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every generation [88]. However, they also conclude that even with slowing voltage scaling
the SER-per-latch can increase by up to 20% every generation depending on the device
and charge collection parameters. More recently, Seifert et al. concluded that the SER-
per-latch is like to remain constant across technologies [74]. These results are consistent
with the results in this dissertation which show a relatively constant SER-per-latch across
technologies.
Combination logic SER scaling: With the continued scaling of feature sizes, soft er-
ror rate in combinational logic is becoming a growing concern. The ITRS roadmap rec-
ommends cost-effective soft error derating, detection, and correctionschemes for combi-
national logic circuits at multiple levels of the design all the way from the device tothe
architectural level [4].
Zhang et al. corroborate our study by showing that SER of combinationalcircuits
are comparable to or exceed that of SRAMs of similar area, but differ in thera e of increase
with decreasing feature size since they model logical masking [85]. They also make the key
observation that combinational logic SER is very dependent on the width of the la ching
window. Seifert et al. further strengthen this conclusion by showing thatsoft errors in
combinational logic account for the dominant fraction of the total SER of an 8bit adder at
90nm [74]. Further, they demonstrate thatα-induced combinational logic SER increases by
over five orders of magnitude with decreasingQCRIT , in agreement with our neutron SER
scaling trends for combinational logic. Blome et al. analyze the masking and propagation
behavior of faults in combinational logic, and identify reasons why they aremor dangerous
than faults in sequential elements [89]. Most importantly, they show that combinational
logic produces a larger average number of manifested errors per faultdue to the significantly
higher probability of multi-bit errors from logic fan-out. These results corroborate our
study, and emphasize the need for new reliability mechanisms that extend SER protection
to combinational logic and latches.
However, in contrast to our projections, Seifert et al. measure a slight decrease
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in the neutron-induced combinational logic SER of specific circuits from 90nm to 65nm.
Further, they report a constant SER per diffusion area across the rang of observedQCRIT
values, and ascribe this to the slowdown in voltage and frequency scaling,nd the reduc-
tion in the charge collection efficiency. On the other hand, the SER per diffusion area in
our model is exponentially dependent on−QCRIT /QS , which is projected to uniformly
increase across technologies (see Figure 3.12). We believe that these diff rences are pri-
marily due to the modeling infrastructure. While we use analytical models and ignore
logical masking, they use real SPICE simulations to computeQCRIT , and thus naturally
account for electrical, logical, and latching-window masking. Further, while we use the
model proposed by Hazucha et al. with an exponential dependence on−QCRIT /QS , they
use experimentally collected failure data to accurately calibrate their SER modelan its
dependence onQCRIT , QS , and the diffusion area. We believe that more investigation is
required to accurately identify the reasons behind the differences.
3.7 Summary
We have presented an analysis of how two key trends in microprocessor technology, device
scaling and superpipelining, will affect the susceptibility of microprocessor circuits to soft
errors. The primary impact of device scaling is that the on-currents of devices decrease and
circuit delay decreases. As a result, particles of lower energy, which are far more plentiful,
can generate sufficient charge to cause a soft error. Using a combination of simulations and
analytical models, we demonstrated that this results in a much higher SER in microproces-
sor logic circuits as feature size decreases. We also demonstrate that higher clock rates used
in superpipelined designs lead to an increase in the SER of logic circuits in all technology
generations.
The primary cause of the significant increase in the SER of logic circuits is the
reduction in critical charge of logic circuits with decreased feature size. Our analysis also
illustrates the effect of technology trends on electrical and latching-windomasking, which
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provide combinational logic with a form of natural protection against soft errors. We found
that electrical masking has a significant effect on the SER of logic circuits inall technology
generations, and this effect is not diminishing with feature size. The effect o latching-
window masking is important, but is reduced by both decreasing feature sizeand increased
clock rate of future technology generations. We conclude that currenttechnology trends
will lead to a substantially greater increase in the soft error rate in combinational logic than
in storage elements.
The implication of this result is that further research is required into methods for
protecting combinational logic from soft errors. Recently, a number of schemes have been
proposed to detect or recover from transient errors in processor computations. All these
techniques are either based on space redundancy or time redundancy [17, 90–92] and have
different performance-reliability tradeoffs. In the next chapter, we will discuss the salient
features of future distributed architectures that provide the foundation for building low over-
head mechanisms for soft error reliability. Building on these features, we will discuss both





Conventional out-of-order superscalar processors face several challenges in achieving tech-
nology scalable performance including but not limited to accessing large centralized struc-
tures, associative wakeup in large instruction windows, high bandwidth register renaming,
full operand bypass networks that scale poorly with increasing issue width, and per instruc-
tion access to a centralized register file [34]. These challenges also pushthe future technol-
ogy limits of power consumption and design complexity, and have motivated architects to
pursue more technology scalable designs involving extensive partitioning ofthe microarchi-
tecture structures, and implementing the processor functions in a distributed fashion on this
partitioned execution substrate to efficiently extract parallelism from the applic tion. There
have been several distributed architectures that have been proposedto achieve technology
scalable performance [47, 93–100]. In this Chapter, we identify the undrlying common
principles of distributed architectures that provide technology scalability, and argue that
these features provide the foundation for implementing low overhead mechanisms for im-
proving hard and soft error reliability.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 identifies the com-
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mon principles of distributed architectures. Choosing a specific architecture is necessary
for quantitative evaluation, and Section 4.2 describes in detail the distributedTRIPS ar-
chitecture we use to implement and evaluate our mechanisms. Section 4.3 argueshow the
principles of distributed architectures are synergistic with the approachesfor improving re-
liability. Finally, Section 4.4 summarizes our discussion, and provides a good starting point
for evaluating reliability enhancement techniques that exploit these synergies.
4.1 Distributed Architecture Principles
We identify three important principles for a distributed architecture:
Modular design: Employ resource partitioning at different granularities to eliminate ac-
cess to large centralized resources. The microarchitecture is composed by connecting the
different modules as necessary.
Cooperative hardware / software techniques: Rebalance the hardware and software ef-
fort to efficiently mine parallelism from the application, and exploit the distributed substrate
to achieve high performance.
On-chip networks: Utilize well-defined, scalable networks for communication between
the different modules, and employ explicit communication protocols on these networks for
managing global latency.
Together the three design principles enable the architecture to achieve technology
scalable performance. Several distributed architectures have been proposed based on these
principles, but each employing different mechanisms, and making different tradeoffs based
on the specific application and technology constraints [47,93,96–100].Resource partition-
ing can be restricted to a few structures, a subset of the pipeline stages within a uniprocessor,
or can be extended to the chip level in the form of multiple independent processing units
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on a single chip. While on-chip networks have been proposed to interconne t memory
components for supporting cache coherency, it can be expanded to enable direct communi-
cation between the distributed processing components with the help of dedicated networks
for distributing instructions, commands, and operand data. Finally, there have been several
approaches explored in industry and research for dividing the responsibility of finding par-
allelism in the application, and the task of distributing the parallel units of computation to
the processing units, between the hardware and software. We expand on each of the three
principles below with three specific distributed architecture design styles as examples.
4.1.1 Modular Design
Modularity in the design can be applied at different granularities. Clustering is a modular
design methodology that can be applied within a processor. The Alpha 21264 was the
first commercial superscalar processor to adopt a clustered design [47]. The execution
stage of the integer pipeline was partitioned into two clusters, with each cluster containing
two integer units. The floating-point functional units are placed in a cluster of their own.
Clustering provides many advantages to a design. By partitioning the design,ach cluster
requires smaller structures and simpler instruction scheduling logic comparedto a non-
clustered design, while supporting the same aggregate throughput across ll the clusters.
Since the smaller structures have lower access latency, a clustered designcan run at higher
frequencies.
The Alpha 21264 design partitions only a subset of the pipeline stages, registe read,
issue, and execute, into two clusters. Register renaming and instruction scheduling are still
centralized and rely on conventional monolithic structures. Many modern implementations
of superscalar processors employ this clustering topology and implement a sparate integer
and floating point cluster. Since clustering is only applied to a subset of the pipeline stages
it does not completely solve the technology scalability problem. Other designs for clustered
superscalar processors have been proposed in research to address this problem [93].
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More recently, the microprocessor industry has migrated toward integratingmulti-
ple moderately complex processors on a single chip to achieve a balance between the single
thread performance offered by each core and the multi-threaded performance across all the
cores [101–105]. The extra concurrency provided by the multiple processors can be traded
for the clock frequency of each processor to keep the power consumption of the chip within
acceptable limits. Further, each processor in the chip multiprocessor (CMP) also provides
a natural granularity for independently implementing dynamic power management tech-
niques such as DVS. Current mainstream designs use separate integer and floating point
clusters within a processor, and CMP based design at the chip level to improve overall
scalability.
In conventional CMP designs the granularity of each processor core on the chip, and
hence the number of processors on the chip, are fixed at design time. Recently, researchers
have proposed tiled architectures which use a small set of unique processing units or tiles
to compose the overall microarchitecture. The tile-based design methodologyall ws easier
extensibility of the architecture from generation to generation by changing the number or
configuration of the different tiles [106]. Further, recent researchhas demonstrated that
a tile-based methodology also provides the capability to dynamically aggregate differ nt
number of tiles to form multiple processors with varying configurations [107]. The RAW
and CLP design both use an array of simple processors as tiles in the microarchitecture [100,
107]. The TRIPS architecture uses five unique tiles to build the processorcore, and eleven
unique tiles in all to compose the entire chip [108].
4.1.2 Cooperative Hardware/Software Techniques
The benefit of a clustered design depends on the rate of inter-cluster dependences and trans-
fers, since each communication operation incurs extra cost. The assignment of instructions
to clusters determines the number of inter-cluster transfers required. Using the compiler to
perform cluster assignment is favorable from a technology scalability viewpoint, but can be
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sub-optimal because of the lack of dynamic knowledge at the compiler. Hardware based dy-
namic cluster assignment has the potential for higher performance, but introduces another
scalability bottleneck. The cost of each communication operation depends onwhether it
is implemented by dynamically inserting operand packets into the inter-cluster network, or
by adding explicit cluster transfer ormoveinstructions to the program. While compiler-
insertedmoveinstructions occupy extra space in the instruction window and compete with
normal instructions to increase issue contention, directly inserting packets into the network
can potentially extend the critical path and impact clock frequency.
In the context of a CMP, the programmer, runtime system, or the compiler is re-
sponsible for parallelizing a program into multiple threads which can then be executed
concurrently on the multiple processors [109]. One such example is the Multiscalar proces-
sor proposed by Sohi et al. [97]. In the Multiscalar execution model the program’s control
flow graph (CFG) is partitioned into tasks and each task is assigned to a processor. Multiple
tasks execute speculatively in parallel on different processors, andh ve to be appropriately
flushed if a mis-speculation is detected. Inter-task register dependencesare marked explic-
itly by the compiler and delivered using specialized networks.
Since the number of processors and configuration of each processoris fixed at de-
sign time in a CMP, it results in suboptimal operation as the number and type of available
threads change over time. Architectures such as RAW and CLP solve this problem by pro-
viding support for mapping instructions from a single program to a subsetof the tiles based
on the program requirement. The hardware and software cooperate to provide the capability
for dynamically aggregating multiple tiles together based on the computation, and memory
requirements of the program. RAW uses static compiler-controlled mapping of instructions
to processors, and statically scheduled execution and routing of values between them, thus
greatly reducing the burden on the hardware, while being limited by the static knowledge
available at the compiler [100]. On the other hand, the CLP design uses a hybrid execution




Distributed architectures implement explicit mechanisms to manage the latency between
the different modules. Communicating values from the local cluster to the register file of
theremotecluster requires an additional clock cycle in the Alpha 21264, and is transmitted
on a dedicated inter-cluster network [47]. Each processor in a CMP canrun an independent
program, and communication between the applications, if required, is performed through
memory using the standard cache coherence network. The processing units or tiles in a
tiled architecture are simple, and are inter-connected by a dedicated scalaroper nd network
(SON) that enables fast inter-tile communication to achieve high performance[100, 110].
Direct communication between the tiles is faster and more efficient than communicating
only through memory as is done in conventional CMP designs.
4.1.4 Summary
The three different distributed architectures discussed use the same three basic principles to
build different mechanisms:





– Assignment of instructions to clusters, and inter-cluster transfers
– Extracting threads for execution on a CMP, and assignment of threads to pro-
cessors
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– Assignment of instructions to tiles, composing processing units/tiles to form a
logical processor
• On-chip networks for communication
– Inter-cluster network
– Cache coherence network
– Scalar operand network
Future distributed architecture will increasingly embrace these three principles to
achieve technology scalable performance, power consumption, and design complexity. In
this dissertation, we use the TRIPS architecture proposed by Sankaralingm et al. to imple-
ment and evaluate our mechanisms [111].
4.2 The TRIPS Architecture
This section describes the features of the TRIPS architecture in detail. We then discuss how
these distributed features can be exploited to improve reliability at low overhead.
4.2.1 Modular Design
The TRIPS architecture uses a tile-based modular design. Unlike conventional architec-
tures, all major processor structures are partitioned into tiles, thus eliminating access to
centralized structures and reducing the pressure on cycle time. The TRIPS architecture
uses each type of tile multiple times as necessary, striking a balance between theb efits of
partitioning and the distribution overhead, to compose the overall microarchitecture. The
processor core is built out of five unique tiles each responsible for a different function: 16
execution tiles (ET), four register tiles (RT), four data tiles (DT), four instruction tiles (IT),
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Figure 4.1: TRIPS processor microarchitecture
Figure 4.1 illustrates the organization of the TRIPS core. The execution resurces
are distributed across 16 ETs, which are organized as a two-dimensionalarray. Each ET
contains an integer unit, a floating point unit, an operand router, and instruction and operand
buffers or reservation stations for storing instructions and their operands. Each ET contains
64 instruction buffer entries. A4×4 grid, with 64 instruction buffer entries at each ET,
thus represents an instruction window of 1024 instructions. The architectural register file is
banked and distributed across four RTs placed on the top of the ETs. TheRTs also contain
read andwrite queues that buffer register inputs, and un-committed register outputs and
implement register forwarding. The level-1 instruction and data caches arealso banked
and distributed across the four ITs and DTs respectively, and placed along the left of the
execution array. The DTs also contain the load-store queue (LSQ) and associ ted logic
necessary for load-store ordering, and the miss-status-handling-registe s (MSHRs) for miss
handling.
The execution resources can be naturally partitioned for mapping up to four threads
when operating the TRIPS processor in multi-threaded mode. While similar to simultane-
ous multithreading [112] in that the execution resource and memory banks are sh ed, the
multi-threaded mode statically partitions most major processor queues including but not
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limited to the instruction and operand buffers in the ETs, the read and write queues in the
RTs, and the LSQ in the DTs, across the four threads. No additional space is required in the
processor queues, since the same storage used to hold speculative statein single-threaded
mode can instead store state from the multiple threads. For instance, while a progr m can
use all the 64 instruction buffer entries in single-threaded mode, each thread is restricted
to use only 16 buffer entries in multi-threaded mode. Specifically, thread 0 uses the first
16 buffer entries, thread 1 uses the next 16 buffer entries and so on.Therefore, across all
the ETs each thread has a instruction window that can hold 256 (16x16) instructions. Four
copies of the architectural register file are used to accommodate the registers of up to four
threads.
4.2.2 Cooperative Hardware/Software Techniques
The TRIPS architecture uses three main techniques to build an innovative execution model
for technology scalability.
Block-atomic execution model: TRIPS implements a block-atomic execution model,
in which a block of instructions is treated as a single unit as it flows throw the logical
pipeline to perform fetch, decode, register read, execute, and commit. Hence, the block-
atomic execution model amortizes the per-instruction logic and bookkeeping overheads in-
curred in conventional instruction-atomic architecture such as current day superscalar pro-
cessors. Further, the block-atomic execution model also reduces the number of ranch
predictions, register file accesses, and the complexity of the register renaming hardware.
The TRIPS compiler converts programs into blocks of instructions, which aresimilar to
hyperblocks [113]. TRIPS blocks have a single entry point, no internalcontrol transfers,
and possibly multiple exit points. Each block has a static set of state inputs but potentially a
variable number of state outputs, depending on the specific exit point from the block. Each
block can contain up to 128 instructions.
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Static Instruction Placement: Superscalar architectures dynamically associate an in-
struction with a specific reservation station entry, which increasingly becomes a scaling
bottleneck with larger window sizes [46,93]. The TRIPS architectures solve this problem
by exposing the distributed instruction window in the ETs to the compiler which performs
static instruction placement. Each TRIPS block is scheduled as a whole on to thedistributed
instruction window in the ETs [114, 115]. The compiler statically assigns eachinstruction
in the TRIPS block to a specific ET instruction buffer entry, and explicitly encodes inter-
instruction dependences within the block. The 64 instruction buffer entriesin ach ET
are divided into 8 block partitions, each containing 8 entries. The compiler maps the 128
instructions in a block across all the sixteen ETs, with one block partition in each ET con-
taining eight instructions. Since the instruction buffer in each ET has eight block partitions,
eight TRIPS blocks can be simultaneously mapped on the processor to support s eculative
execution. All the major processor queues including the operand buffers in the ETs, the read
and write queues in the RTs, and the LSQ in the DTs are also statically block-partitioned in
a similar fashion to support up to eight speculative blocks.
Direct Instruction Communication: The third important innovation in the execution
model improves the capability to execute dependent instructions efficiently. Since prior
research has shown that using associative matches in the instruction window to wake-up
dependent instructions is not scalable [46], TRIPS adds support in theISA to allow depen-
dent instructions to directly communicate with each other, completely eliminating the need
for associative matches. Unlike a conventional architecture which includes with an instruc-
tion the destination register specifier that is used for performing the associative look-up,
the TRIPS ISA instead explicitly encodes in each instruction the location of the instruc-
tions which need its result. The location information includes both the specific ET, and
the instruction buffer entry in it. Using this explicit instruction target encodingallows the
architecture to replace the associative look-up, with a direct mapped look-up f the instruc-
tion buffer at the target ET. While block primary register inputs and outputs must be fetched
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from and committed to the architectural register file, block temporaries, which are values
that are produced and consumed entirely within the block, can be forwarded directly from
producers to consumers using this target information. Further, the on-chip networks dis-
cussed in Section 4.2.3 provide an efficient physical substrate for performing this direct
instruction-to-instruction communication of block temporaries.
Base Scheduler Algorithm
An example schedule of instructions on a2×2 execution array is shown in Figure 4.2.
Read instructions are used to fetch values from the register file to the consumer instruc-
tions. Block register outputs are produced bywrite instructions. In the TRIPS ISA,
instructions do not encode their source operands like in a conventional RISC ISA, instead
they explicitly encode the locations of their children. Figure 4.2 shows the instruction en-
coding for the above example. For example, theadd instruction placed at location [0,1,0],
upon execution, forwards its result to theLSH instruction placed at location [1,1,0]. The
explicit concurrency expressed in the ISA, and static mapping of instructions o resources
naturally allows for a scalable and modular microarchitecture implementation. Further-
more, the physical instruction layout corresponds to the dataflow graph,and the physical
layout of ALUs is exposed to the instruction scheduler, so that the wire andcommunication
delays can be used to help the scheduler minimize the critical path.
TRIPS uses an algorithm calledspatial path scheduling(SPS) that explicitly reasons
about program paths and the physical paths they get mapped onto, whenmapping a block to
the execution array [115]. Specifically, the goal of the scheduler is to find a placement for
each of the 128 instructions in a TRIPS block in the distributed (4x4) execution array, such
that the completion time of the block is minimized. The SPS algorithm accomplishes this
objective by using sophisticated static estimates for the inherent instruction level parallelism
in the block, static execution and routing latencies between dependent instructions, dynamic
latencies due to execution unit and network link contention, and global inter-block critical
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Original Program
AND  R1,   R1,  R4 
ADD  R3,   R4,  R5
LSH   R3,   R3,   #3









[0, 0, 1]  AND
[0, 0, 0]  SUBI
[1, 0, 0]  ADDI
[1, 0, 1]  SUB
[0, 1, 1] 
[0, 1, 0]  ADD
[1, 1, 1] 
[1, 1, 0]  LSH
AND                [1, 0, 1]
ADD                 [1, 1, 0]
SUB      R7
LSH       #3       [1, 0, 1]
SUBI  R1,  R2,  #0
ADDI  R6,   R3,   #0
SUBI
SUBI     #0       [0, 0, 1]
ADDI    #0       [1, 0, 0]
READ R2       [0, 0, 0]
READ R4       [0, 0, 1]   [0, 1, 0]









Figure 4.2: Instruction physical layout
paths. The SPS algorithm basically usesanchor pointsand computes the cost of routing
operands to and from known anchor points. Anchor points are instructions whose placement
is constrained because of reasons that include accessing a known spatial loc tion such as a
specific register bank for a read or write instruction, a particular data cache bank for a load
or store, the global control tile for a branch instruction, or simply a specificexecution tile
for an instruction that has already been placed.
For each instructioni in the open list, and for each available and legal physical
locationslot, the SPS algorithm computes aplacement costassociated with placingi atslot.
For each instructioni it tracks theslot that minimizes the placement cost, and schedules the
instruction from the open list that has the largest minimum placement cost. The algorithm
adds the unscheduled children of this instruction to the open list and continues until all
instructions have been scheduled. The placement cost is the estimated latency of the longest
path in the TRIPS block that passes through this instruction. It is computed as:
pCost(i, slot) = input Latency+ util Penalty+ execLatency+ outputLatency
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Input Latency computes the sum of the arrival time of the critical register input to the
block with respect to this instruction, and the static execution and routing delays from that
register input to this instruction. The algorithm searches for the register input that is at the
start of the longest path containing this instruction through the block, taking into account
inter-block register dependences, in computing the critical register input.Util Penalty
adds the dynamic latencies due to both execution unit and network link contentio, and
Exec Latency accounts for the static execution latency of this instruction. Finally, similar
to input Latency, output Latency calculates both the static execution and routing delays
to the most critical block register output taking into account global critical paths due to
inter-block register dependences. A detailed explanation of the SPS scheduler is provided
in [115].
4.2.3 On-chip Networks
The tiles in the TRIPS architecture are interconnected using point-to-point, multi-hop, dy-
namically routed networks. The architecture uses multiple different dedicatene works for
communicating instructions, data, and commands, each implementing protocols thatare
best suited for the specific purpose. Since each hop in the network takesone cycle, the
communication protocols look for the shortest path to minimize latency, and use pipelining
to improve network throughput.
Table 4.1 lists the different networks used in the TRIPS architecture. Links ineach
of these networks connect only nearest neighbor tiles and messages traver e one tile per
cycle. Figure 4.3 illustrates how a subset of these networks are used to connect the tiles
in the TRIPS processor. The GDN is a simple point-to-point, multi-hop network used for
transferring instructions from the ITs to the reservation stations in the RTs and the ETs.
Since the tiles are always expected to have enough storage for the incominginstructions,
this network does not experience any contention and does not implement any flow control.
The GSN is used for signalling block execution status such as i-cache refills, block com-
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Micronetwork Function
Operand network (OPN) Pass data operands between tiles
Global dispatch network (GDN) Dispatch instructions to tiles
Global control network (GCN) Commit and flush blocks
Global status network (GSN) Transmit information about block completion
Global refill network (GRN) I-cache miss refills
Data status network (DSN) Communicate store completion status among
the L1 data cache tiles
External store network (ESN) Determine the completion status of stores in
the L2 cache or memory.
Table 4.1: TRIPS processor micronetworks
pletion, and successful retirement of block outputs to architectural state,and also does not
implement any flow control. The GCN is a command network and is used to deliverb ock
commit and flush commands from the GT to all the other tiles. The OPN is a 2D mesh net-
work that connects the ETs, RTs, and DTs and is used for communicating operand values.
The OPN uses y-x dimension-order routing to transmit scalar operands among the tiles.
When routing a packet from a parent to a child tile, the packet first travelsin the y-direction
(along the column) until it reaches the row of the child, then it travels in the x-direction until
it reaches the child tile. The OPN is dynamically routed and experiences contenti since
multiple OPN packets can be travelling simultaneously from different source tiles to target
tiles. The DTs use thedata status network(DSN) to share information about completion of
block stores, and the ESN is used to determine store completion in the L2 and beyond.
4.2.4 Summary
In summary, while TRIPS uses a dataflow execution model within a block, it uses a con-
ventional speculative execution model across blocks. The dependences between block out-
puts of one block and the block inputs of its successor, along with load-store communica-
tion pairs, create the dataflow arcs for the entire program. The output of control transfer
instructions which specify the address of the succeeding block are also treated as block
86
Operand Network (OPN)
Global Commit Network (GCN) Global Status Network (GSN)
G R R RRI
D E E EEI
D E E EEI
D E E EEI
D E E EEI
G R R RRI
D E E EEI
D E E EEI
D E E EEI
D E E EEI
G R R RRI
D E E EEI
D E E EEI
D E E EEI
D E E EEI
G R R RRI
D E E EEI
D E E EEI
D E E EEI
D E E EEI
Global Refill Network (GRN) Global Dispatch Network (GDN)
G R R RRI
D E E EEI
D E E EEI
D E E EEI
D E E EEI
Transports data operands
140 bits wide
Issues I-cache fill requests
36 bits wide
Issues block fetch commands,
dispatches instructions








G R R RRI
D E E EEI
D E E EEI
D E E EEI
D E E EEI
Data Status Network (DSN)
Communicates store information
70 bits wide
Figure 4.3: TRIPS micronetworks
outputs. The hardware uses control speculation techniques to determine the s quence of
blocks and determines the data dependences between blocks through register naming and
load/store dependence checking. The processor uses a “static-placement, dynamic-issue”
(SPDI) model in which an instruction is assigned a ET statically, but issued byeach ET
dynamically depending on the availability of resources and input operands[114]. Sec-
tion 4.2.5 describes the functions of the different tiles and the networks in thedifferent














Figure 4.4: Events in the execution of a TRIPS block
4.2.5 Events in the Execution of a TRIPS Block
This section describes the important events in the lifetime of a block execution shown in
Figure 4.4. Similar to pipelined execution of instructions, fetch, map, and execution of
multiple blocks can be overlapped with the execution of the current block.
Block Allocation: Before the instructions of a block can be fetched, it must be assigned
resources in the processor. Resources have to be allocated in multiple tiles including the
RTs, ITs, DTs, and the ETs. Each of these tiles provide eight block partitions hat are man-
aged in a sequential and cyclical manner. An empty block partition has to be allocated in
the RTs for holding theread andwrite instructions, in the ITs for holding information
regarding instruction cache fetch status, in the Load Store Queue (LSQ) inthe DTs for hold-
ing the load and store instructions, and in the ETs for holding the normal blockinstructions.
Block allocation has to stall until an empty block partition can be found.
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Block Fetch: Once the block instructions have been fetched either from the I-cache ort
L2, the hardware initiatesblock fetch. The GT orchestrates the delivery of block instruc-
tions, read, and write instructions from the instruction caches to the execution and register
tiles using theinstruction dispatch network(GDN) (see Figure 4.3). The TRIPS architec-
ture supports block-level control speculation to achieve high performance, and uses a next
block predictor to speculatively select the next block that should be fetched and executed,
while the current block is still executing.
Block Execute: Register read instructions fetch the block register input values from the
register file if the value is already resident there.
If the required value is produced by an older block which has not committed its
output to the register file, the register renaming logic in the RTs detect this depen nce
and route the value from the appropriate location in theWrite Queuecorresponding to the
older block, to the location in theRead Queuecorresponding to the current block, from
where it is delivered to the consumer instruction at one of the ETs. An instruction in one
of the ETs can execute once it has received all its operands. Both the RTs and the ETs use
theoperand network(OPN) to transfer operands. Address computations for load and store
instructions execute at the ET and then transmit the addresses, and data values for stores, to
the DTs. Each load and store instruction is assigned aload store identifier(LSID) to assist
the memory system in maintaining program order between the load and store instructions.
The DTs send the loaded values back into the execution array using the OPN. The block
instructions are held in the reservation stations until the block has completed execution by
producing all its register, store, and branch outputs.
Block Completion: A block is said to have completed execution when it has produced
all its register and store outputs, and the branch output that points to the next block that
should be executed. The DTs use thedata status network(DSN) to share information about
the completed block stores. Both the RTs and the DTs use theglobal status networkto
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communicate to the GT that all the block register and store outputs have been rec ived. The
branch output is directly delivered to the GT using the OPN. The branch, register, and store
status information is used to detect block completion.
Block Commit: If the current oldest block has reached block completed state, the block
can becommitted. The GTs use theglobal control network(GCN) to signal to all the DTs,
RTs, and the ETs that they can now commit the information to permanent architectural
state. Block outputs are written back to the architectural register file and updates to memory
are carried out. The GSN is again used to acknowledge to the GT that the updates were
completed successfully. Subsequently, a new block can be allocated in the block partition
that is freed by this block. In the event of an exception raised by any instruction in the
block, the entire block is re-executed after the the exception is serviced.
Block Flush: In the event of a misprediction, the GT uses the GCN to send the flush
mask, indicating all the blocks that have to be flushed, to all the DTs, RTs, and ETs. The
flush mask is used by each tile locally to flush the state corresponding to all the blocks
marked in the flush mask.
Table 4.2 shows the detailed configuration of the baseline TRIPS architecture we
use in the rest of this dissertation for evaluating our mechanisms.
4.3 Synergy between Distributed Architecture Principles and Re-
liability
In Chapter 1, we broadly discussed the different approaches for improving the reliability
of a system at different levels of the design. In this section, we return to the same discus-
sion but within the specific context of distributed architectures. In particular, we propose
to precisely identify the synergies between the underlying principles and distributed mech-
anisms in the TRIPS architecture, and the approaches for improving reliability. The rest of
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Tile Composition
GT Block management state supporting eight blocks in single-threaded mode
and two blocks for each of 4 SMT threads in multi-threaded mode,
L1 I-cache tags, 128 TRIPS blocks, 2-way set-associative,
16-entry, fully-associative instruction TLB,
84 Kbit next-block predictor that includes a local/global adaptive
tournament exit predictor with speculative updates,
branch/call target buffers, branch type and return predictors,
RT Four 32-register banks, one each for 4 SMT threads,
inter-block register dependence check logic.
IT 16 KB bank, 64-byte lines, one cycle hit latency,
DT 2-way, one-cycle 8 KB L1 cache bank, with 64-byte cache lines,
cache-line interleaving among 4 DTs,
one 256-entry LSQ, one-entry coalescing write buffer,
16-entry, fully-associative data TLB,
MSHRs supporting up to 16 requests to up to four cache lines,
memory-side, 1024-entry, single-bit dependence predictor to
predict the dependences between program stores and loads.
ET 64-entry reservation station holding decoded instructions
a five-stage, single-issue execution pipeline,
one integer unit and one FP unit,
single cycle basic integer operations,
3-cycle, pipelined integer multiply,
24-cycle, non-pipelined integer divide,
4-cycle FP operations, no support for FP divide and sqrt
Processor 30 tiles: 1 GT, 4 RTs, 5 ITs, 4 DTs, 16 ETs
16-wide issue, 1024-entry window
Table 4.2: Composition of the processor tiles.
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the dissertation explores mechanisms for improving hard and soft error reliability by taking
advantage of these synergies.
4.3.1 Fault Avoidance
The primary concern of this dissertation is with architectural techniques forimproving re-
liability, and since fault avoidance is typically implemented at the device or circuitlevel
it is not our primary focus. However, we do believe that the principles behind distributed
architectures provide some important advantages for fault avoidance.
Borkar et al. propose a design shift from maximizing transistor density to a regular
design fabric optimized for balanced design as a key enabler for gigascale integration [6].
A modular designapproach that exploits concurrency reduces the emphasis on clock fre-
quency and thus is less susceptible to extrinsic and intrinsic failures that leadto p rametric
or delay faults [6]. It can also aid in distributing the power consumption more evenly across
the chip area, reducing the severity of hotspots that accelerate these failur s [31].On-chip
networks constrain the wiring layout and naturally achieve a more regular interconnect
fabric, analogous to metal patterning and design rule constraints that can be applied at the
layout level [6]. This can significantly reduce the wiring congestion in the design and the
susceptibility to design rule induced systematic defects. Static scheduling of block instruc-
tions can optimize for load-balancing across the ETs and the network links asan additional
constraint, to reduce the possibility of highly skewed thermal and power densities.
It is more difficult to enumerate the advantages of distributed architectures for soft
error avoidance, since techniques such as SOI and radiation hardening are typically applied
at the device or circuit level [9, 20]. Overall, since distributed architectur s reduce the
emphasis on clock frequency, they allow for more slack in the hardware logic paths that can
be exploited to implement circuit techniques such as appropriate latch selectionor selective
node engineering to reduce soft error susceptibility at low overhead [11,88].
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4.3.2 Fault Tolerance
Chapter 1 referred to the four necessary and sufficient principles offault tolerance proposed
by White et al. [14]: a) redundancy, b) fault detection and annunciation, c) fault isolation,
and d) on-line repair. This section discusses how the features of the TRIPS architecture help
in achieving these four principles. For each of the three distributed architecture principles,
we first discuss the synergy with hard error reliability, and subsequentlydiscuss soft error
reliability. We presently limit the discussion to improving soft error reliability through
redundant execution. Further, we envision redundant execution of blocks in the TRIPS
architecture, analogous to instructions in conventional architectures [91].
Modular Design: The tile-based modular design provides abundant redundancy in the
architecture that can be exploited for defect tolerance. For instance, since there are six-
teen ETs, the architecture may easily tolerate a defective ET without a significant drop in
the execution resources. This is possible because the tile-based modular design effectively
reduces the size of thefield replaceable unit(FRU) thus enabling fine-grained reconfigura-
tion [18]. Further, a tile also provides a natural granularity for fault detection, isolation, and
repair using advanced BIST techniques [24,116].
The key advantage that tile-based design provides for soft error reliability, is that
it enables temporal and spatial redundancy to handle both soft errors and intri sic failures
which may appear transient in nature. Further, since all the queues in the TRIPS architecture
are statically block-partitioned (as described in Section 4.2), redundant execution of TRIPS
blocks also provides spatial redundancy within the queues.
Cooperative Hardware/Software Techniques: We make the key observation that the
TRIPS block-atomic execution model can provide redundancy that can beexploited for
defect tolerance. Redundancy in a TRIPS block exists whenever it is under-utilized and
contains fewer than 128 instructions. While a block that contains 128 instructions requires
the full capacity of the distributed instruction window and cannot tolerate even a single
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defective ET, a block that is under-full grants the scheduler the capability to successfully
accommodate the instructions on a subset of the ETs that are functional. Theblock-atomic
execution model provides an ideal granularity for the scheduler to perform this fault-aware
instruction scheduling. This software-assisted, fine-grained fault reconfiguration, is similar
in concept to logical partitioning that enables coarse-grained dynamic CPUsparing in IBM
pSeries systems [28]. Chapter 5 explores this technique in greater detail.
The redundancy available in under-utilized TRIPS blocks can also be used by the
compiler to insert redundant instructions for soft error detection. Further, t compiler can
enforce spatial redundancy, in addition to temporal redundancy, by appropriately schedul-
ing the redundant instructions on spatially redundant ETs. Since TRIPS blocks provide
a natural granularity for fault detection, they also enable a different redundant execution
model that is independent of block utilization, where each block as a whole isredundantly
executed. This block-granular redundant execution model also allows selective redundant
execution, in which the hardware or software identifies a subset of the blocks f r redundant
execution to trade fault coverage for improved performance overhead[117–119]. Chapter 7
explores the block-granular redundant execution model, and selectiveredundant execution
in greater detail.
On-chip Networks: Modular design using routers allows the architecture to isolate a de-
fect to a particular router in a tile. On-chip networks also provide the potential for spatial
redundancy in the paths between a given source and destination tile. This ispo sible be-
cause each tile along the path contains a dedicated router that can independently decide
the next hop for a packet, unlike a global wire that travels directly from thesource to the
destination. While the degree of flexibility in the paths depends on the routing function, in
general, it allows for fully-adaptive routing algorithms that are capable ofrouting packets
around defective tiles [120,121].
The OPN in the TRIPS architecture currently implements y-x dimension-order rout-
ing that specifies exactly one route for a given source and destination tile pair. Hence, it
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does not provide the adaptivity that the hardware can use to exploit the inherent spatial
redundancy in the paths for defect tolerance. However, since the distributed execution re-
sources are exposed to the TRIPS compiler, this inherent redundancy cbe exploited at the
software level by intelligent fault-aware instruction scheduling that can avoid the defective
tiles and communication paths. Chapter 5 explores compiler-assisted fault reconfiguration
in greater detail, and also discusses the implications of augmenting the OPN to be fully-
adaptive.
The key advantage that on-chip networks provide for soft error reliability, is that it
provides temporal and spatial redundancy along the communication paths. While temporal
redundancy is naturally achieved during execution, the TRIPS compiler can enforce spatial
redundancy by scheduling the instructions of the redundant block to usespatially redundant
paths that still follow y-x dimension-order routing. Of course, as mentionedabove spatial
redundancy can also be achieved by enhancing the routing function of the OPN to provide
this adaptivity.
4.3.3 Fault Evasion
As described in Chapter 1, fault evasion techniques observe the behavior of the system for
periods of high vulnerability to hard or soft errors, and trigger preventi reconfiguration
to reduce the probability of occurrence of an error. Dedicated hardware or software can be
added to the system to perform this introspection, and the symptoms monitored can ither
be direct indicators of an error that has already occurred, or indirect indicators that signal
periods of high vulnerability to errors.
For hard error evasion, the advantages that the TRIPS architecture provides are
exactly the same as those for fault tolerance; the only difference is that fault reconfiguration
is performed preventively in this case. While IBM pSeries servers already mploy fault
evasive techniques by monitoring intrinsic failure rates [28], a tile-based modular design
and use of on-chip interconnection networks enables more fine-grainedreconfiguration and
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adaptivity. The symptoms monitored may include existing failure rates, and hot spots due
to high tile and link utilization, and congestion which can be used as a prognosisof future
failure locations.
Prior research has shown that processor utilization is a good indicator ofvulner-
ability to soft errors [122], and Mukherjee et al. refined this analysis and proposed the
architectural vulnerability factor(AVF) as a measure of a structure’s vulnerability to soft
errors [123]. To the first order, the amount of time for which unprotected s ate is resident in
a structure or itsoccupancydetermines the likelihood of a soft error.
Modular Design: A tile-based design provides an opportunity to detect periods of spatial
non-uniformity in soft error vulnerability across different tiles [124], and selectively trigger
reliable execution mode only for the vulnerable tiles. A fault evasive technique can either
reduce the electrical vulnerability of the tile by changing the operating conditios such as
voltage and clock frequency, or use architectural load-balancing andthrottling techniques
to spread the vulnerability more uniformly across the tiles.
Cooperative Hardware/Software Techniques: The compiler or the hardware can either
statically or dynamically monitor the factors that affect soft error vulnerability including
but not limited to occupancy, and processor utilization, and use it to dynamically transition
to a less vulnerable execution mode as described above. While performing thisanaly is at a
full program granularity hides the time-varying behavior, performing it ata per-instruction
granularity provides information that can be difficult to exploit in a timely fashion limiting
the potential benefits. In Chapters 6 and 7, we show that the TRIPS block-at mic execution
model provides an ideal granularity for performing such introspective analysis, because it
can operate at the block boundary allowing enough time for the information to be effectively
used during the block execution lifetime.
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On-chip Networks: The TRIPS on-chip networks act as an enabler for the fault evasion
techniques just described. As explained in Sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.5, block fetch, regis-
ter read, execute, and commit are performed using multiple independent on-chip etworks
(GDN, OPN, GCN, GSN). We make the key observation that the occupancyof block state,
and hence its vulnerability, can be regulated by controlling the relative timing ofthe oper-
ations on these different networks. For instance, implementing a just-in-time block fetch
protocol on the GDN to trigger instruction fetch only upon receiving a blockregister in-
put on the OPN, can potentially reduce the occupancy of block instructionsin the ETs by
fetching them just when necessary. Chapters 6 and 7 explore this observation in greater
detail.
4.3.4 Performance-Reliability Tradeoff
For hard errors, the primary advantage of a distributed architecture is theopportunity for
graceful degradation provided by the abundant inherent redundancy. Of course, detailed
analysis is necessary for both hard and soft errors to remove single points of failure from the
design that can render the full chip defective [26]. The TRIPS architectur provides many
opportunities to reduce the performance overhead of soft error detection using redundant
execution of TRIPS blocks.
Modular Design: The block-partitioned modular design of the processor queues that ser-
vice register reads, loads, and stores can be naturally extended to passvalues speculatively
from the primary execution of a block to its redundant execution. These valu s re then
verified by the block’s redundant execution before they are committed to architectural state.
Decoupling operand delivery from verification overlaps the execution latencies of the pri-
mary and redundant block and potentially improves performance. Further, these queues
also implicitly serve as synchronizing structures that control the relative slack between the
primary and redundant execution streams.
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Cooperative Hardware/Software Techniques: The block-atomic execution model pro-
vides several opportunities for reducing the performance overhead.While checking the
output of every instruction detects faults in execution very early, it requirs high band-
width for output comparison [125]. Since only the block outputs have to be compared,
the block-atomic execution model provides a favorable compromise between fault detec-
tion latency, and the bandwidth and storage requirements for output comparison. Prior
research demonstrated that the block-atomic execution model reduces register file updates
by 30-90% by using direct communication of temporary values between producing and
consuming instructions within a block [50]. The redundant execution modeldescribed in
detail in Chapter 7 allows multiple primary and redundant blocks to execute concurre tly
for higher performance. The model also exploits static knowledge of instruction placement
to implement fine-grained, and light-weight communication of data between the primary
and redundant blocks to further reduce performance overhead.
On-chip Networks: On-chip networks are the enabling technology for implementing
fine-grained communication between the primary and the redundant blocks,that can reduce
the performance overhead of redundant execution. The TRIPS architecture has several dif-
ferent on-chip networks for implementing different processor functions, a d can be reused
to communicate program instructions, commands, and data directly from the primary to the
redundant block.
4.4 Summary
Table 4.3 summarizes the features of the TRIPS architecture that help in improvng hard
error reliability. As described in Section 4.3.3, the advantages that the TRIPS architecture
provides for hard error evasion are exactly the same as those for harderro tolerance, so
Table 4.3 only shows the synergies for hard error tolerance. Table 4.4 summarizes the
features of the TRIPS architecture that help in improving soft error reliability. As described
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in Section 4.3.4, the features of the TRIPS architecture also provides opportunities to reduce
the performance overhead.
In this chapter, we qualitatively described in detail the synergy between theprin-
ciples of distributed architectures and the approaches for improving reliability. Though
we focus primarily on the TRIPS architecture, we recognize that these synergies apply to
distributed architectures in general since they are built on the same core principles. Sec-
tion 4.1.4 described how these principles are translated to specific mechanismsfor three
different distributed architecture design styles. For instance, these synergies would also ap-
ply to a CMP that uses modular design at the intra- and inter-processor granularity, on-chip
networks in the memory hierarchy, and software threads for extracting cocurrency. Prior
research has explored hard and soft error reliability mechanisms exploiting these synergies
on a CMP architecture [19,126–128]. In the remaining chapters, we quantitatively evaluate
specific mechanisms in the TRIPS architecture for hard and soft error reliability based on a
subset of these synergies.
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Synergy between TRIPS Features and Hard Error Tolerance
Principles of Feature of Technique for
Fault tolerance TRIPS architecture improving reliability
Redundancy Tile-based modular design Avoid defective tile
On-chip networks Avoid defective path, router
Block-atomic execution model Blocks with fewer than 128
instructions have redundancy
Fault detection Tile-based modular design Modular BIST engines at
On-chip networks each tile and router
Fault isolation Tile-based modular design Reduced size of
On-chip networks Field Replaceable Unit (FRU)
On-line repair On-chip networks Adaptive routing algorithms
Routing tables for
reconfiguration
Static instruction placement Fault-aware instruction
scheduling
Block-atomic execution model Ideal granularity for
rescheduling
Table 4.3: Features of the TRIPS architecture that aid in implementing the principles of
fault tolerance for hard error reliability
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Synergy between TRIPS Features and Soft Error Tolerance
Principles of Feature of Technique for
Fault tolerance TRIPS architecture improving reliability
Redundancy Tile-based design Spatial, temporal redundancy,
spatial redundancy in queues
On-chip networks Spatial redundancy
on communication paths
Block-atomic execution model Insert redundant instructions in
the block, if there are empty slots
Static instruction placement Compiler can enforce
spatial redundancy
Fault detection Block-atomic execution model Natural granularity for




On-line repair Block-atomic execution model Ideal granularity for
checkpointing for fault recovery
Synergy between TRIPS Features and Soft Error Evasion
Fault Evasion Feature of Technique for
TRIPS architecture improving reliability
Tile-based design Exploit spatial non-uniformity
in vulnerability by electrical
or microarchitectural techniques
Eg: non-uniform DVFS
On-chip networks Control GDN, OPN, GCN
independently to reduce
occupancy of block state
and thus reduce block
vulnerability
Block-atomic execution model Ideal granularity for introspective
fault-evasive techniques
to measure & reduce
vulnerability
Table 4.4: Features of the TRIPS architecture that aid in implementing soft errr r liability
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Chapter 5
Techniques for Improving Hard
Error Reliability
In this chapter, we explore techniques based on features of distributed architectures that
can be used to improve chip yield and enhance the graceful degradation of fail-in-place
systems. We observe that many structures even in current day chip designs, beyond just
DRAM and SRAM, contain a substantial degree of regularity. For example,modern super-
scalar processors contain regular structures for managing register renaming, and for queuing
instructions and other pending operations. Many processors contain par llel or replicated
structures, such as execution units and set associative caches. We begin by showing that
exploiting microarchitectural redundancy is a powerful technique, and cbe effectively
applied towards the current mainstream design methodology that uses chip multiprocessors
composed of multiple dynamic superscalar processors, to achieve significant improvements
in yield at future technologies.
Chapter 4 argued that future architectures will use greater software cooperation to
exploit concurrency in a technology scalable manner, which naturally alsosuggests using
software assistance for performing fault reconfiguration. In the second half of this chap-
ter, we propose an innovative compiler-assisted fault reconfiguration technique for static
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architectures like the TRIPS architecture, that exploits many of the synergies described in
Table 4.3. The technique takes into consideration both the opportunities and the extra de-
mands placed by important new features including on-chip interconnection networks, and
the greater reliance on software.
Some of the redundancy, such as the replicated ETs in the TRIPS architecture, and
extra entries in bookkeeping structures such as the instruction window, register renaming
queues, and reorder buffer, can be removed with moderate performance pe alty. Processors
also contain non-essential structures, such as branch prediction tables, that enable higher
performance but are not required for correct execution of programs. While modern chips
are typically declaredfunctional only if all of the components are fully functional, we
propose that chips with some defective components are still useful and can improve overall
yield or achieve higher availability in a fail-in-place system. Based on this idea,w extend
performance binningto include a new method of differentiating chips that come off the
fabrication line based on their relative performance, and propose a newyield metric called
performance-averaged yield(YPAV ) that is a function of the performance range of each bin
and the number of chips in the bins.
We analyze these degraded chips in the context of improving yield for current and
future technologies. We further explore different granularities of degraded components,
from processor sub-components to whole processors, for uniprocess r chips and future ar-
chitectures based on chip multiprocessors [101]. We explore dynamic mechanisms for fault
reconfiguration in dynamic superscalar architectures, and fault-awareinst uction schedul-
ing heuristics in the statically scheduled TRIPS architecture. Our results indicate that the
YPAV for a dynamic superscalar processor can be improved from 85% to 98% with certain
assumptions about defect density and defect size. For chip multiprocessor architectures
at future technologies, we show that microarchitectural redundancy provides substantial
benefits achievingYPAV of up to 99.6%. We argue that compiler-assisted fault reconfigu-
ration is more efficient than pure hardware based mechanisms for static architectures such
103
as TRIPS, and propose fault-aware scheduling heuristics which, for aset of EEMBC and
SPEC benchmarks successfully reschedule the program to avoid defective r sources with
less than 4% loss in performance. We also discuss hybrid hardware-software techniques for
fault reconfiguration as an interesting avenue that is worth investigating in the future.
These results show that many random manufacturing defects can be tolerated by
exploiting microarchitectural redundancy. These results also suggest that augmenting fail-
in-place systems with chip-level diagnostics and reconfiguration could provide more grace-
ful degradation when components become faulty. Section 5.1 introduces theno ion of
performance-averaged yield and describes how it can be calculated. Section 5.2 applies
the performance-averaged yield to dynamic superscalar architectures inthe context of both
a uniprocessor and a multiprocessor. Section 5.3 extends fault reconfiguration to the com-
piler and evaluates fault aware instruction scheduling heuristics. Section 5.4 summarizes
the related work, and finally Section 5.5 presents our conclusions.
5.1 Performance-Averaged Yield
Today, it has become common for manufacturers to separate chips that arefor sale into
speed bins based on their operating frequency and to offer them for sale at different prices.
More recently, some have made use of a more generalp rformance binningstrategy that
separates parts into bins of guaranteed performance levels rather than bins based solely on
operating frequency [129]. We propose that designs that include replicated or non-essential
functions in support of increased performance be enhanced with the capability to disable
some of these structures in face of defects detected within the circuitry. Chips of differ-
ent end-performance, corresponding to different degraded configurations, can be offered at
different prices, extending the current manufacturers use of speedbinning. We formalize
this notion of performance binning, and propose a new yield metric calledperformance-
averaged yield(YPAV ) in which the total yield is a function of the performance range of
each bin and the number of chips in the bins.
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Yield conventionally includes only chips that are fully functional, taking into ac-
count redundant rows to increase yield in caches. We propose to augment chips with spe-
cific fault reconfiguration capabilities, so that non-functioning components that fall within
the domain of these capabilities can be successfully disabled to produce a functional chip,
albeit with some performance degradation. While a fully functional processr with all
of its components having their full capacity achieves peak performance, the overall yield
(YOV ERALL) that includes both fully functional processors and processors with some c m-
ponents disabled, exhibits a range of different system end-performance v lues. However, a
fair methodology for calculating yield must now account for the system end-performance
while combining the yield of fully functional processors and processors with performance
degradation.
While YOV ERALL treats all the processor configurations equally regardless of their
degraded state,performance-averagedyield (YPAV ) specifically aims to differentiate be-
tween fully functional chips and chips with degraded components. Our design of theYPAV
metric achieves this by using the performance of the resulting chip configuration s the
discriminating measure. Using this formulation captures both the effects of redundancy—
improvements in yield and reductions from peak performance. Processorcompanies typ-
ically use a carefully selected suite of applications, that are representativof the target
market segment, to calculate processor performance, so that it can be easily compared with
other designs. We propose to measure system performance in instructions-per-cycle (IPC),
which is a standard metric used for measuring processor performance. Adding three steps
to the algorithm for computingYOV ERALL gives usYPAV . First, theMAXIPC corre-
sponding to the base configuration (which is the fully functional processor configuration)
is calculated. Each degraded configuration is then associated with arelative IPC, which is
the ratio of itsIPC to theMAXIPC. Finally the yield of each degraded configuration is









5.2 Exploiting Microarchitectural Redundancy for Defect Tol-
erance in Dynamic Architectures
In this section, we propose to extend thedesign for yieldtechniques in the microarchitec-
tural level by specifically identifying the redundancy in different on-chip components and
the mechanisms by which it can be exploited. We suggest that by allowing some of th se
redundant structures to be disabled or degraded in the face of internald fects, the chip can
offer improved defect tolerance.
We present results for yield enhancement at future technologies and chip microar-
chitectures as a function of the defect characteristics and the redundancy models. We exam-
ine the yield trends for a uniprocessor with and without redundancy, analyze the benefits of
microarchitectural redundancy for chip multiprocessor architectures, and finally end with
a comparison of the yield improvements attained using different redundancymodels. We
consider the two main chip topologies proposed in Chapter 2; a uniprocessor with a con-
stant architecture, whose area decreases rapidly with decreasing feature size because the
microarchitecture is kept constant, and a chip multiprocessor architecture which includes
increasing number of processors per chip with decreasing feature sizes, and hence main-
tains constant chip area. Chapter 2 described the modeling infrastructurethat integrates a
basic yield model and a microprocessor area model with the redundancy model of the chip
components, in detail. This overall chip yield model is extended to accommodate newer
on-chip redundancy models proposed to achieve higher defect tolerance. Since there can be
a performance penalty depending on the degraded configuration, we use a microprocessor
simulator to measure the chip end-performance across the range of different configurations.
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Four built in  





in place of bad entry
(b) Array Redundancy (AR) 






(c) Dynamic Queue Redundancy (DQR)
All entries available Two entries invalid
Functional, some performance loss
Figure 5.1: Basic redundancy models
5.2.1 On-chip Redundancy Model
This section describes each redundancy model and our implementation of theredundancy
models in the different processor components. In the future, chips will likely contain mul-
tiple processors, when we can imagine a set ofintra-processorredundancies as well as
inter-processorredundancy at the next level of hierarchy. As designs strive for more out-
standing operations in flight, it is likely that this potential for redundancy will increase over
time. As a basis for analyzing the effects of the different redundancy types, we use the same
processor model shown in Figure 2.3 of Chapter 2, that is similar to Alpha 21264 [43]. Both
the integer and floating point clusters are symmetric and each have 2 functional units within
them. The processor also has an on-chip L2 cache of 1MB. We identify three primary types
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of redundancy as a basis for our redundancy model. In the next few paragraphs we explain
each type of redundancy shown in Figure 5.1.
Component Level Redundancy (CLR): In CLR, the component is typically replicated
to provide additional performance through parallelism, but only a subset isac ually required
for correct functionality. Each component that hasCLR has aresourceline associated with
it, and the component’s BIST module sets theresourceline to be permanently BUSY in the
event the component is disabled due to internal faults. The parent control l gic already con-
tains mechanisms that restricts its use each cycle to only those components whose resource
lines are FREE. For instance, the instruction scheduling logic is implemented usingwakeup
arrays that containRESOURCE AVAILABLElines indicating which resources are FREE in
the given cycle [130]. The execution clusters and the internal ALUs of the processor are
covered by theCLR model. The hierarchical nature of theCLR for the clusters and ALUs
provides coverage over the control logic of the individual clusters.
The Alpha 21264 [43], for example, has two integer clusters each with two integer
arithmetic units. TheCLR concept can be applied within a cluster since it can operate
correctly with only one functional unit. The clusters are not exact copiesof ach other in the
Alpha 21264, and the instruction dispatch logic is statically biased to distribute instructions
between them. But we use a modified Alpha 21264 design where they are symmetric, and
hence theCLR model can be applied here as well. In the future, as designers continue to
struggle with managing the complexity of large designs, we expect this sort ofdesign for
reuseto become more common. Further, ifCLR can be proven to have a positive effect
on defect tolerance and yield, it is reasonable to expect that the amount of CLR is likely to
increase over time.
Array Redundancy (AR): Array redundancy was already described in Chapter 2, but
is included here for completeness. When defects are detected in rows or columns of bit
cells in the main body of the array, theAR mechanisms can be configured to effectively
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steer the decode towards the redundant entry rather than towards the bad row or column.
This technique is already commonly used in many types of RAM chips as well as inthe
embedded RAM structures found in more general purpose chips such asmicroprocessors.
From a yield perspective,AR is attractive because a relatively small investment in area
can offer excellent defect tolerance for the entire structure. In many cses, this can drive
the yield loss due to these structures to very low levels with no loss in performance. The
set associative L1 and L2 caches are way-interleaved allowing bothCLR (disabling one
set) andAR (redundant row steering within one of the operational sets). TheCLR for
the caches provides coverage over the peripheral logic of the individual cache banks also.
Consistent with the accepted design practice [48], the redundant rows and columns are
about 2.5% of the base cache capacity. We also allow the configuration with noon-chip
L2 cache,ie., with both L2 cache banks defective. The TLBs are also covered by theAR
model.
Dynamic Queue Redundancy (DQR): DQR is the third type of redundancy that we
explore. Avalid bit is added to each queue entry that hasDQR. If a particular queue
entry has defects, it can be permanently disabled by clearing thevalid bit, thus decreasing
the number ofavailableentries. The existing protocols that add queue entries are modified
to stall the machine when theavailablequeue entries are full. Downstream queue access
logic is also augmented so that the queue entries markedinvalid are never processed. In
highly pipelined designs, as well as designs that support dynamic reordeing of operations,
many structures such as the reorder buffer, the issue window, the registe remappers, the
load and store buffers are implemented as queues. For example, in the Alpha21264, the
reorder buffers, the issue window, the register remappers, the load buffers, and the store
buffers are all implemented as queues. There is a minimum size to these queuesto s pport
basic functionality, and the larger sizes are intentionally used to gain performance. In our
implementation ofDQR, we include spare queue entries to provide some defect tolerance
without losing any performance, similar toAR. Nevertheless, our experiments show that
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Processor Redundancy Configuration
Microarchitecture Resource Base capacity / Redundancy Minimum
Spare entries Model operational size
INT, FP Instruction Window 20 / 1 DQR 20
INT, FP Register File 80 / 2 DQR 80
INT, FP Map Table 32 / 1 DQR 32
Execution units per cluster 2 / 0 CLR 1
(INT Alu, FP Alu, INT Mult, FP Mult)
INT, FP Clusters 2 / 0 CLR 1
Reorder Buffer 80 / 2 DQR 80
Load / Store queue 32 / 1 DQR 32
TLBs (Fully associative) 128 / 2 AR 128
L1 I, D cache (2-way associative) 64KB / 1.5KB AR, CLR 32KB
L2 cache on-chip 1MB / 24KB AR, CLR 0MB
Table 5.1: Processor redundancy configuration
disabling one or two entries in most of these queues results in at most 1% loss inperfor-
mance. All of the instruction window queues, register files, map tables, reorder buffers, and
storage queues are associated with theDQR model.
Table 5.1 summarizes the redundancy model in the different processor components.
Thespare entriesprovided in the components are used only in the face of defects and do
not contribute to additional performance. Elements of the processor not listed in the table,
like random control logic, and logic that is used to implement the redundancy model itself,
have no redundancy coverage in our example design. Nevertheless, approximately 85%
of the total area of the processor has coverage through redundancy, as ompared to 50%
with AR alone in the L1 and L2 caches. This configuration and aggregate model is used
for the uniprocessor and multiprocessor yield analysis described througout this study. As
described in Section 2.3.2, baseline yield (YBASE) corresponds to a processor withAR in
the L1 and L2 caches.
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5.2.2 Extensions to the Overall Chip Yield Model
Section 5.2.1 describes how a single processor component may have more than one form
of redundancy. If the multiple redundancies are non-hierarchical in nature, the overall com-
ponent yield is simply equal to the product of the yield of the individual regions with the
different redundancy models. The individual yields can be composed uing a simple prod-
uct because the Poisson model treats defects as completely independent. On the other hand
if the component has redundancies that compose hierarchically, we beginby applying the
method at the lowest level at which the redundancies of the regions are non-hierarchical, and
then reapply the method recursively at each higher level of hierarchy.The chip area model
is used to estimate the area of the different component regions. The redundancy model of
a region is one ofCLR, AR, DQR or no redundancy. The Poisson Yield model is used
directly to calculate the statistical yield of a region with no redundancy. The method to cal-
culate the yield of a region with one of the three primary redundancy schemesis d cribed
below.
A redundancy model specifies the minimum number of working entries the com-
ponent must possess to ensure correct overall functionality. The component yield is then
simply the probability that it has at least its minimum subset of entries working outof the
total number of entries including the spares. The overall component yield is therefore the
sum of the probabilities associated with all the configurations in which the component has
at least the minimum number of working entries, out of the total number of entries includ-











whereCnr is thecombinationsoperator,mins is the subset of entries required for
correct functionality,bs represents the base number of entries in the component, andse
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is the number of spare entries. The probability of a entry being functional or invalid is
computed using the Poisson Yield model. For example, caches that haveAR are provided
with enough redundant rows and columns to greatly improve yield and at the sam time
show no reduction from peak performance. Hence in this casemins becomes equal to
bs, and the value ofse is dependent on the cache capacity. Components with DQR also
have very similar specifications. WithCLR in the clusters, the processor could potentially
have a configuration with only one functional cluster, in which casese is equal to zero and
mins is equal to one. HenceYOV ERALL, not only includes the traditionally accounted
fully functional chips but also includes chips with degraded components. The minimum
subset of entries for each on-chip component determined by the specificr dundancy model
is given in Table 5.1.
5.2.3 Results
To evaluate the performance of the various degraded configurations weu ed the sim-alpha
simulator which models the Alpha 21264 core in detail [131]. First, we configured sim-
alpha to resemble our processor model. We further made modifications that enable us to
simulate the different degraded configurations by selectively disabling on-chip components.
Table 5.2 shows the seven benchmarks we chose from the SPEC2000 benchmark suite and
sphinx, a speech recognition benchmark, to provide a wide range of behavior intheir us-
age of the memory system and the execution resources. The applicationsmesa, equake,
eon,andgzip show relatively high IPC and are more sensitive to the available execution
resources. The applicationssphinx, mcf, swimandart are memory intensive in nature and
show greater sensitivity to cache capacities. For each benchmark, we simulated the se-
quence of instructions which capture the representative phase of the program, determined
by using SimPoint [132]. Table 5.2 also shows the number of instructions skipped to reach
the start of the execution phase (FFWD), the number of instructions simulated (RUN ),
determined using SimPoint [132], and the maximum IPC for each benchmark atthe base
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Benchmark category Benchmark name FFWD RUN MaxIPC
(x100M)
INT Memory intensive 181.mcf 336.3 100M 0.13
sphinx 60 200M 0.57
Processor bound 164.gzip 332 100M 1.76
252.eon 207.3 100M 1.29
FP Memory intensive 171.swim 1196 100M 1.02
179.art 66.3 100M 0.26
Processor bound 183.equake 193.4 100M 1.11
177.mesa 639.9 100M 1.34
Table 5.2: Benchmarks used for performance experiments
configuration.
Two important factors contribute toYPAV being nearly equal toYOV ERALL. To
describe the factors we plot the relative IPC distribution in Figure 5.2 for allthe allowed
processor configurations, not accounting for their actual yield or likelihood of occurrence.
A subset of this data along with the degraded processor configuration is also shown in
Table 5.3. As a review, the relative IPC is calculated as the ratio of the IPC ofthe degraded
configuration to the peak IPC corresponding to the fully functional configuration.
The top portion of Table 5.3 shows the harmonic mean relative IPCs of a small
subset of chip configurations having relative IPC greater than 0.8. In the bottom portion,
the relative IPC drops below 0.8, with the last row corresponding to our most degraded
configuration. First, the graph shows that 80% of the configurations havea relative IPC
greater than 0.8. The remaining configurations having relative IPC around 0.55 correspond
to the chips with a fully defective L2 cache. Second, there is enough redundancy in our
processor model that most of the yield is also concentrated in configurations with high
relative IPC, and highly degraded configurations such as in the bottom portion f the table
never occur and hence provide no contribution to yield. Hence in all of theproduct terms



































Figure 5.2: IPC distribution for the different configurations
Based on this analysis, we present our results for yield enhancement atfuture tech-
nologies and chip microarchitectures as a function of the defect characteristi s and the re-
dundancy model. We model the same constant-architecture uniprocessor and constant-area
chip multiprocessor topologies proposed in Chapter 2. We first proceed toexamine the yield
trends for the uniprocessor with and without redundancy. We then analyze the benefits of
microarchitectural redundancy for chip multiprocessor architectures, and finally end with a
comparison of the yield improvements attained using different redundancy models.
Constant-architecture Uniprocessor Yield
Figure 5.3 showsYPAV obtained by incrementally adding different flavors of on-chip re-
dundancy to the constant-architecture uniprocessor model. For instance, t 100nm the
maximum contribution comes from L2 bank level redundancy, andCLR in the functional
units dominates among all the other types of redundancy, which together incraseYPAV
114
Degraded Processor Configuration
Integer Floating Point I-Cache D-Cache L2 Cache Relative
Functional Functional Capacity (KB) Capacity (KB) Capacity (MB) IPC
Units Units
4 4 64 64 1 1.0
3 4 64 64 1 0.97
2 4 64 64 1 0.93
4 3 64 64 1 0.99
4 2 64 64 1 0.98
4 4 32 64 1 0.97
4 4 64 32 1 0.97
4 4 64 64 0.5 0.94
2 2 64 64 1.0 0.93
2 2 32 32 0.5 0.85
1 1 64 64 1 0.73
1 1 32 32 0.5 0.69
4 4 64 64 0 0.65
2 2 32 32 0 0.5
1 1 32 32 0 0.44
Table 5.3: Relative IPCs for a few sample degraded configurations
to 98.8%. Since most of the configurations lie within 20% of maximum performance(see
Figure 5.2)YOV ERALL (indicated by the dotted line), which includes both fully functional
processors and processors with some components disabled, is 99.2%, which is only 0.4%
greater thanYPAV . Across technologies,YBASE , the yield withAR in the L1 and L2
caches, increases from 85.4% to a maximum of 93.7% because the gain fromthe rapidly
decreasing chip area outweighs the increased susceptibility to yield loss dueto the higher
kill ratio. Second, the contribution of L2 bank level redundancy continues to be signifi-
cant, and all the other types of redundancy give progressively diminishing returns. This is
because the L1 and L2 caches occupy almost 70% of the chip area and theabsolute area
occupied by the remaining components becomes vanishingly small at smaller feature sizes.
Finally, YPAV increases from 98% at 250nm to 99.2% at 50nm, and since most of the con-
figurations lie within 20% of maximum performance (see Figure 5.2)YOV ERALL, indicated
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DQR: On-chip queues 
CLR: L1 D bank level redundancy 
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Figure 5.3: Yield for a constant-architecture uniprocessor model at normal defect size
significant because it shows that even thoughYBASE improves with technology,YPAV can
be further improved by adding microarchitectural redundancy.
Constant-area Chip Multiprocessor Yield
In this study, we explore two types of multiprocessor redundancy. In intra-processor re-
dundancy, a chip can have its processors in any of the allowed internally degra ed states,
but the entire chip is considered bad once the available redundancy is exhausted in even
one of its processors. On the other hand a processor in a chip with only inter-processor
redundancy becomes useless if any fault resides in it. However, if enough of the remaining
processors are functional, the chip can still be operational. In this study,we consider the
chip to be functional as long as there is at least one good processor perchi . However, due
to the abundant redundancy available, in practice our models never produce chip configu-
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rations with more than two bad processors per chip. Since we model the multiple threads
to be independent, we calculate chip performance as the aggregate performance of all the
cores on the chip. The algorithm for calculatingYPAV from Section 5.1 can be naturally
extended to a multiprocessor by modifying each step to account for theIPC of the entire
multiprocessor (whether the configuration is fully functional or degraded). Extending the
equation forYPAV from Section 5.1 to a multiprocessor:
YPAV =
∑






where,Nc is the number of cores,IPCij is the performance of each core in that
configuration, andMAXIPCcore is the peak IPC of a fully functional processor. Since the
atomicity of failure in the inter-processor redundancy model is a whole processor, a core
has at most two states corresponding toMAXIPCcore or zero IPC. The expression for
YPAV can then be simplified to:
YPAV =
∑





where,Nw is the number of fully functional processors in that degraded configura-
tion.
Yield with Intra-processor Redundancy: Figure 5.4 plotsYPAV across all technolo-
gies, obtained by incrementally adding redundancy to each processor in amultiprocessor
chip with intra-processor redundancy. The x-axis shows the feature size and the number of
processors per chip at each technology. At any given technology adding redundancy im-
provesYPAV substantially.CLR in the functional units give maximum yield benefit, and
the benefits from L2 bank level redundancy,DQR in the queues, andCLR in the clusters
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Figure 5.4: Yield with intra-processor redundancy at normal defect size
from 68.2% to 93.7%.
Three interesting features can be observed across technologies. First, theYBASE
decreases substantially from 85.4% at 250nm to 59.5% at 50nm, because the kill ratio
increases considerably at smaller feature sizes. Second, the instancesof intra-processor re-
dundancy on the chip increases linearly with the number of processors, and as a result the
addition of redundancy leads to greater improvements in yield at smaller feature sizes. For
instance, at 180nmYPAV increases by 4.4% withCLR in the functional units, whereas it
increases by 12.4% at 50nm. Third, the higher yield benefits, depending on the redundancy
model, imply that more chips are degraded at smaller technologies. But as the area occupied
by a single processor decreases, itsYBASE increases (see Figure 5.3), and hence the prob-
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Figure 5.5: Yield with inter-processor redundancy at normal defect size
per chip, the fraction of degraded processors per chip decreases with technology. Hence,
even though the number of degraded chips increases at smaller technologies, each resulting
degraded chip configuration contains a majority of fully functional processor cores and very
few degraded processors. As a result,YPAV continues to be within 0.2% ofYOV ERALL at
all technologies. Although there are significant benefits from adding redundancy,YPAV
with all the types of redundancy drops from 98% at 250nm to 91.3% at 50nm due to higher
kill ratio.
Yield with Inter-processor Redundancy: Figure 5.5 plotsYPAV for a multiprocessor
with inter-processor redundancy. Inter-processor redundancy gives coverage over the en-
tire area of the chip and hence dramatically improvesYOV ERALL, approaching 100% at
technologies beyond 180nm. The yield at 250nm alone is low because only one pr ces-
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Figure 5.6: Comparison of Y-PAV for different redundancy models
the fraction of degraded processors per chip decreases with technology. As a result,YPAV
increases uniformly from 85% at 250nm to 98% at 50nm.
Comparison of Redundancy Models: Figure 5.6 comparesYPAV obtained using four
different redundancy models. With onlyAR, YPAV decreases rapidly from 85.4% at 250nm
to 59.5% at 50nm. Having intra-processor redundancy alone achieves high YPAV , which
decreases slightly from 98% at 250nm to 91.3% at 50nm. Inter-processor redundancy gives
coverage over the entire area of the chip and henceYPAV increases uniformly from 85.4%
at 250nm to 98% at 50nm. The yield benefits offered by intra and inter-process r redun-
dancy crossover at 100nm because of the opposite trends in theirYPAV across technologies.
A comparison of the improvements offered by intra and inter-processor redundancy mod-
els shows that, down to 100nmYPAV obtained using intra-processor redundancy is higher
than from inter-processor redundancy after which we see greater ben fits from the inter-
processor redundancy model. The crossover point is dependent onthe defect parameters
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and the processor granularity at each technology. While this analysis assume a constant
defect density across technologies, larger defect densities will shift the crossover point to
the right because the fault susceptibility per unit area of silicon increases, nd hence fine
grained redundancy becomes more appropriate. Also, while our CMP design is composed
of a number of relatively small Alpha 21264-like cores, future CMP designs may take ad-
vantage of much larger uniprocessor cores to achieve technology scalable high performance
over a wide range of applications [111]. Consequently, there will be fewr processors and
significantly greater intra-processor redundancy than inter-processr redundancy per chip,
which will again shift the crossover point to the right. Since intra and inter-processor redun-
dancy offer different types of coverage, having both intra and inter-processor redundancy
provides consistently highYPAV ranging from 98% at 250nm to 99.6% at 50nm, with a
maximum improvement inYPAV of 3.75% over having only one of the types of redun-
dancy.
These results show that exploiting microarchitectural redundancy is a powerful
technique that can achieve significant improvements in the yield of dynamic superscalar
CMP architectures at future technologies. However, as described in Chapter 4, future dis-
tributed architectures will use greater software assistance to achieve highperformance. Ar-
chitectures may adopt fully static or hybrid execution models that expose the distributed
resources to the software for static allocation to achieve technology scalability. While error-
free execution can be achieved in a dynamic superscalar processor byforcing the program to
utilize only the functional processor resources, just disabling a statically allocated resource
in a static architecture will lead to incorrect execution. Further, configurina hardware
component to be offline or online in a dynamic architecture, is relatively easy, and can be
done using busy lines, free lists, or valid bits that mostly already exist, as describ d in Sec-
tion 5.2.1. On the other hand, in a static architecture, either the application also has t be
appropriately recompiled to account for the degraded configuration, ordedicated hardware
resources need to be added to perform the necessary fault reconfiguration oblivious to the
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software.
5.3 Fault-Aware Instruction Scheduling Heuristics for Static Ar-
chitectures
In this Section, we propose techniques for compiler-assisted fault reconfiguration in static
architectures, and identify potential advantages over purely hardwarebased mechanisms
for defect tolerance. First, we propose that future static architecturespush dynamic fault
reconfiguration within the boundaries of a single processor to achieve greater yield and
system availability. Second, we propose that the defective processor configuration be ex-
posed to the compiler which can then perform efficient fault reconfiguration by intelligent
instruction scheduling. We argue that fault-aware physical layout of theinstructions can
more effectively exploit the available spatial redundancy, and with fewerov heads than a
purely hardware based approach to achieve both better performance and yield. We evaluate
our mechanisms on the TRIPS architecture.
5.3.1 Design Space for Fault Reconfiguration in Static Architectures
The design space for fault reconfiguration in static architectures can beorganized under
three axes:
Granularity of reconfiguration: Fault reconfiguration within a chip can be coarse-grained
and operate at a processor granularity, exploit fine-grained intra-processor redundancy, or
both. Section 5.2.3 discussed the tradeoffs involved, and concluded thatsupporting intra-
processor fault reconfiguration is beneficial either if the defect density is large, or if the
cores that compose the chip are large.
Hardware or software based reconfiguration: Fault reconfiguration can be performed
either using hardware techniques that are transparent to the software,or with software as-
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sistance. In static architectures like TRIPS, in which the hardware configuration is already
exposed to the instruction scheduler for spatial instruction placement (seeSection 4.2),
software-assisted fault reconfiguration is a natural proposition and provides interesting op-
portunities and challenges.
Economy of mechanisms: To be complexity-effective, fault reconfiguration must ide-
ally reuse mechanisms that already exist, or propose new mechanisms that can be useful
for achieving multiple goals. A lot of research has been done on hardware techniques for
architectural adaptation of processor resources to achieve improved pwer and energy effi-
ciency [105,133]. Many of these core concepts and mechanisms can beeffici ntly adapted
for fault reconfiguration.
Software based dynamic reconfiguration on logically partitioned IBM pSeriessym-
metric multiprocessor systems allows movement of hardware resources fromone partition
to another enabling autonomic system management to optimize performance, resource uti-
lization, and reliability [28]. It provides the foundation for self-healing anddiagnosing
software for dynamic CPU sparing that allows systems to transparently replace a defective
processor with a fully functional processor with no impact on the application. This tech-
nique uses virtualization to manage system reconfiguration at the processor granularity, and
can be naturally applied to future system-on-a-chip and CMP designs [126].
The Transmeta Crusoe processor pushed this technique within the boundaries of
a single processor, and virtualized an X86 CPU by implementing a code morphing soft-
ware layer that dynamically translated instructions from the target X86 ISA tothe VLIW
host ISA [134]. Traditionally, VLIW processors expose the processor pipeline details to
the compiler, requiring all existing binaries to be recompiled following any change i the
pipeline microarchitecture. The Transmeta processor solved this problem by xposing the
actual VLIW hardware configuration only to the code morphing software that does the dy-
namic translation. Thus, only the translation software requires modification whe ever there
is a change in the underlying hardware. In general, virtualization can be used to isolate
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the details of the hardware from the software whenever the underlying hardware configura-
tion is expected to change, thus enabling application portability to new environments and
processors.
5.3.2 Fault Reconfiguration in the TRIPS Architecture
In the context of the TRIPS architecture, the instruction scheduler already xamines the
entire distributed execution substrate, and accounts for all the constraintshat contribute to
optimal block performance (see Section 4.2.2). The scheduler can therefore naturally act as
the virtualization layer, and take advantage of the abundant redundancywithin the TRIPS
processor to expose only the functional resources to the scheduling algorithm. Table 4.3 in
Section 4.4 summarized the salient features of the TRIPS architecture that can be exploited
for hard error reliability. The next few paragraphs discuss how the featur s of each TRIPS
tile influence the choices for fault reconfiguration available in each axes of the design space.
Register Tile (RT): Defects in entries of the architectural register file, and the read and
write queues can be tolerated usingDQR described in Section 5.2.1. Further, with mod-
est extra reconfiguration logic, the hardware can use one of the other fur egister banks
provisioned for use in multi-threaded mode, if a defect in the random logic portion renders
an entire bank of the register file unusable. Of course, this would mean thatthe processor
can support only up to three threads instead of four. Similarly, since the read and write
queues are statically block-partitioned, adding simple microarchitectural support to limit
the maximum number of speculative blocks below eight in single-threaded mode, an the
maximum number of threads below four in multi-threaded mode, allows an entire block
partition to be disabled for even higher defect tolerance. Since the RT area is dominated by
storage, we believe that these techniques will provide very high defect tol rance. However,
if a defect renders the entire RT unusable, a program must be able to confine its usage to
the functional RTs. Since the architectural registers are statically interleavd across the four
RTs in a round robin fashion, register allocation must be made fault-aware touse nly the
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architectural registers in the functional RTs. While this technique is feasibleat static compi-
lation time to improve chip yield, redoing global register allocation at run-time to improve
lifetime reliability is an expensive and inconvenient operation. Further, if a deect occurs in
the router (OPN), or other communication logic (GSN, GCN, GDN), redundant logic and
routing paths must be provided to allow communication between the different RTs.
Data Tile (DT): The data caches, the storage structures in the LSQs, and the miss-
handling logic can be protected effectively using a combination ofAR andDQR described
in Section 5.2.1. Further, if the structures are sub-banked they can also useCLR. Since
the DT area is also dominated by storage, we believe that these techniques willprovide
very high defect tolerance. However, if a defect in unprotected random logic disables an
entire DT then no data accesses can be allowed to that tile. Since addressesare tatically
interleaved at a cache line granularity across the four DTs in a round robin fashion, the in-
terleaving policy must be made configurable to use only the functional DTs. The tradeoffs
associated with this technique are discussed in [26]. Further, if a there is adefect in the
OPN router that disables communication through the DT, the load and store instructions
that generate the data tile accesses, and the target instructions that consume the data must
only be scheduled in rows or columns such that the y-x dimension-order paths in both cases
do not include the defective tile. Alternatively, redundant logic and routing paths for all the
networks (OPN, GSN, GCN, DSN) must be provided to allow communication between the
different DTs.
Instruction Tile (IT): The instruction cache arrays, and other queues can similarly be
protected usingAR, DQR, andCLR to achieve very high defect tolerance. A defect
that disables an entire IT is arguably more difficult to manage, since TRIPS uses a fixed
allocation policy wherein each IT is responsible for delivering instructionst the ETs in
the same row. One option is to use compiler assistance to reduce the maximum allowed
block capacity from 128 instructions, and scheduling the block on the ETs inthe rows
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corresponding to the functional ITs. Since the ETs corresponding to thedefective IT now
only contain NOP instructions, it can be ignored without affecting correctness, albeit with
a corresponding performance overhead. However, redundant logic and routing paths have
to be provided to allow communication between the different ITs.
Global Tile (GT): While the I-cache tag, and predictor arrays can be protected usingAR,
GT also contains a significant amount of state machines and control logic which must be
protected by conventional redundancy techniques such as duplication.Since there is only
one GT we believe that the overhead due to duplication will be reasonable.
Execution Tile (ET): The ET is unique in many respects. Sankaralingam et al. demon-
strated that the ETs consume 28% of the overall chip area [108]. Thus, while the layout
and routing density of logic is less than regular memory arrays, the large area occupied by
the ETs make them susceptible to defects. Further, like the GT, ET area is dominated by
control logic, both due to regular datapath structures in the functional units, a d significant
amount of random control logic in the decode, select, register read, execut , and writeback
pipeline stages. The key difference however is that, unlike the GT, there ar sixteen ETs
providing a substantial amount of redundancy both for computation and communication.
Also, prior research has shown that the ALUs and the operand registerfile a e the
hottest structures on the chip making them most vulnerable to intrinsic failures [31, 135].
TRIPS uses a three-level register storage hierarchy composed of the architectural register
file and the read queues in the RTs, and the operand buffers in the ETs, tooptimize for
capacity, latency, and bandwidth. Since the ET buffers, that form the lowst level of the
hierarchy, are the most frequently accessed due to their low latency and high bandwidth,
they may potentially become a thermal hotspot in the design.
These unique aspects of the ETs make them the most interesting structure to study.
Further, since the area of the other tiles (except GT) are dominated by storage,AR, DQR,
andCLR can be effectively applied to achieve substantial defect tolerance. Hence we focus
126
only on the ETs in the rest of this study. We explore opportunities for using the instruction
scheduler as the virtualization layer to exploit the fine-grained redundancy available. How-
ever, the design of the fault-aware instruction scheduling algorithm depens o the fault
model for the ETs.
5.3.3 Fault Model
Based on the above analysis, we make the simplifying assumption that the yield ofall chip
components except the ETs is perfect, to help us with isolating the yield behavior of the ETs.
This assumption allows us to calculate chip yield using the basic yield model proposed in
Chapter 2, along with an accurate area model for the ETs alone. The areastim ted by the
model is within 1% of the actual area computed by synthesis of the ET RTL, thusvalidating
the model. We also ensured that the area of the major individual components,such as the
instruction and operand buffers, and the functional units, from the area model and synthesis
matched each other closely. The redundancy model we assume for the components within
an ET includesDQR for the instruction and operand buffers, but does not includeCLR in
the functional units because each ET contains only one functional unit ofeach type.
Table 5.4 shows the projected yield distribution for five technology nodes 180nm,
130nm, 90nm, 65nm, and 45nm. The number of ETs per chip increases with decreasing
feature size to occupy a constant area of the chip. Since we assume that all c ip components
except the ETs have perfect yield, defects can only disable the ETs. Note that, as expected,
the random defect limited yield of chips with all ETs fully functional is quite high between
84.2%-96.4%. More importantly, notice that the distribution of defective chipsfalls quite
rapidly, with chips with one defective ET uniformly being the dominant common case at all
technology nodes. Further, this result is independent of the chip configuration determined
by the number of processors per chip and the number of ETs per processor. Based on this
result, we use single-defective-ET as the fault model in the rest of this study, and focus on
fault-aware scheduling heuristics that can tolerate one defective ET. Further, we consider
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Defective ET Yield Distribution
Technology 180 130 90 65 45
node (nm)
Number of 8 16 32 64 128
execution tiles
per chip
Area (mm2) 43 45 43 45 43
Total number 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
of chips
Number of 964 948 928 888 842
fully functional
chips
Number of 35 51 70 106 145
chips with
1 defective ET
Number of 1 1 2 6 12
chips with
2 defective ETs
Number of 0 0 0 0 1
chips with
3 defective ETs
Table 5.4: Determining the fault model using the yield distribution for the ETs
two specific variations of this general fault model:
• Faulty Node: The defect can occur anywhere on the ET except on the logic required
for communication. This excludes the OPN router, and logic included for the GDN
and GCN. So instructions cannot be scheduled on this ET, but the ET can be used as
an intermediate hop between a different source and destination tile.
• Faulty Link: A more restrictive fault model which also allows defects in the operand
router that transmits the results of computation to dependent instructions. Therefore,
in addition to not scheduling any instructions, this ET also cannot be on any pth
between two functional ETs.



















Figure 5.7: Fault-aware instruction placement
struction placement for the same dataflow graph shown in Figure 4.2. With thefaulty node
model, the algorithm must only avoid placing instructions on the faulty ETs. For instance,
while addi andsub in Figure 5.7a are scheduled on functional nodes, the y-x dimension-
order path fromaddi to sub passes through the defective ET. For thefaulty link model
shown in Figure 5.7b, the algorithm must also ensure that all pairs of depennt i structions
can use fully functional ETs along the path specified by the y-x dimension-order routing
function. Using the same example,addi andsub have been rescheduled in Figure 5.7b to
provide a functional path between them.
5.3.4 Evaluation Methodology
We used a simulator that models the TRIPS microarchitecture, execution model, an dis-
tributed protocols in detail. The simulator was validated to be within 4% of the RTL-level
processor simulator on a wide set of microbenchmarks. We employ a variety of bench-
marks to model a wide range of behaviors. The benchmarks are compiled using the TRIPS
compiler that performs traditional scalar optimizations, and several high-level transforma-
tions for generating high quality TRIPS blocks. The TRIPS compiler is still in develop-
ment and currently lacks a few optimizations that can further improve the quality of the
TRIPS blocks. To account for this, the benchmark suite includes both compiler-generated
and hand-optimized benchmarks. The hand-optimized benchmarks use better register allo-
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Compiler generated EEMBC Benchmarks
Automotive/Industrial Networking
a2time01 Angle to time conversion ospf Open shortest path first
basefp01 Basic integer and floating point pktflow Packet flow
bitmnp01 Bit manipulation routelookup Route lookup
cacheb01 Cache buster Office Automation
canrdr01 CAN remote data request dither01 Dithering
aifirf01 Finite impulse response filter rotate01 Image rotation
idctrn01 Inverse discrete cosine transformtext01 Text processing
iirflt01 Infinite impulse response filter bezier02 Bezier curve calculation
pntrch01 Pointer chasing Telecom
puwmod01 Pulse width modulation autocor00 Autocorrelation
rspeed01 Road speed calculation conven00 Convolutional encoder
tblook01 Table lookup and interpolation viterb00 Viterbi decoder
ttsprk01 Tooth to spark
matrix01 Matrix arithmetic
Hand-optimized EEMBC Benchmarks
a2time01 Angle to time conversion
basefp01 Basic integer and floating point math
rspeed01 Road speed calculation
tblook01 Table lookup and bilinear interpolation
bezier02 Bezier curve calculation
dither01 Dithering
autocor00 Finite length fixed-point autocorrelation
Table 5.5: List of EEMBC benchmarks used for evaluation.
cation, predication optimization, and hyperblock formation to improve the overallperfor-
mance.
Table 5.5 shows the list of compiler-generated and hand-optimized EEMBC bench-
marks. We used 24 compiler-generated and 7 hand-optimized EEMBC benchmarks. The
EEMBC benchmarks are loop-based benchmarks that execute for a user-defined number of
iterations. We compute the number of TRIPS blocks executed for a single iteration, nd fast
forwarded as many blocks to skip the initialization phase. The number of blocks t be fast
forwarded must be recomputed if any of the compilation parameters change.The EEMBC
benchmarks were executed for a substantial number of iterations to achieve a r asonable
simulation time.





186.crafty Game playing: chess
197.parser Word processing
255.vortex Object-oriented database
300.twolf Place and route simulator
254.gap Group theory, interpreter
176.gcc C programming language compiler
SPEC CPU Floating Point
168.wupwise Physics/Quantum chromodynamics
171.swim Shallow water modeling
172.mgrid Multi-grid solver: 3D potential field
173.applu Parabolic/Elliptic differential equations
177.mesa 3-D Graphics library
179.art Image recognition / neural networks
200.sixtrack High energy nuclear physics accelerator design
301.apsi Meteorology: pollutant distribution
188.ammp Computational chemistry
183.equake Seismic wave propagation simulation
Table 5.6: List of SPEC benchmarks used for evaluation.
SPEC benchmarks were generated by the compiler. We used 10 benchmarks from the SPEC
2000 floating point (SPEC FP) suite, and 8 benchmarks from the SPEC 2000 integer (SPEC
INT) suite. The SPEC benchmarks were simulated for the execution phase determined by
using SimPoint [132]. The benchmarks either use the early SimPoint region,or e of the
early regions among multiple SimPoint regions if the early region is too far into the program
to minimize simulation time. The region is stretched to the boundaries of a non-inlined
function call or a return, to ensure that any comparison between different compilations is
performed on identical program regions.
5.3.5 TRIPS Block Utilization
Fault-aware scheduling algorithms rely on redundancy to isolate the fault. Asillustrated
by the simple example in Figure 5.7, the TRIPS block must contain empty instruction slots
to allow for the possibility of scheduling its instructions such that the defectiveET can be
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avoided. To tolerate the single-defective-ET fault model, the algorithm mustat least be able
to reschedule the instructions on the defective ET to other functional ETs.Since the base
scheduling algorithm may schedule up to 8 instructions of the 128 instructions ina block on
an ET, the fault-aware scheduling algorithm must find at least 8 available instruction buffer
entries in the functional ETs to provide the minimal redundancy for successful fault recon-
figuration. This implies that each block can contain a maximum of 120 instructions(= 128
- 8) to have any redundancy at all for the algorithm to exploit. Reducing block utilization
can potentially lead to performance loss even in the fault-free case and is thesta ic cost of
the technique, as we have to first create redundancy before it can be dynamically exploited
when there are defects. This is similar in concept to adding a fixed number ofexplicit
spares for improving availability, which contribute to fixed overheads in area, and possibly
execution time. This minimal reduction in block utilization may prove to be inadequate
for the more restrictiveFaulty Link fault model, for now each instruction must not only be
scheduled on a functional ET, but also on one that can be reached from all its parents, and
from where it can reach all its children through paths that do not contain adefective ET. The
Faulty Link fault model may require reducing the block utilization even further to improve
the robustness of the algorithm.
Table 5.7 presents the results for the average dynamic block size in instructions for
the set of compiler-generated EEMBC and SPEC integer and floating point benchmarks,
and the hand-optimized EEMBC benchmarks. The results show that althoughthe allowed
block capacity is 128 instructions, the average block size of compiler-generat d EEMBC,
SPEC integer and floating point benchmarks are 45.3, 28.5, and 41.5 instructions respec-
tively. While this is the average dynamic capacity across all the blocks in the benchmarks
of that category, individual blocks within benchmarks have block capacities reaching up to
126 instructions. However, the hand-optimized EEMBC benchmarks have amuch greater
average dynamic block size of 72.5 instructions, demonstrating the effectiveness of the extra
optimizations. These optimizations are currently being implemented in the TRIPS compiler
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Compiler-generated EEMBC BenchmarksHand-optimized EEMBC Benchmarks
a2time01 45.9 a2time01 85.4
aifirf01 72.5 tblook01 94.2
cacheb01 24.4 bezier02 61.8
canrdr01 30.5 dither01 65.9
tblook01 78.1 autocor00 44.3
matrix01 52.2 rspeed01 51.6
ttsprk01 51.9 basefp01 104.4
pntrch01 79.5 SPEC Integer Benchmarks
pktflow 36.4 164.gzip 39.3
ospf 36.5 176.gcc 24.1
rotate01 44.6 181.mcf 37.6
bezier02 22.8 186.crafty 29.9
dither01 40.4 197.parser 19.4
text01 33.9 255.vortex 20.2
autocor00 42.5 254.gap 26.7
conven00 42.9 300.twolf 30.8
bitmnp01 58.7 SPEC Floating Point Benchmarks
rspeed01 30.8 168.wupwise 39.9
puwmod01 37.1 171.swim 36.7
iirflt01 50.3 172.mgrid 74.8
routelookup 39.5 173.applu 45.8
basefp01 43.9 177.mesa 35.9
viterb01 52.6 179.art 48.7




Compiler-generated EEMBC BenchmarksMEAN: 45.3
Hand-optimized EEMBC Benchmarks MEAN: 72.5
SPEC Integer Benchmarks MEAN: 28.5
SPEC Floating Point Benchmarks MEAN: 41.5
Table 5.7: Dynamic block capacity of a set of EEMBC, SPEC integer and floating point
benchmarks.
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% Increase in Execution Time 
3.7% 3.1% 4.6% 9.3% 24.2%
Default Capacity of a Block: 128 Instructions
Figure 5.8: Performance sensitivity to block capacity for the set of EEMBCbenchmarks
which will reduce the gap between compiler-generated and hand-optimized benchmarks.
Overall, these results show that most blocks are not fully utilized and inheretly provide the
capability required for fault reconfiguration.
Figure 5.8 presents the average results for the performance sensitivity toblock ca-
pacity for the set of compiler-generated EEMBC benchmarks. The TRIPScompiler can
take the maximum allowed block capacity as an input for block generation at static com-
pilation time. The results were generated by specifying these different block capacities
as input to the compiler, and measuring the resulting increase in execution time compared
to the default maximum capacity of 128 instructions. As described in Section 5.3.4, the
number of blocks that have to be fast forwarded is independently determined for each com-
pilation. The results show that execution time increases by less than 5% on the average even
if the block capacity is reduced to 80 instructions. On the other hand, reducing the block
capacity to 64 or 40 instructions leads to a significant increase in execution timeof 9% and
24% respectively.
Overall, these exploratory results show that most of the blocks already have suf-
ficient redundancy in them, and reducing the maximum block capacity to as low as 100
instructions to enforce redundancy in all the blocks affects performance by less than 4%.
Since fault-aware scheduling algorithms are predicated on the capability to regulat the
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block size to allow fault reconfiguration, we restrict our evaluation of fault- ware instruction
placement to the compiler-generated benchmarks. While the block size of hand-optimized
benchmarks are fixed, the TRIPS compiler, as described above, allows the the maximum
block capacity to be specified as an input at static compilation time.
5.3.6 Fault-Aware Instruction Placement
The basic idea of fault-aware instruction placement is to expose the defectiv configura-
tion to the scheduler, so that it can appropriately perform instruction scheduling based on
the configuration and the fault model. While this concept obviously applies during static
compilation time to improve yield, it can also be extended to improve lifetime reliability.
Section 5.3.7 discusses the challenges associated with run-time compiler-assisted reconfig-
uration. Section 4.2.2 described the base scheduler for the TRIPS architecture that takes
as input the instructions, and a detailed processor model that includes the rou ing t pology,
static instruction and communication latencies, and produces the instruction schedule con-
taining the assignment of instructions to ETs. We describe two heuristics for fault-aware
instruction placement built on the base scheduling algorithm.
Avoid Faulty Nodes Heuristic (AFN)
This heuristic assumes theFaulty Nodefault model. The scheduler takes as input a detailed
processor configuration which additionally includes pointers to the defective ETs, the rest
of the inputs are identical to the base scheduler. The algorithm itself is identical to the base
scheduler, but it now considers only the functional ETs for instruction placement. Based
on the discussion in Section 5.3.3 for the single-defective-ET model, setting the block uti-
lization at 120 instructions ensures the success of this heuristic. Since there is only one
defective ET (and no faulty links), there is always enough redundancy to reschedule the
instructions when the block is constrained to have a maximum of 120 instructionsat static
compilation time. To limit the simulation time, we measured the performance impact for
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a subset of the 16 possible fault locations, one in the first row next to the RTs, one in the
first column next to the DTs, and the third in the middle of the ET array. We measur d the
average performance impact to be less than 4% over the set of compiler-generated EEMBC,
and SPEC benchmarks. Based on this result, and the performance sensitivity to block ca-
pacity measured in Section 5.3.5 (see Figure 5.8), we conclude that the performance drop
is mostly due to the reduction in block capacity, and rescheduling the instructions to avoid
the defective ET has relatively minimal impact for these set of benchmarks.
Avoid Faulty Links Heuristic (AFL)
This heuristic accounts for both faulty ETs and routing paths, and can be considered as an
enhancement to the previous algorithm. The input processor configuration now not only
contains pointers to the defective ETs, but also has infinite communication latencies as-
signed to the defective nodes from all of its immediate neighbors. This implies that any
path from a producer to a consumer instruction that includes a defective execution node is
of infinite duration, which naturally serves to ensure that such a path is never s lected to
provide the block with the minimum completion time. However, the constraints imposed by
faulty communication paths and dimension-order routing can potentially lead to intermedi-
ate block schedule configurations from which it is impossible to find a legal andfunctional
location for the next dependent or parent instruction. Figure 5.9.a illustrate an example
placement of the parent instructions (P1, P2), the faulty ET, and the ETs with one available
instruction buffer entry (A). In this example, there is no ET with available entri s where
the child can be placed that gives functional routes (that follow y-x dimension-order rout-
ing) from both the parents. Figure 5.10.a presents another example placement of the parent
instructions (P1, P2) and the faulty ET, for which there is no ET, regardless of whether it
has available entries or not, where the child can be placed that gives functional routes (that
follow y-x dimension-order routing) from both the parents.








































a) No functional path exists from parent P1
to any of the available Execution Tiles
b) Instruction R is rescheduled to create 
a valid location for C which has functional










Figure 5.9: Fault reconfiguration by rescheduling a pre-placed instruction, to create a new
location for the current instruction which provides it with functional routesfrom both its
parents
rescheduling some of the instructions that have already been placed. Thealgorithm searches
for all locations, regardless of whether they already contain instructionsor ot, that provide
the current instruction functional paths to all its pre-scheduled parent and child instructions.
If such a location contains a pre-placed instruction, the algorithm attempts to rechedule
the instruction to an alternate valid location, and schedules the current instruction in the
entry freed by this relocated instruction. However, rescheduling one instruction may trigger
rescheduling a dependent instruction to provide a functional path between th m, and lead
to a domino effect that does not terminate until the algorithm is able to find functional l ca-
tions and paths between all the instructions in the affected data dependencegraph. To limit
the impact on scheduling latency and complexity, and to tune the algorithm for thesingl -
defective-ET fault model, we constrain the depth of rescheduling and limit itto rescheduling
only the current instruction or the immediate dependent parent or child instructions.
For instance, to fix the unfavorable block schedule configuration shown inFig-
ure 5.9.a, the algorithm reschedules a pre-scheduled instructionR t a different legal lo-






a) No node exists with functional routes 
from both parents P1, P2
b) R is rescheduled, P1 is moved there
C is scheduled now with functional routes


























Figure 5.10: Rescheduling a pre-placed parent instruction changes theconfiguration such
that it allow the current child instruction to be successfully scheduled
R as shown in Figure 5.9.b.R can only be relocated to an ET with a currently available
entry (A), and is not allowed to reschedule another dependent instruction. H wever, this
solution will not work for the situation in Figure 5.10.a since there are no legalnodes which
will satisfy C. Hence, in this case the AFL algorithm reschedules one of the pre-scheduled
parent instructionsP1. The algorithm first attempts to find an ET with an available entry
(A) that P1 can be relocated to. Since there are no such ETs in this example that provides
functional paths from both parents, it reschedules another instructionR, as shown in Fig-
ure 5.10.b, similar to the previous scenario. In general, as many pre-scheduled immediate
dependent parent or child instructions are rescheduled in order to successfully schedule the
current instructionC. The AFL algorithm fails if it is unsuccessful in schedulingC using
either of these two approaches.
Figures 5.11.a and 5.11.b show two more example locations for the defective ET,
that expose the limitations of the AFL algorithm with respect to anchor points. The first
example shows how the location of the defective ET, immediately next to an RT onthe
periphery of the execution array, makes it impossible to access the required architectural






to the execution array
b) No path exists from the execution array
























a) No path exists from register bank RX
DX
Figure 5.11: Defective execution tiles at the register tile and data tile boundary can make
it impossible to access a particular register or data cache bank. Dedicated bypass logic,
software support, or programmable hardware support is required to handle these defects.
the simplifying assumption that the hardware must include redundant logic andommuni-
cation paths to deliver register operands bypassing the defective ETs on the RT boundary,
while defective ETs from the second row onwards can be handled by theAFL algorithm de-
scribed above. Alternatively, as described earlier, fault-aware register allocation can solve
this problem by not using the registers from this RT in the program. However, while in-
struction scheduling is localized to a single block, register allocation is a global operation
in the compiler and hence is much costlier.
The example in Figure 5.11.b shows a defective ET that makes it impossible to
access a particular data cache bank. Again, we make the simplifying assumption that the
hardware must include redundant logic to deliver load and store operands bypassing the
defective ETs on the DT boundary, while defective ETs from the second lumn onwards
can be handled by the AFL algorithm described above. Load and store accesses are different
from register accesses, because the exact cache bank that needs tob accessed is not known
until dynamic execution time, since it depends on the actual address. As described earlier,
an alternative to including dedicated bypass logic, would require programmable h rdware
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support for modifying the address interleaving policy across the data cache banks so that no
addresses are mapped to the cache bank adjacent the defective ET.
Results: Based on the discussion in Section 5.3.5, we explored two block sizes, 120 in-
structions, and 112 instructions with more than the minimal redundancy. First, we studied
whether the AFN heuristic used for the Faulty Node model is able to tolerate bothfaul y
nodes and links. We performed instruction scheduling for all the benchmarks for all the 16
possible fault locations, and found that the AFN heuristic failed to find a functio al sched-
ule in over 75% of the cases. In the remaining cases, the algorithm was luckilyable to find
a schedule that provided functional nodes and paths for all the block instructions.
On the other hand, the AFL algorithm is successful in scheduling all the bench-
marks for all the 16 fault locations. Further, we found that the AFL heuristic was equally
successful for blocks with 120 instructions and blocks with 112 instructions, proving the
extra block redundancy as unnecessary in this context, and demonstrating he effectiveness
of the algorithm. However, reducing the block utilization indirectly increases throbustness
of the algorithm, and hence may allow the designer to reduce its complexity. Section 5.3.8
expands on this tradeoff. Finally, we measured the average performance impact to be less
than 4%, similar to the AFN algorithm, for the same subset of fault locations. Thisresult
again suggests that the performance drop is mostly due to the reduction in block capacity,
and rescheduling the instructions to avoid the defective ET and network links has relatively
minimal impact. We recognize that these results are dependent on the compiler,and are
worth re-investigating as the TRIPS compiler matures.
Overall, the results show that fault-aware instruction scheduling has potential to
increase the yield at a small performance overhead, and hence providea highYPAV .
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5.3.7 Compiler-Assisted Fault Reconfiguration for Improving Lifetime Reli-
ability
This section provides a brief overview of how fault-aware instruction placement can be
extended to improve lifetime reliability. Runtime BIST mechanisms must periodically
perform fine-grained error detection, and expose the defective configuration to the sched-
uler [24]. On any change in the defective ET configuration, program execution has to
resume from a known good checkpoint since the execution on the defectiv processor can-
not be trusted [24]. Resuming from the checkpoint, the instruction scheduler m st use the
new defective configuration to perform fault-aware instruction scheduling. When the fault-
aware scheduling heuristic is successful on a portion of the program, it can be executed on
the degraded processor. If it is unsuccessful, program execution must be shifted to a fully
functional processor. Applications can use a simple policy wherein a migration marks the
specific processor as unusable by it in the future, and the program is execut d on a fully
functional processor until completion. Therefore, processors are maked defective on a
per-application basis, providing an application-specific defective configuration that poten-
tially improves performability [136]. This is a fine-grained compiler-assisted adaptation of
dynamic processor sparing implemented in IBM systems, where an application istra spar-
ently migrated from a defective processor to a functional processor and esumes execution
from a checkpoint [28].
5.3.8 Tradeoff between Block Utilization and Algorithm Complexity
Good design of the fault-aware scheduling algorithm improves chip yield in thestatic case.
In the dynamic case, it reduces the probability of application migration and increases both
the availability and the performability of the system [136]. The two key design factors are
the amount of redundancy in the block or the block utilization, and the complexityof the
scheduling algorithm. While decreasing the maximum allowed block capacity evenfurther
increases the amount of redundancy and indirectly improves the robustness of the algorithm,
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the disadvantage is that it is a one-time static decision that contributes to fixed performance
overhead even in the fault-free case (see Section 5.3.5). Alternatively,h complexity of the
scheduling algorithm can be increased to tolerate larger number of defects, or more difficult
defective configurations. Ideally, the block utilization and the algorithm mustbe designed
for a single-defective-ET fault model in the beginning, and upgrades tothe algorithm can
be made over time if necessary. This is similar in concept to updates to the code morphing
software in the Transmeta processor, to adapt to modifications in the VLIW architecture for
achieving higher performance.
5.3.9 Hybrid Hardware-Software Approach for Fault Reconfiguration
While we propose a compiler-assisted fault reconfiguration technique, a large body of re-
search exists on adaptive fault-tolerant routing for n-dimensional meshes [120, 137, 137,
138]. A purely hardware based scheme using adaptive fault-tolerant routing protocols
would still require explicit spare ETs to accommodate the instructions that are scheduled on
the defective ET in the single-defective-ET fault model. Further, basedon the location of
the spare ET, extra reconfiguration logic will be needed to redirect the block instructions on
the GDN (instruction dispatch network) to the spare ET, and redirect instruction execution
results originally targeted for the defective ET to the spare ET. To eliminate theaddition of
explicit spares since the architecture already contains abundant redundancy, and to reduce
the complexity of the reconfiguration logic, we envision a more efficient, hybrid approach
for fault reconfiguration using both the compiler and the adaptive routing protocols in co-
operation.
In the hybrid approach, the compiler can reduce the maximum block capacity to
ensure that the functional ETs have enough capacity to accommodate the entire block, thus
obviating the need for spare ETs. Further, the scheduler can use the simpl AFN heuristic
described in Section 5.3.6 to avoid placing instructions on defective ETs, guaranteeing that
no instruction result targets a defective ET, thus getting rid of this extra reconfiguration
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logic. The software assistance reduces the responsibility on the hardware, and the adaptive
routing algorithms are now only responsible for correctly delivering packets from source
to destination ETs, routing around the defective ETs within the 4x4 array. The routing
algorithms typically use virtual channels to route around defective nodes,and follow certain
conventions with respect to virtual channel ordering for achieving deadlock freedom [120,
138].
While virtual channels can provide higher throughput and fault tolerance, they also
incur fixed overheads in buffer space, and latency for virtual channel management. Gratz
et al. showed that the latency of the operand network (OPN), that is tightly integrated
into the execution pipeline in the ET, is critical for performance [110]. Further, they also
conclude that the OPN router buffers occupy significant area, and thearea cost must be
carefully balanced with the performance benefits. Hence, while adaptiverouting provides
good theoretical guarantees for fault tolerance, more analysis is required to optimize the
latency, and area tradeoffs, and we believe it is a promising avenue for future work.
5.4 Related Work
Support for Defect Detection: Regardless of the source of yield loss that is targeted,
yield enhancement schemes rely on the ability to detect faults in the circuit, and whenever
possible, circumvent the problem by disabling or reconfiguring the faulty resource [41]. As
the number of transistors on a chip increases, so does the complexity and volume of the test
patterns required to identify and diagnose faults. Driven by the enormousexpense of suit-
able testers and test time with growing chip complexity, many chips today are augmented
with built-in self test (BIST) functions to partially relieve the testing burden. Although
BIST does not eliminate the need for traditional test patterns, it is used extensively for test-
ing on-chip RAM structures, for stressing the design during burn-in, and for speed binning.
Some RAM BIST controllers are capable of pinpointing faults within the array,configuring
the redundant rows or columns to avoid the fault, and then retesting the array. If successful,
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the BIST controller communicates the recommended configuration information to the next
level of test coordination.
In this study, we propose to push the traditional techniques of yield enhancement,
based on detecting and either disabling or reconfiguring the faulty resources [41], inside the
boundaries of a single processor by identifying and exploiting redundancies at the microar-
chitectural level. Due to the fine-grained nature of redundancy proposed, we envision the
need for more advanced BIST controllers that build on the capability that exists for array
repair to include support for other types of fault tolerance mechanisms [23]. The challenges
here will be to define the appropriate granularity for the BIST domains, andto develop au-
tomatic pattern generators for isolating faults in structures that contain more logic circuitry
than basic RAMs. Shyam et al. showed that such advanced BIST techniques are possi-
ble and can be integrated into a processor with modest modifications to the hardware [24].
Schuchman et al. proposedintra-cycle logic independence(ICI) as the necessary condition
for testability to allow fine-grained fault isolation in processor structures, and outlined mod-
ifications required to conventional processor structures to comply with ICI[139]. Another
promising concept for chip multiprocessors (CMPs) proposed in [140] involves the use of
one of the on-chip processors themselves for coordinating the testing of other processors
and chip-level structures.
Yield Metrics: There are two classes of work related to theperformance-averaged yield
concept. In [141], yield evaluation is done for memory chips with redundancy that allows
the chip to be partitioned so that the fault-free sections can operate independently. The
equivalent yieldconcept proposed in that paper accounts for partially good chips by scaling
the yield by the memory capacity of the degraded chip. In this study, we extendth argu-
ment to processor chips and propose a performance based metric that is abe ter measure of
the effect of chip degradation at the system level. Performability was proposed as a refined
measure of availability by accounting for the degraded performance dynamically [136].
Performance-averaged yieldadapts this dynamic concept to static chip yield evaluation by
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accounting for the relative performance of the degraded chips.
Design for Yield: Section 2.1.2 described several techniques for improving defect toler-
ance at the device and circuit level. Bower et al. proposed self-healingrrays that detect
array defects at run-time and dynamically perform reconfiguration [142]. DeHon et al. pro-
posed seven strategies based on redundancy at different granularities, support for roll-back
recovery, and run-time reconfiguration support for tolerating high defect rates expected in
future architectures with nanoscale devices [143].
Design for Lifetime Reliability: Several designs based on coarse-grained spatial redun-
dancy have been proposed to improve the lifetime reliability of systems [18,25,28]. Recent
research has focused on applying similar concepts in the context of future m lti-core or
system-on-a-chip architectures. Aggarwal et al. identified simple modifications that can be
made to a commodity multi-core processor to enhance its capability for fault isolation and
thus prevent the entire chip from failing on a defect [26]. Sylvester et al. proposed a com-
plete architecture called ElastIC based on aggressive run-time self-diagnos s, adaptivity,
and self-healing to tolerate parametric defects due to process variability [144]. Srinivasan
et al. extended the concept ofperformance-averaged yieldto improve the availability of a
processor by allowing it to continue operation in a degraded state [145]. Srinivasan et al.
also proposed dynamic reliability management, a fault evasive technique forprobabilisti-
cally improving processor lifetime [31].
Software-assisted Hard Error Reliability: Many high-end systems use a combination
of software, firmware, and hardware to both detect and manage errors[15, 28]. IBM
pSeries systems use self-diagnosing software to monitor the recoverable error rates of pro-
cessors [28]. If the number of errors exceed an internal threshold,the operating system is
notified which in turn triggersdynamic reconfigurationto substitute the defective proces-
sor. Recently, Joseph et al. proposed a virtualization based methodology todynamically
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spare an entire defective processor in a CMP [126]. Sankaralingam et l. argue that future
tile-based CMP designs using larger cores will be able to achieve technology scalable high
performance over a wider range of applications [111]. Consequently, there will be fewer
processors per chip, which motivate the hardware and software techniques for exploiting
intra-processor redundancy proposed in this chapter.
5.5 Summary
This chapter examines the redundancy in modern microarchitectures that can be used to
enhance their yield. Though we focus primarily on the yield loss due to random defects,
we recognize that many of the techniques discussed here will also help in identifying more
usable chips during the initial technology learning phase, and in improving thelifetime
reliability of the processor. We propose a new yield metric calledp rformance-averaged
yield (YPAV ) which accounts for the level of performance degradation on all functioing
chips. For dynamic superscalar architectures, we focus on relatively coarse grain com-
ponents within the microarchitecture such as execution units and cache banks, and show
that mechanisms already exist within the processor control logic that can easily disable the
defective components from being used during program execution.
The results also demonstrate that while using just inter-processor redundancy achieves
high yield, exploiting microarchitectural redundancy within a processor further improves
the yield, and will be increasingly important if future CMPs use coarse-grained cores to
achieve high performance. By exploiting microarchitectural redundancy, we demonstrate
that theYPAV can be improved to as high as 99.6% at 50nm, with a maximum reduction in
performance in any chip of less than 20%, a substantial improvement from aYOV ERALL of
60% achieved when only considering the defect-free parts. WhileAR, DQR, andCLR are
applicable in static architectures also, we argue that software-assisted fault reconfiguration
may be more efficient than pure hardware based mechanisms for statically allocated re-
sources on a distributed execution substrate. We evaluate fault-aware scheduling heuristics
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in the TRIPS architecture which, for the set of benchmarks explored, succe sfully resched-
ule the program to avoid defective ETs with less than 4% loss in performance.
Today’s systems that provide fail-in-place capabilities do so at the system lev l and
typically provide hot spares for power supplies, processors chips, memory modules, and
disks [16]. We advocate pushing fail-in-place inside the boundaries of aingle chip or pro-
cessor and allowing defective components to continue to operate, perhaps with somewhat
degraded performance. Optional components arise in system-on-a-chip(SOC) implemen-
tations in which a subsystem of the chip could be defective, but the chip could be deployed
in systems that did not require the functionality of the defective component. Extending
performance binning further,functional binningis a similar strategy that recognizes some
design features to beoptional from a yield binning point of view. For example, future
systems-on-chip (SoC) designs may include a wide range of modular functions (GPS radio,
WiFi radio, etc) that are not essential for all market applications but areincluded to enable
a single product to achieve higher volumes. Allowing some of these featuresto b optional
enables functional binning, and can have the effect of increasing the effective yield.
The regularity and redundancy that we exploit is synergistic with severalt chnol-
ogy and design trends. Managing increasing design complexity has becomea tremendous
challenge for both design and verification, and demands modular design techniques that
reuse chip components, thus creating redundancy opportunities. Second, the increase in
wire delay relative to transistor switching time will likely lead to partitioned architectur s
composed of replicated hardware modules [111]. whether they be processors, ALUs, or a
combination of both [50]. Finally, looming limits on energy and heat have led architects
to suggest trading power for performance by modulating the clock frequency in different
regions of a chip [146], dynamically reducing memory structure sizes, or by selectively dis-
abling microarchitecture components [147]. We expect that future systemsd signers will
take advantage of replication and partitioning to meet these joint goals of power, perfor-
mance, reliability, and ease of design.
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Chapter 6
Soft Error Reliability Regimes
Different systems have different reliability requirements based on their target pplication
and market domain. For instance, high availability is a critical requirement forenterprise
systems used in business processes [148]. On the other hand, processo s used on desktops
have less critical reliability requirements, and companies typically have different soft error
rate targets for these different market segments. The relative importanceof reliability deter-
mines the degree of overhead that is acceptable due to reliability enhancement t chniques,
and is an explicit design parameter when designing these systems. The masking f ctor or the
fraction of soft errors that have the potential to affect program outcome, and the reliability
target together determine the degree of protection needed. Therefore,an accurate estima-
tion of the masking factors at all levels is important to prevent over or under-designing the
reliability mechanism.
Chapter 3 described the various factors that determine whether a soft error occurs in
an SRAM cell, or a latch, either because of a direct strike to the latch or due topropagation
through combinational logic. Figure 6.1 illustrates the classification proposedby Mukher-
jee et al. of the possible outcomes a single bit fault at the architectural level,once the soft
error has already occurred [2]. In three cases, 1, 2, and 3 the soft rr r has absolutely no
effect on the program. In scenarios 1 and 3, the soft error is masked at the microarchitec-
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Figure 6.1: Mukherjee et al. proposed this classification of a soft errorin a bit based on its
severity [2]. SDC = silent data corruption, DUE = detected unrecoverabl error.
tural or architectural level, analogous to circuit-level error masking discussed in Chapter
3. In this chapter, we improve the accuracy of chip-level SER estimation by extending
the methodology in Chapter 3 to account for microarchitectural and architectural masking
factors. While the error is detected and corrected in scenario 2, there is no provision for
error correction in scenarios 5 and 6. Adding detection alone to a bit prevents the program
from generating a wrong output, but provides only fail-stop behavior. This class of errors
is referred to as detected unrecoverable errors (DUE). The worst scenario is 4, where the
bit has no protection and silently affects the program output. This is referred to as silent
data corruption (SDC), and designers employ error detection and correcti n mechanisms to
reduce the probability of SDC. The reliability targets for a particular design are specified in
terms of the acceptable SDC and DUE rates. For example, IBM targets 114 SDC FIT, 4566
system-kill DUE FIT, and 11415 process-kill DUE FIT for its Power4 systems [2]. Process-
kill DUEs correspond to detected unrecoverable errors which can be isolated to a specific
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process or set of processes that have to be killed. On the other hand, the entire system must
be restarted to recover from a system-kill DUE. As expected, the SDC target is more strin-
gent than the system-kill DUE target, which is more stringent than the process-kill DUE
target.
This chapter provides the foundation for the architectural soft error reliability tech-
niques we design and evaluate in this dissertation. This chapter makes the following main
contributions:
Understanding the scope of architectural reliability techniques: We propose a sys-
tematic methodology for quantifying the reliability improvement required every technology
generation from architectural techniques. We present four different scenarios for architec-
tural reliability improvement depending on the support for improving reliability at other
levels of the design. Since the reliability requirement is significantly differentin the four
scenarios, we argue that different architectural reliability enhancement strategies should be
adopted to provide the best performance-reliability tradeoff.
Reliability performance ratio: We propose a new metric for quantifying the performance-
reliability tradeoff that can be applied in all the scenarios. The metric allows a designer to
account for both the performance overhead and the reliability improvement,and choose the
technique that provides the best tradeoff.
Soft error reliability regimes: Building on this framework, we classify architectural soft
error reliability techniques into four regimes: error correcting codes, full redundant execu-
tion, selective redundant execution, and AVF throttling, appropriate forthe four different
scenarios. While architectural techniques that fall within the first three regimes have been
proposed in prior research, we present a new regime calledAVF throttling that can signifi-
cantly reduce the power consumption, and complexity overhead. This classifi tion sets a
good starting point for the specific reliability techniques from each regime wevaluate in
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the TRIPS architecture in Chapter 7.
Architectural masking factors in the TRIPS architecture: We present a systematic, de-
tailed methodology and evaluation of the architectural masking factors of important struc-
tures in the distributed TRIPS architecture. We compare the architectural masking factors
in the TRIPS architecture with conventional architectures, and identify the causes that lead
to the differences in soft error vulnerability. We conclude with some important implications
of physical and logical partitioning, employed in distributed architectures, onsoft error
vulnerability.
Section 6.1 builds a framework for estimating the reliability improvement needed
every generation from architectural techniques. Section 6.2 describesthe ACE analysis
methodology for estimating architectural masking factors, and Section 6.3 presents our
new metric RPR for evaluating the performance-reliability tradeoff. Section 6.4 divides
architectural soft error reliability mechanisms into four regimes with different p rformance-
reliability tradeoffs. Section 6.5 summarizes the masking factors for important structures
in the TRIPS architecture. Section 6.6 discusses the tradeoffs between thetwo primary
methods for evaluating architectural masking factors. Section 6.7 presentsour conclusions
and builds the foundation for evaluating each regime in detail.
6.1 Soft Error Rate Scaling Analysis
Chapter 3 projected the raw soft error rates for the three basic circuits of a m dern micro-
processor: SRAM cells, latches and combinational logic. Several scalingstudies basically
agree that the raw soft error rate(SER)-per-SRAM cell will decrease gradually with decreas-
ing device size, although they differ on the rate of decrease [67,149].Karnik et al. conser-
vatively project SER-per-latch to either increase by 8% every generation if supply voltage
scales linearly (0.7x) across technologies, or remain constant if voltage sc ling slows down,
and supply voltage decreases only by 0.8x every generation [88]. However, they also con-
151
clude that even with slowing voltage scaling the SER-per-latch can increaseby up to 20%
every generation depending on the device and charge collection parametes. Our results
in Chapter 3 show a slight increase in SER-per-latch every generation. In Chapter 3, we
predict that the raw SER of combinational logic will be comparable to that of latches by the
50nm technology generation [67]. However, we don’t consider the impact of circuit-level
logical masking which can potentially reduce the observed rate of increase[70,71].
Building on these raw error rates for the building blocks, Chapter 3 also projected
the chip-level SER to account for the increase in the number of bits every generation. It used
a simple chip area model based on Moore’s law, and a simple analytical model toivide
the chip area among SRAM cells, latches, and combinational logic. While this simple
model accounts for the difference in raw vulnerability of the three basic circuits, it treats
all microprocessor structures built using the same basic circuit as equally vlnerable. The





where FIT/bit represents the raw SER of each circuit type, and in this equation also
accounts for the circuit-level masking factors described in Chapter 3, and Bits stands for
the total number of transistors alloted to the particular circuit type. The model accounts
for circuit-level masking factors, but it does not account for masking atthe microarchitec-
tural and architectural level which can further reduce the error rate.For instance, while
both an on-chip cache and a branch predictor use SRAM cells for their storage, an error in
the branch predictor state will only affect performance, whereas an error in the cache can
lead to faulty program output. In summary, the raw soft error rate (taking into account the
circuit-level masking factors), the structure capacity, and several architectural and microar-
chitectural masking factors together determine the soft error vulnerability of the structure.





FIT/bit × AV F × Bits
where the additional term, AVF, stands forarchitectural vulnerability factorper bit,
and represents the architectural and microarchitectural masking factors. It is a measure of
the likelihood of an error propagating through that bit to the program outcome, given that
the error was not filtered by the circuit-level masking factors. Chip SER is determined by
combining three factors: the SER-per-circuit, the total number of bits, and the architectural
vulnerability factor (AVF). The goal of a reliability mechanism is to maintain the system
SER, by reducing these three factors using different design techniques. An accurate esti-
mation of the masking factors at all levels is important for precisely determining both the
absolute error rate, and the scaling trend across technologies, and is necessary to prevent
over- or under-designing the reliability mechanism. While device or circuit level t chniques
can be used to reduce the raw SER/bit, error correcting codes have been traditionally used
to reduce the total number of vulnerable bits in a design. Processor state that cannot be
effectively protected using these two techniques must be protected using microarchitec-
tural reliability mechanisms that decrease the AVF of the structures to achievet e r quired
reduction in error rate.
Figure 6.2 shows four different scenarios for maintaining chip SER, with differ-
ent assumptions for the error rate per bit (SER/Bit), and the number of vulnerable bits
(Bits). Each of the four scenarios places a different requirement on the required reduction
in AVF, and thus implies a different performance-reliability tradeoff at the microarchitec-
tural level. From a purely technology scaling viewpoint, the first scenarioshows that nearly
51% reduction in AVF would be required every generation, if the number ofbits follows
Moore’s law scaling and almost doubles every generation, and the (SER/Bit) increases by
8% [67, 88, 149]. Karnik et al. demonstrated that 70% of the hardware logic paths are
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Scenario I: Technology Scaling
− Moore’s law Bits scaling
− Increasing SER/Bit
1.0 SER/Chip = 1.9 Bits * 1.08 SER/Bit * X AVF
Need ~50% reduction in AVF
X = 0.49
− Increasing SER/Bit
Scenario III: Error Correcting Codes
− Sub−Moore’s law Bits scaling
1.0 SER/Chip = 1.5 Bits * 1.08 SER/Bit * X AVF
X = 0.62
Need ~38% reduction in AVF
− Sub−Moore’s law Bits scaling
1.0 SER/Chip = 1.5 Bits * 0.7 SER/Bit * X AVF
X = 0.95
Need ~5% reduction in AVF
Scenario IV: Multi−layer ReliabilityScenario II: Device/Ckt Techniques
Need ~25% reduction in AVF
X = 0.49
1.0 SER/Chip = 1.9 Bits * 0.7 SER/Bit * X AVF
[Karnik et al., VLSI Symposium, 2001]
− Linearly decreasing SER/Bit
− Moore’s law Bits scaling
− Linearly decreasing SER/Bit
Figure 6.2: Soft error rate scaling analysis
non-critical with respect to clock frequency, and exploited this slack to perform selective
capacitance insertion into the latches at the end of these paths to achieve an almost 2X re-
duction in SER, and a linearly decreasing SER/Bit [11, 88]. Scenario II show that such
device or circuit techniques can reduce the AVF reduction needed to 25%. Techniques such
as ECC or parity will continue to be used in the future to protect an increasingfraction of
on-chip storage structures. While Moore’s law implies a 100% increase in processor state
every generation, these techniques help in achieving a slower than Moore’s law rate of in-
crease in vulnerable processor state. Assuming they are able to decrease th rate of increase
of vulnerable bits every generation to 50%, the AVF reduction required then drops to 38%,
as shown in Scenario III. Finally, if both device and circuit techniques, and error correcting
codes, are used to reduce both the (SER/bit), and the rate of increase ofvulnerable bits
(Bits), the reduction needed in AVF is only 5% every generation.
Since the reliability requirement is significantly different in the four scenarios, we
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argue that different architectural reliability enhancement strategies should be adopted to
provide the best performance-reliability tradeoff. A designer can use thi characterization
to choose the appropriate architectural reliability technique based on his reliability require-
ment and acceptable design overhead. Circuit level techniques and error co ecting codes
also have associated implementation costs. Karnik et al. showed that the hardening tech-
niques they propose have a 10% cost in setup time, and a 4% penalty in powerconsump-
tion [88]. Error correcting codes also typically need dedicated circuitry and have a fixed
storage overhead [21]. Mitra et al. present a complete characterizationof circuit-level soft
error reliability techniques based on their reliability improvement, and area, power, and
complexity overheads [150]. In the same spirit, we classify architectural soft error reliabil-
ity techniques into four regimes that map to these different scenarios in the AVF reduction
space, and different points on the performance-reliability tradeoff spectrum. Before we
present this classification, the next two sections describe the methodology used to compute
the AVF, and the metric for quantifying the performance-reliability tradeoff of architectural
reliability techniques.
6.2 Computing the Architectural Vulnerability Factor
Mukherjee et al. proposed an innovative methodology based on detailed microarchitecture
simulation termed, ACE analysis, to determine the AVF [123]. The AVF of a structu e
in this technique is measured by tracking each physical bit location of the structure over
the period of simulation, and computing the fraction of time for which a soft error in that
bit location will affect program output. A bit in which a soft error will lead to incorrect
program output, is required forarchitecturally correct execution(ACE), and is termed as
an ACE bit. On the other hand, bits in which soft errors are masked are called un-ACE
bits. The methodology works by accumulating for each physical bit location the umber of
cycles for which it is ACE (ACE Cycles), and the number of cycles for which it is un-ACE
(un-ACE Cycles). The key insight of the algorithm is that there are several r asons why a
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bit can be un-ACE. Mukherjee et al identified several sources of un-ACE bits:
• Invalid state: When a bit in a structure does not contain any valid information it
cannot affect the program outcome. For instance, a soft error in an empty slot of
the instruction window that does not a contain valid instruction is irrelevant to the
program outcome.
• Mis-speculated state: Bits that correspond to mis-speculated state either dueto branch
mispredictions or incorrect load-store disambiguation are un-ACE.
• Predictor state: Errors in predictor structures will in most cases only affect perfor-
mance and not functional correctness of the program.
• Ex-ACE state: This is slightly different from invalid state, and corresponds to state
that may still be marked valid but has already been utilized by downstream logic.
For instance, an instruction that has already dispatched for the last time may still be
marked valid, but is not vulnerable since the information is not needed any more.
• NOP instructions: Most of the bits in a NOP instruction, except the bits that dif-
ferentiate it from a non-NOP, are un-ACE. This is typically the opcode bits of he
instruction, but can also be the destination register.
• Performance enhancing instructions: Except the opcode bits, the remaining b ts of a
performance enhancing instruction are un-ACE. For instance, an error in a prefetch
instruction can cause it to fetch data from a wrong location potentially reducing the
performance improvement but with no effect on functional correctness.
• Predicated-false instructions: Predicated instructions execute only if theyrec ive en-
abling predicates during execution. An instruction is indirectly predicated-false if its
results are only delivered to a predicated-false instruction. In either cas, the majority
of instruction and result bits are un-ACE. The predicate specifier bits in theopcode,
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the predicate register specifier, and the least significant bit of the predicat value are
ACE.
• Dynamically dead instructions: Program execution can also contain dynamically
dead instructions whose results are not used, or are used by instructions which are
in-turn dynamically dead. In both these cases, a significant fraction of theinstruc-
tion and operand bits are un-ACE. The opcode and the register specifierbits a e still
counted as ACE since they can either cause the program to crash during instruction
decode, or cause the instruction to deliver the results to incorrect destination registers
and thus corrupt program state.
• Logical masking: Logical masking arises mostly due to bitwise logical operations,
and compare instructions before branches. The operand bits that are logically masked
are un-ACE bits. More subtle scenarios of logical masking may exist and more so-
phisticated analysis will be required to reveal those opportunities.
The AVF of the bit is then equal to the fraction of the simulation cycles that are
ACE Cycles. Assuming that all cells have equal raw soft error rates, theAVF of a structure
is the average AVF of all its constituent bits. The following equations show hot e soft
error rate of the chip (FIT/chip) can be calculated as a function of ACE cycles.
FIT/chip = FIT/bit × AV F × Bits
∝





Number of Errors ∝ ACE Cycles
where FIT/bit stands for failures in time per bit, AVF stands forarchitectural vul-
nerability factorper bit which is a measure of the likelihood of an error propagating through
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that bit, Bits stands for the total number of bits in the processor vulnerable to errors, Cy-
cles is a measure of the time for which we are observing the processor for er ors, and ACE
cycles is a measure of processor reliability, and stands for the cycles thatcontribute toar-
chitecturally correct execution. ACE cyclesis computed by adding up the cycles vulnerable
to soft errors, for all the bits, across all the processor structures. The total number of errors
is thus directly proportional to theACE cyclesaccumulated during that period.
6.3 Reliability Performance Ratio (RPR)
The equations show that reducing the error rate requires a corresponding reduction in
(ACE Cycles/Cycles) by the same amount. An ideal reliability technique would achieve
this by only decreasing theACE Cycles without affectingCycles, thereby reducing both
the error rate and the number of errors with no performance overhead.In this spirit, we pro-
pose a metric Reliability Performance Ratio to measure the performance-reliabilitytradeoff
achieved by a reliability mechanism.
Weaver et al. [2] proposed Mean Instructions to Failure (MITF) to quantify the
tradeoff between performance and reliability. MITF is calculated as:
MITF =
(








If the number of instructions is constant, then an increase in MITF only implies a
reduction in ACE cycles, and it does not capture the cost incurred in execution cycles to
achieve this reduction. We propose a new metric, Reliability Performance Ratio(RPR),
to capture the impact of a design parameter on both performance and reliability, and is
analogous to Energy Performance Ratio (EPR) proposed by Hofstee etal. to study the
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tradeoff between power consumption and performance [151]. In this paper, we measure
RPR of a design parameter as the ratio of the percentage decrease in ACE cycles to the
percentage increase in execution cycles, as shown by the equation:
RPR =
(
Percentage decrease in ACE cycles
Percentage increase in execution cycles
)
Thus an RPR of 1 for a parameter means that the ACE cycles improves by 1%
for a cost of 1% in execution time. An RPR of 2 is better than an RPR of 1 since it
implies a 2% increase in reliability for the same 1% decrease in performance. Iftwo design
parameters have different RPRs, designers can exploit this asymmetry to improve reliability
at constant performance by reducing the design parameter at lower RPR, while maintaining
the performance by increasing the parameter with higher RPR. Thus RPR provides the
foundation for a systematic approach where designers work to achieve the r liability target,
at the same time optimizing the RPR to achieve low overhead.
In practice, there are some important caveats to consider when using the RPR met-
ric. First, the RPR of a single parameter may vary depending upon the trend inxecution
time and ACE cycles, as more of the design parameter is used. For instance, the RPR
of pipelining can be quite different at the beginning when it is very beneficial, from the
point at which pipelining starts to provide diminishing returns in performance.So the RPR
of a technique may can be different in different regions of this curve. In fact, RPR can
become infinity on the graph if at any point there is a change in ACE cycles, with no as-
sociated change in the execution time. However, these discontinuities in the graph will be
rare, and do not correspond to the average RPR of the parameter in thatregion. Second,
quantization limits of the technique that only allow discrete points on this curve, and design
constraints besides reliability may force us to consider the absolute impact on the differ-
ent parameters such as performance, reliability, area, and power consumption and give less
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importance to the RPR itself. Finally, it is possible that a technique improves both system
reliability and performance. For instance, prefetching state into ECC or parity protected
memory structures can reduce the execution time of the program without adding any vul-
nerable state. Further, the smaller execution time can also lead to a reduction in total ACE
cycles. These techniques are most desirable from an RPR viewpoint because they improve
reliability without adding any performance overhead.
6.4 Soft Error Reliability Regimes
This section presents the four architectural soft error reliability regimes.Three of the
regimes, error correcting codes, full redundant execution (FRE), and selective redundant
execution (SRE) are based on fault tolerance; and the last regime, AVF throttling, is based
on fault evasion.
6.4.1 Error Correcting Codes
The first regime is based on incrementally adding parity or ECC protection to on-chip struc-
tures to keep the SER/chip within the reliability budget. With ECC, for 64 bit data 7 ad-
ditional bits are needed to correct all single-bit errors [2]. While this provides near-zero
SER for that structure, it adds an overhead of 11% in the number of bits. Further, ECC
also requires extra circuitry on both the read and the write datapath for checking and gen-
erating the error code. Tyler et al. [21] calculated the delay through an optimized ECC
generation circuit to be between 8-10 fan-out-of-4 inverter (FO4) gatedelays. This takes
up almost 50-80% of the 12-16 FO4 cycle time target in a high performance microproces-
sor, and thus will either potentially extend the cycle time or add extra cycles. While the
overall area and timing overhead is amortized for large structures such ascaches, in-line
ECC checking or generation may be unacceptable in on-chip storage structures such as in-
struction windows that are tightly integrated into the pipeline, and for which instruction
read or write is performed serially with several other operations such as decode, wakeup or
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selection in the same pipeline stage. While ECC generation or checking can alsobe per-
formed in a pipelined fashion, this adds datapath complexity to eventually trace and flush
the corresponding data before it can update architectural state [2].
Parity has smaller area overhead due to the extra storage and circuitry, since it o ly
provides detection capability. However, errors which might have earlier be n masked and
not affected program output, are now reported as parity failures leading to an overall in-
crease in error rate. Section 6.2 listed several factors that can lead to false positives, in-
cluding parity errors in processor state that is ex-ace, mis-speculated, logical y masked,
predicated-false, or dynamically dead. Mukherjee et al. showed that false p rity errors
account for more than 52% of the total errors, and naively adding parityto the instruction
window more than doubles the error rate by worsening the AVF from 29% to 62% [2].
Based on this result, they proposed tracking parity errors until they can be determined to be
a true or a false error, at which time only the true errors are allowed to interrupt the system
while the false errors are filtered. They described the logic required forcorrectly propa-
gating parity errors through different execution and memory operations for detecting false
positives. For instance, they observe that while a parity error on mis-speculat d state can be
filtered at instruction retirement with modest extra hardware, detecting falseerrors due to
dynamically dead state will require storing and analyzing instructions in a post-retirement
buffer with at least 512 entries to achieve significant coverage.
6.4.2 Full Redundant Execution (FRE)
While error detecting and correcting codes can be applied to storage structures, and can be
extended to regular datapath logic [152], control logic is typically unprotected by these
mechanisms. Since FRE in general, redundantly performs all the operationsin all the
pipeline stages for each instruction, it achieves protection over both the daapath and con-
trol logic. Hence, while FRE provides near-zero (SER/chip), it may incura significant cost
in performance, power, area, and complexity. There have been several different approaches
161
implemented and proposed in research for improving the coverage and reducing the over-
head of FRE [17,19,25,92,153].
Systems with a long history of implementing high reliability through redundant exe-
cution include IBM S/360 that is currently the zSeries [18,154], the HP NonSt p Server [153],
and the Stratus continuous processing technology [25]. The scope of afaulty operation is
quickly contained, either by using duplicated processor pairs run in lock-stepped fashion
as in the case of the HP NonStop Server and Stratus, or by using duplicate pipeline stages
for fault detection, and a checkpoint and instruction retry for transparent recovery, as in the
case of IBM zSeries systems. A comprehensive overview and comparison of the IBM and
HP fault tolerance approaches is provided in [153].
There have been several approaches proposed in research for further improving the
efficiency of redundant execution. DIVA achieves extremely low performance overhead by
using a simple dedicated checker to verify the results of instructions ready tobe c mmitted
by the high performance core [17]. The checker is a standard five-stag in-order processor
designed with sufficiently large transistors and operated at a clock rate sufficient to make
it immune to soft errors. Despite its slow clock rate and simple design, the checker does
not become a bottleneck because it does not incur mis-speculation penaltiesand incurs
virtually no memory system overhead due to the prefetching effect causedby the high
performance core. Since the recomputations have both a spatial and temporal gap they
will not be affected by the temporal or spatial locality of the particles. Research rs have
suggested modifications to the superscalar hardware to support redundant execution for a
subset of the pipeline stages [155, 156]. There have also been proposals t leverage the
multi-threading support in hardware or software to implement redundant execution [19,90–
92]. Both AR-SMT [90] and SRT [91] use a hardware mechanism called simultaneous
multithreading to drive the redundant threads of execution. Both these schemes are rather
complex, but SRT has the advantage that it does not require changes to thoperating system
and can handle multi-cycle faults. Recent research has explored the possibility of exploiting
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the redundancy in CMPs for light-weight redundant execution [127].
Redundant execution has also been applied at the circuit or logic level throug con-
current error detection techniques [157]. Recently, Mitra et al. proposed built-in soft error
resilience (BISER), a temporal redundant execution technique that uses the assistance of
already existing design for test (DFT) structures [158]. This mechanismelegantly reuses
already existing scan latches for fault detection, uses a C-element for fault ecovery, and
achieves high reliability with minimal overhead in area and power consumption. Snce the
scan chains in a processor are generally used at a slow frequency, they are typically sized
smaller than normal latches to minimize the overhead in area and power consumption. How-
ever, BISER requires the scan latches to be operated at the processorlock frequency for
fault detection. The challenge here lies in enabling at-speed use of the scan chains, and at
the same time balancing the fault coverage with the overheads in area and power consump-
tion.
6.4.3 AVF Throttling
FRE proactively detects faults in the execution by redundantly performing all instruction
operations at the cost of higher complexity, power consumption, and performance overhead.
In this dissertation, we propose a new reliability regime, AVF throttling, based on fault
evasion rather than fault tolerance. AVF throttling is at the other end of the spectrum in
comparison to FRE and completely eliminates redundant execution. It improvesreliability
by trading concurrency to reduce the amount of processor state vulnerable to soft errors.
Modern microprocessors employ several concurrency techniques to impr ve er-
formance. Many of these techniques such as speculative execution, achieve higher perfor-
mance by aggressively bringing future program state into the processorand mining them
for available parallelism. As these techniques increase the average time for which program
state is resident on the processor, they also increase the probability of thesta e being cor-
rupted by a soft error and hence the structure’s AVF. The performance-reliability tradeoff
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therefore refers to this opposing interaction between the larger AVF and the smaller execu-
tion time. A key observation is that while exploiting parallelism along the longest program
path can significantly reduce execution time, fetching program state into the proc ssor cor-
responding to the majority of other program paths can be delayed by several cycles without
any effect on the execution time. Fields et al. termed this latency tolerance exhibit d by
program state aslack, and demonstrated that there is a significant amount of slack in pro-
gram execution [159]. The fault evasive mechanisms we explore later in this dissertation
precisely take advantage of this abundant execution slack to defer the fetc of program
state, thus reducing the amount of vulnerable processor state, and at thesame time also
minimizing the performance overhead.
AVF throttling mechanisms thus reduce processor ACE cycles by reducing both the
vulnerable processor state and exposure time to soft errors. AVF throttling is built upon two
important observations.
Protected vs unprotected storage:While structures such as instruction and data
caches are typically protected, other processor structures such as thereord r buffer, register
file and latches may not always be protected. So when state is aggressively fetched out of
protected structures, it is effectively converted from protected to vulnerabl state, and thus
now begins accumulating ACE cycles.
Error expansion: It is also common that state stored in microarchitectural struc-
tures are wider since they include either post-decoded information or additional pipeline
control state. For instance, while instructions in the cache are typically 32 bitswide, a
post-decoded instruction in the instruction window may well be 100 bits wide. Threfore,
the same information now accrues more ACE cycles and has a higher chance of being cor-
rupted.
The work that comes closest to AVF throttling is the concept of triggers and actions
proposed by Weaver et al. [2]. They observe that in an in-order processor, events such as L2
misses increase the vulnerability of the instructions waiting in the instruction windothat
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are behind this L2 miss. They proposed to reduce the ACE cycles accumulated by flushing
the instruction window on L2 misses. They showed that this approach incurred minimal
performance overhead in an in-order architecture. Qureshi et al. [160] proposed to use
the slack available on an L2 miss to perform redundant execution of instructions to reduce
SER. While both these techniques manage the originally available slack, the AVFthrottling
regime we propose aims to reduce slack by spreading the computation appropriately and
fetching program state just when needed. While deferring the fetch of program instructions
has been proposed earlier by Muthler et al. for improving performance [161], we use it to
improve soft error reliability. Reducing instruction window SER using fronte d throttling
was also explored by Kalappurakkal et al. [162].
6.4.4 Selective Redundant Execution (SRE)
Selective redundant execution can be viewed in primarily two different ways. First is the
hardware centric view, where redundant execution is performed only ina subset of the
pipeline stages. IBM System 390 used redundant execution based faulttolerance only in
the decode and execute stages of the processor [18]. There is some area ove head due to
duplication, and extra power consumption due to redundant execution in these stages, but
low performance overhead.
Second is the program centric view, where redundant execution is performed only
for selective portions of the program [118, 119]. Parashar et al. exploit high confidence
control flow, address, and value predictions as a means for verifying the corresponding
branch, load, and store addresses and values, and do not redundantly execute the program
slices computing these values [118]. Gomaa et al. dynamically detect periodsof l w single-
thread performance during which they trigger redundant execution to reduce performance
overhead [119]. These and other hardware proposals for doing SRE arguably achieve lower
fault coverage than full redundant execution (FRE), but have the potential to significantly
improve the performance overhead. However, it also increases the hardware complexity, be-
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cause hardware now not only must perform redundant execution, but must also dynamically
decide when to and when not to trigger redundant execution.
Other research has explored software-based SRE, and investigated using offline pro-
filing and optimization algorithms to determine the degree of protection required in different
parts of the program [117]. In this approach, the compiler uses this information to appropri-
ately insert redundant instructions in the program. For instance, if the analysis revealed that
only the control flow requires verification for a particular section of the program, only the
slice of instructions that determine the control flow are duplicated. While software takes
almost the full responsibility for redundant execution in this methodology, an altern tive
hybrid methodology may use the compiler only to annotate different parts of theprogram
using different execution flags, and not actually insert the redundantinstructions. The ex-
ecution flags may denote different execution modes including but not limited to normal
execution, redundant execution, and redundant execution of only thememory instructions,
and the hardware can then interpret these flags dynamically to trigger the appropriate form
of redundant execution.
Partial redundancy is also applicable at other levels of the design. Cost-effective
partial duplication of logic gates is motivated by an observation of electrical masking, and
duplicates only the gates nearer the latch that are more susceptible [10]. Selective capaci-
tance insertion focuses on increasing latching-window masking to reduce the probability of
latching transient errors [11]. While device or circuit level techniques directly target the ac-
tual source of a fault, higher level mechanisms using redundant execution and the compiler
may be able to provide better reliability guarantees and lower overhead at thesystem level.
6.4.5 Summary
While FRE can be implemented using redundant instructions within a single thread, as
two threads on the same processor, or as two threads on two different processors, it incurs
high overhead in all cases [19]. Hence, it will be justified only for worst-case soft error
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rate scaling trends or for markets with very stringent reliability requirements,a d will be
over-designed in other cases. On the other hand, AVF throttling is a class of micr archi-
tectural fault evasion techniques that efficiently reduces the amount of vulnerable processor
state. SRE uses hardware or software approaches to redundantly execute only specific sub-
portions of the program. Therefore, both AVF throttling and SRE can significa tly improve
the performance-reliability tradeoff over FRE. Further, AVF throttling is significantly sim-
pler than both FRE and SRE since it is not based on redundant execution,and hence is also
more power efficient.
While FRE or SRE based fault detection will probably be required to achievethe
AVF reduction in the first two scaling scenarios in Figure 6.2, and ECC can be applied to
large storage structures, we propose that microarchitectural fault evasion techniques such
as AVF throttling, can achieve the 5%-25% AVF reduction required in last twoscaling sce-
narios at lower overhead. Further, similar to SRE, the performance-reliability tradeoff of
AVF throttling can also be configured based on the application and reliability requirements.
Chapter 7 extends this analysis, and presents a detailed comparison of the reliability im-
provement, performance, area, power consumption, and complexity overheads of the four
regimes.
6.5 TRIPS AVF Methodology and Evaluation
This section presents the detailed methodology for evaluating the AVF of important mi-
croarchitectural structures in the TRIPS processor using ACE analysis. Chapter 4 described
the TRIPS microarchitecture in detail, and Table 6.1 lists the TRIPS processorstructures for
which we computed the ACE cycles, along with the number of instances in the TRIPS core,
and the number of entries in each instance. Features such as extensive predication, fewer
architectural register file reads/writes, and the physical partitioning of allm jor structures
have the potential to reduce the per-bit AVF in comparison with conventionalarchitectures.
At the same time, the block-atomic execution model which has the potential to extendthe
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Unit Register Tile Execution Tile Data Tile Operand Router
Structure Register Read Write Instruction Operand LSQ LSQ OPN
file queue queue buffer buffer buffer CAM buffer
Instances 4 4 4 16 2x16 (opA, opB) 4 4 100
Entries 32 64 64 64 64 256 256 4
Table 6.1: TRIPS processor structures for which ACE cycles are tracked
occupancy of block state on the processor, and the larger sizes of processor structures in-
cluding but not limited to the instruction window and operand buffers have thepot ntial
to increase the overall vulnerability of the structure over conventional architectures. The
processor ACE cycles presented in the rest of the dissertation is the sum of the ACE cycles
across all these structures. In computing the ACE cycles and the AVF, we account for the
sources of un-ACE cycles that are applicable from the list in Section 6.2.
6.5.1 TRIPS AVF Methodology
The following paragraphs give a detailed explanation of the different un-ACE factors that
were considered for each structure in Table 6.1 in computing the AVF.
Instruction Buffer in the Execution Tile: Figure 6.3 shows the TRIPS instruction for-
mats. Since theread andwrite instructions are stored in the RT, they are not considered
here. While Figure 6.3 shows the format of 32 bit pre-decoded instructions, each entry in
the instruction buffer contains a post-decoded instruction which is 74 bits wide. In addition
to the opcode bits, predication mode specifier bits, branch offsets, data for immediate and
constant operands, and destination target specifiers, a post-decodeinstruction also con-
tains control bits that encode the instruction type, that aid in functional unit and operand
selection during execution, and that speed-up the construction of the OPNcontrol and data
packet that are sent to the router.
Since the TRIPS compiler does not currently generate any performance enhancing
instructions, our analysis does not include masking due to that factor. We also restricted our
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OPCODE = Primary Opcode
XOP = Extended Opcode
PR = Predicate Field
IMM = Signed Immediate
T0 = Target 0 Specifier
T1 = Target 1 Specifier
LSID = Load/Store ID
EXIT = Exit Number
OFFSET = Branch Offset
CONST = 16-bit Constant
V = Valid Bit
GR = General Register Index
RT0 = Read Target 0 Specifier
RT1 = Read Target 1 Specifier
Figure 6.3: TRIPS instruction formats
analysis of logical masking to bitwise logical operations, and sign extension instructions
which are encoded in the general instruction format. Masking due to NOP, invalid, and ex-
ace state are easily computed by tracking valid block instructions, block commit and flush
events, and the time when each instruction enters into, and is issued out of theinstruction
buffer for execution, respectively. The destination target specifiers, and the control bits re-
lated to OPN control packet formation are not derated for dynamically deadinstructions.
The predicate specifier bits are not derated for the predicated-false instructions. Addition-
ally, we do not derate the target specifier bits of indirectly predicated-false instructions,
instructions which are themselves not predicated but which deliver data to those at are
predicated-false.
Operand Buffer in the Execution Tile: The data values in the operand buffer are 64 bits
wide. In computing the AVF, we account for invalid state, mis-speculated state, ex-ace state,
predicated-false instructions, dynamically dead instructions, and logical masking. Since the
information contained is only data, the vulnerable cycles are fully derated for all un-ACE
state, including predicated-false and dynamically dead instructions. We modelrelatively
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Valid Register Target 1 Target 2 Write Queue Write Queue Write Queue Read Queue
Specifier Entry Valid Entry Index Entry Issued Entry Issued
1 bit 7 bits 9 bits 9 bits 1 bit 5 bits 1 bit 1 bit
Table 6.2: Bit fields of a read queue entry
simple support for logical masking and only account for bitwise logical instructions, and
sign extension instructions.
Architectural Register File in the Register Tile: The architectural register file contains
committed program register state, and each register is 64 bits wide. Since it contains com-
mitted state, only a subset of the masking factors are applicable for the registefile. For
instance, it cannot contain state that is invalid, mis-speculated, or produced by predicated-
false instructions. On the other hand, we account for the register value being in ex-ace state
after it has been read for the last time by a block that is not on the mis-speculated p th, and
before it is over-written with a new value. We also derate register data that isover written
before it is read, since it is dynamically dead. Finally, we account for someof the bits in
the register value being logically masked, if they are logically masked in all of their us s.
Read Queues in the Register Tile: Read queues and write queues are used for register
forwarding in the TRIPS processor. The write queue entries buffer theblock register out-
puts until they are determined to be non-speculative when they can be committedto he
architectural register file. Each read queue entry contains the register specifier denoting the
architectural register to read, using which it matches against the writes to thesam regis-
ter buffered in the write queue from older blocks. Register forwarding from the write to
the read queue uses several control bits in the read queue including the issued tatus, the
pointer to the write queue entry, and the status of the write queue entry, to signal the current
status of forwarding. The read queue entry also contains two target specifiers pointing to
the instructions to which the register value must be sent. Table 6.2 shows the bitfields of a
read queue entry.
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Valid Register Data Ready Value Forwarded Exception Null Committed
Specifier to Read Queue
1 bit 7 bits 64 bits 1 bit 1 bit 1 bit 1 bit 1 bit
Table 6.3: Bit fields of a write queue entry
The valid bit of an entry is always considered to be ACE since it can either lead
to a register value not being delivered to the block if a valid bit becomes invalid, or lead
to incorrectly delivering a register value to the block if an invalid entry is marked valid.
The susceptibility of the register and target specifiers, and the read queue entry issued bit
are dependent on whether the entry is valid, since they are vulnerable only during the win-
dow when the entry is valid. Similarly, other control bits such as the issued status of he
write queue entry, and the write queue entry index from where the value is delivered, are
vulnerable only when the control bit indicating whether there is a valid write queue entry
corresponding to this read queue entry is set. Once the vulnerable windows for the different
bit fields are computed, they are then used in a conventional fashion to apply further derating
using mis-speculated information, ex-ace information, and dynamically dead information.
Write Queues in the Register Tile: The write queues store the actual data to be com-
mitted to the architectural register file. Table 6.3 shows the different fields in awrite queue
entry. While information in the read queue entry is generally vulnerable only until it is used
(after which it is ex-ace), the data in the write queue entry is vulnerable untilit is success-
fully written into the register file. This is the primary difference between read queue and the
write queue entry vulnerability. Due to this difference, all the fields of the write queue are
vulnerable for the entire duration when the entry is valid. Using a similar methodology, the
vulnerable window is used to apply further derating due to ex-ace state, speculative state,
and dynamically dead state to estimate the AVF.
LSQ structures in the Data Tile: The load-store queues are responsible for maintaining
program order and enabling data forwarding between dependent loads and stores to improve
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Name Description
CTRL VALID Indicates whether control packet contains valid information.
CTRL TYPE[3:0] Message type: Identifies the type of message
0 - Generic Transfer or Reply
1 - Load Request
2 - Store Request
4 - PC Read Request
5 - Branch/PC Write
CTRL BID[2:0] Block ID: Internal hardware or program block.
CTRL DNODE[5:0] Destination tile: Identified as a 6-bit (xxxyyy) coordinate.
CTRL DINDEX[4:0] Destination Index: used by the destination tile.
CTRL SNODE[5:0] Source node: Identified as a 6-bit (xxxyyy) coordinate.
CTRL SINDEX[4:0] Source Index: used for debugging.
Table 6.4: Bit fields of an OPN control packet
performance. The AVF for the loads and stores are calculated independntly since they
exhibit different behavior. The vulnerable window for the load address is from the time
the address is available in the LSQ, to the last time it is used to gather the data. Theload
data in the LSQ can be obtained from prior stores in the LSQ, and/or the data cache, and/or
the miss-handling logic (MSHRs), and needs to be stored in the LSQ only until ithas been
fully constructed and can be sent to the target instruction. On the other hand, t e address and
data of store instructions are vulnerable until they are successfully committedto the caches,
similar to register data in the write queues. We further take into account derating due to
load and store instructions that are mis-speculated, directly or indirectly predicat d-false,
and dynamically dead.
Operand Buffers in the Operand Router: The operand router is responsible for routing
data between the different tiles in the TRIPS processor. It uses a protocol where each data
packet is preceded by a control packet, and the control packet is always exactly one cycle
ahead of the corresponding data packet [110]. Every tile in the TRIPS processor has a
router, and each router has separate control packet and data packet buffers for each of the
four directions (North, South, East, West). We compute the AVF of the control and data
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Name Description
DATA VALID Indicates whether data packet has valid information.
Cancelled or flushed transfers are invalidated by the sender.




DATA VALUE[63:0] Message payload
Unused bits should be assigned to logic 0.
DATA VALUE[2:0] exit number for branches, load target for loads
DATA VALUE[8:0] load target for loads, PC read requests
DATA ADDR[39:0] In the normal operating mode, this field contains the 40-bit
virtual address for memory operations or the PC value for pc writes
DATA OP[2:0] Lower bits of opcode for branches, loads, stores;
for other cases, this field is unused (set to 0’s).
Table 6.5: Bit fields of an OPN data packet
packet buffers in all the tiles.
Table 6.4 shows the format of the OPN control packet. Control packets ofmulti-
ple types are supported indicative of the instruction type that generates them. The Block
ID identifies the TRIPS block to which these packets belong. Finally, the source node
and index, and destination node and index identify the source and destination locations for
this packet. Since the packet leaves the buffer immediately after it is processed, there is
never any ex-ace state associated with the buffer. If the control packet belongs to a block
that is mis-speculated, all bit fields of the control packet are derated except the Block ID
which is used for flushing the packet. Our methodology currently does notacc unt for de-
rating control packets corresponding to predicated-false instructions and dynamically dead
instructions.
Table 6.5 shows the format of the OPN data packet. The TYPE field indicates
whether the data packet is normal, null, or has an exception. As shown in thetable, the size
of the data value, address, and op fields depend on the actual type of instruction generating
the data packet. For instance, while a load or store instruction uses both the data ad ress and
value fields, a general format instruction such as ADD uses only the valuefie d. Therefore,
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based on the instruction type we determine the actual number of meaningful bitsin the
data address, value, and op fields and only take those into account in computing the AVF.
Similar to the control packet, there is never any ex-ace state in the data buffers. All the
fields are derated if the data packet is mis-speculated. Our methodology doesnot account
for derating data packets corresponding to predicated-false instructions and dynamically
dead instructions.
6.5.2 TRIPS Baseline AVF Results
We augment the cycle-accurate, validated execution driven simulator that models the TRIPS
architecture in detail to compute the ACE cycles. We used 24 compiler-generat d and 7
hand-optimized benchmarks from the EEMBC 2.0 suite, 10 benchmarks fromthe SPEC
2000 floating point suite, and 8 benchmarks from the SPEC 2000 integer suit . All the
SPEC benchmarks are generated by the compiler. The rest of the methodology is identical
to that described in Section 5.3.4. More details regarding each of these structures can be
found in [108].
Table 6.6 presents the AVF for the different structures analyzed. The first four
columns present the AVF for the individual benchmark categories. At a high level, the hand-
optimized benchmarks have the highest AVF, followed by the compiler-generated SPEC
floating point benchmarks, EEMBC benchmarks, and finally the SPEC integer b nchmarks.
This is not surprising since the order corresponds to the expected degree of processor uti-
lization. However, in contrast to results form prior research [123], theaverage AVF of
the instruction window for SPEC floating point benchmarks is less than for SPEC integer
benchmarks. This is primarily because floating point instructions stay for a shorter time
in the instruction window in comparison to integer instructions due to the higher inhe t
parallelism available in floating point programs.
The last three columns of Table 6.6 present the AVF averaged across all the bench-
mark categories at two granularities; AVF, which represents the error probability per bit of
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Structure Hand EEMBC SPEC SPEC Average Average Average
optimized AVF INT FP AVF (AVFxBITS) Percentage
AVF AVF AVF Contribution
Register 11.9% 10.5% 7.8% 12.1% 10.6% 866.2 7.4%
File
Read 5.7% 4.6% 4.1% 5.4% 4.8% 419.2 3.6%
Queue
Write 5.1% 3.8% 3.2% 7.2% 4.6% 918.1 7.8%
Queue
Instruction 15.5% 10.1% 9.4% 6.2% 9.8% 7453.1 63.5%
Buffer
Operand 1.6% 0.7% 0.5% 0.8% 0.8% 1037.8 8.9%
Buffer
LSQ Buffer 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 0.6% 0.4% 255.0 2.2%
LSQ CAM 1.1% 0.9% 0.5% 1.5% 1.0% 411.8 3.5%
OPN Buffer 0.9% 0.5% 0.4% 1.0% 0.7% 368.2 3.1%
Table 6.6: Baseline AVF results
the structure per cycle, and (AVF x BITS), that indicates the error probability of the overall
structure across all the tiles in which the structure exists, per cycle. For instance, (AVF x
BITS) of the local instruction buffer accounts for the bits in all the 16 distribu ed instruction
buffers in the processor. The same data is also shown normalized to the total(AVF x BITS)
to show the relative contributions of the different structures to the overallprocessor SER.
The architectural register file, and the local instruction buffers at eachET ave the
maximum AVF. These results are consistent with prior research that have reported the high-
est vulnerability for these two processor structures [92,123]. However, the absolute values
of the AVF for these two structures are considerably smaller in TRIPS in comparison to
prior research that reported an AVF of 18.65% for the register file [92], and 28% for the
instruction window [123]. The primary reason the register file has lower AVF is because
the TRIPS processor implements a storage hierarchy for managing instruction operands to
optimize for capacity, latency, and bandwidth. The hierarchy consists of three levels: the
architectural register file, and the read and write queues that perform register forwarding
between blocks in the RTs, and the local operand buffers at each ET. As mentioned before,
accesses within a block only need to access the local operand buffers,while the read, and
write queues and the register file are accessed at block boundaries. This division of ac-
cesses, along with the extensive partitioning of all the structures that spreads the accesses
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physically, together reduce their vulnerability when compared to conventional architectures.
Similarly, the extensive partitioning of the instruction window reduces its average vulnera-
bility. Further, the large capacity of the window allows more speculative instructions which
are inherently less vulnerable.
Accounting for the structure capacities using (AVF x BITS) shows that many struc-
tures including the Write Queues used for register value forwarding, andthe local operand
buffers at each ET have vulnerabilities greater than the register file. Reiset al. reported an
AVF of 18.65% for a register file with a total capacity of 8320 bits (128 registers x 65 bits)
resulting in an (AVF x BITS) of 1539.5. Although the capacity of the TRIPS register file is
similar (128 registers x 64 bits), the (AVF x BITS) is smaller than this because of the distri-
bution of accesses across the three levels of the hierarchy. Computing the con ribution of all
the three levels of the hierarchy by adding the (AVF x BITS) of the registerfile, read queue,
write queue, and the local operand buffers produces a total of 3241.3. While the combined
capacity of these structures is almost 20 times greater than the register file in theconven-
tional architecture, the overall hierarchy is only twice as vulnerable. Thevulnerability does
not scale with capacity because the logical partitioning of the accesses, and the physical par-
titioning of the structures reduce the occupancy and utilization. Further, asmentioned, the
vulnerability is also a function of all the other masking factors enumerated in Section 6.2.
Similarly, Mukherjee et al. reported an AVF of 28% for an instruction windowwith a total
capacity of 6400 bits (64 entries x 100 bits) resulting in an (AVF x BITS) of 1792. While
the TRIPS distributed instruction window with a capacity of 75776 bits (1024 entries x 74
bits) is more than 10X larger, it has an (AVF x BITS) of 7453.1 which makes itabout four
times more vulnerable than the conventional instruction window. The vulnerability again
does not scale with capacity because it depends on all the factors enumerated in Section 6.2.
Together the register file, read and write queues, and the local operandbuffers at
each ET contribute 27.7% of the overall ACE cycles. The instruction windowis still the
dominant contributor accounting for 63% of the processor error rate. This is partially be-
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cause instructions have more control information that cannot be derated easily when com-
pared to data. Further, instructions in the TRIPS processor arrive muchearlier than the
operands due to the block-atomic execution model, and the large instruction window and
hence accumulate more ACE cycles. Chapter 7 provides more insight into this analysis.
In summary, while physical and logical partitioning of the structures and accesses reduces
the per-bit AVF, the larger capacity and the greater amount of state increases the overall
vulnerability of the structures. However, the 10-20X increase in capacityonly leads to a
2-4X increase in vulnerability. Prior research has demonstrated that these larger capacities
can be used used to out-perform conventional architectures by a factor of 3X on a highly
optimized set of benchmarks [163], providing an RPR of approximately 1. In the future,
such analysis of the performance-reliability tradeoff will be an important component of the
design process along with studying the power consumption, area, and complexity tradeoffs.
6.6 Discussion
The most widely used methodology for estimating AVF is called statistical fault inject on
(SFI). Statistical fault injection works by randomly injecting bit flips into the bits of the
processor structures being studied, and then comparing the architectural state of the model
with a golden reference model after simulating for a certain number of cycles. While a mis-
match indicates an error, a successful match can either mean that the errorhas been masked
or is still latent in the processor. A more detailed comparison of the microarchitectural state
can reduce the probability of the error still being latent and improves the accuracy of the
analysis [122]. Multiple fault injections are performed for each structureto attain statistical
significance based on an analysis of confidence intervals. Both the time interval b tween
two fault injections and the physical location of the fault injection are chosenrandomly for
every experiment. The fraction of runs for which the outputs mismatch repres nts the AVF
for the structure. While SFI can be used both on a performance model and at the RTL level,
its accuracy is higher at the RTL level where the microarchitecture is modeledin greater
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detail.
Mukherjee et al. analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of the two techniques,
ACE analysis, and SFI in computing AVF [123]. While SFI does not requirea detailed
knowledge of the underlying architecture, the length of each fault injectionrun is usually
limited to tens of thousands of cycles because RTL simulation is very time consuming.
Further, estimating the AVF of a structure requires multiple fault injection experiments to
achieve statistical significance and is very computationally intensive. On the other hand,
ACE analysis can measure the AVF for all the processor structures simulated by the per-
formance model using just one detailed simulation. Wang et al. argue that dueto several
reasons including the abstract nature of the performance model, SFI will provide signifi-
cantly greater accuracy than ACE analysis [164]. However, since the performance models
used in industry model the microarchitecture in great detail, ACE analysis should provide
reasonably good accuracy, and in much less time than SFI. In summary, since performance
models are available earlier in the design than RTL, ACE analysis allows a designer to es-
timate processor reliability and make important architectural decisions for improving relia-
bility, earlier in the design cycle, albeit with lower accuracy. Further, ACE analysis is ideal
for this process since it permits a better understanding of the interaction between he archi-
tectural decisions for high performance and their impact on reliability. For instance, ACE
analysis can be used to determine the relative contributions of different processor structures
to the overall ACE cycles, or to study the effect of architectural parameters such as branch
misprediction rate or the percentage of dynamically dead instructions on the AVF.
6.7 Summary
In this chapter, we extend the raw soft error rate analysis performed in Chapter 3 to the
chip level by taking into account architectural masking factors. We use themethodology
proposed by Mukherjee et al. to compute the architectural vulnerability facors for critical
TRIPS processor structures. We extend the methodology to build a quantitative fr mework
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for analyzing the performance-reliability tradeoff. We propose Reliability Performance
Ratio (RPR), a new metric which a designer can use to measure the performance-reliability
tradeoff, and achieve the reliability target with the least excessive protection and overhead.
We analyze the scaling trend of chip soft error rate to quantify the soft error reliability
improvement needed every technology generation, and discuss the performance-reliability
tradeoffs of achieving it at different levels of the design including device techniques, error
correcting codes, and microarchitectural mechanisms. Based on this analyis, we propose a
classification of the architectural soft error reliability techniques into fourregimes each with
a different performance-reliability tradeoff. In the next chapter, we explore mechanisms
from each of the regimes and present a detailed comparison of the reliability improvement
and the associated tradeoffs.
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Chapter 7
Techniques for Improving Soft Error
Reliability
This chapter presents techniques from three soft error reliability regimes: full redundant
execution (FRE), AVF throttling, and selective redundant execution (SRE). As described in
Table 4.4, the techniques are built upon key features of the TRIPS architecture: tile-based
modular design, on-chip networks, block-atomic execution model, and static ins ruction
placement to lower overhead. Sections 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 describe the techniques and present
the results for FRE, AVF throttling, and SRE respectively. For each regimewe valuate
the reliability improvement as the percentage decrease in ACE cycles, and theperformance
overhead as the percentage increase in execution cycles relative to the baseline TRIPS mi-
croarchitecture in normal execution mode using all the execution resources. Finally, Sec-
tion 7.4 provides a detailed comparison of the reliability improvement, performance over-
head, and other design tradeoffs associated with the regimes.
As described in Section 5.3.4, the execution cycles and ACE cycles are bothcom-
puted using a cycle-accurate, validated execution driven simulator that models the TRIPS
architecture and the distributed protocols in detail [111]. We use 24 benchmarks from the
EEMBC 2.0 suite, 10 benchmarks from the SPEC 2000 floating point suite, and 8 bench-
180
marks from the SPEC 2000 integer suite. Apart from these compiler-generat d benchmarks,
we also use 7 hand-optimized EEMBC benchmarks to account for the fact that the TRIPS
compiler is still in development. As shown in Table 5.7, the hand-optimized benchmarks
have significantly larger block sizes and hence utilize the processor resourc more effec-
tively.
7.1 Full Redundant Execution (FRE)
The TRIPS block-atomic execution model provides two basic forms of redundant execu-
tion: redundant execution of instructions within a block, and redundant execution of blocks
at the block granularity. Full redundant execution within a block basically requires each
block instruction and all its operations in the pipeline (fetch, decode, register read, exe-
cute, writeback) to be duplicated within the block. The block size has to be appropriately
reduced to allow space for this duplication. In the latter model, each TRIPS block is as-
sociated with acorresponding redundant block(CRB) that verifies its execution. In this
dissertation, we explore this latter model of redundant execution at the block granularity
because it has some qualitative advantages. First, block-granular redundant execution is
a natural fit for the block-atomic execution model and is independent of block utilization.
Second, the TRIPS microarchitecture easily lends itself to this model since the majority
of the processor queues are already statically block-partitioned (see Section 4.2.1). Third,
using a primary and a redundant block provides greater opportunity forslack between the
redundant operations for higher reliability. Finally, fault detection at the block granularity
amortizes the overhead of comparing the outputs of each instruction and allows better scal-
ability at future technologies. While we primarily focus on fault detection, TRIPS blocks
provide a natural boundary for checkpointing, and the model can be naturally extended to
include fault recovery. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 illustrate our FRE model. The following para-
graphs describe the model and the additions needed to the baseline TRIPS microarchitecture































Figure 7.1: Block-granular redundant execution model
Redundant Execution Model: In the baseline microarchitecture, the 64 local instruc-
tion and operand buffer entries at each ET are statically divided into eightblock partitions
allowing simultaneous execution of up to eight blocks. For redundant execution, these en-
tries are statically and equally divided to allow up to four primary and redundant blocks to
execute simultaneously. Resources that are not statically allocated such asthe functional
units are dynamically shared between the primary and redundant blocks. If events from
both the primary and the redundant block are ready in the same cycle, the model uses a
simple round-robin scheme for arbitration. For instance, primary block andCRB commits
use round-robin scheduling. The baseline microarchitecture already contains round-robin
thread scheduling logic for use in multi-threaded mode, which can be augmented for use in
redundant execution mode.
Multiple CRBs execute simultaneously, similar to the primary blocks, to reduce per-
formance overhead. Further, only primary blocks that complete successfully without any
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Figure 7.2: Using the LSQ to perform replication of load values and comparison of stores,
and the BOQ to compare branch addresses
This reduces the number of instructions that are redundantly executed and decreases con-
tention for the shared execution resources. While CRB instructions can begi execution
only after successful completion of the primary block, CRB allocation, instruction fetch
from the I-cache, and delivery of operands from older CRB’s, areinitiated as early as pos-
sible to effectively hide their transmission latency. CRB instructions and operands thus
fetched occupy their allocated instruction and operand buffer entries, and w it for primary
block completion. The commit commands on the GCN, which inform every instruction of
the oldest primary block (at each of the ETs) about its successful completion, are augmented
to trigger the execution of the CRB. A CRB instruction that is otherwise ready for execution
can be selected only after the notification of primary block completion is receivd.
Detecting Control Flow Errors: A primary block is retired as usual if the predicted
address matches with the computed address. If a misprediction occurs, thena flush is
initiated for the mispredicted primary blocks and the corresponding redundant blocks. In-
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stead, if they match we propose to add the actual and the predicted addressboth to a block-
partitioned Branch Outcome Queue (BOQ). The BOQ will contain eight entriesto hold
branch outcomes for eight successive blocks. A CRB can retire only if itscomputed branch
address matches both the actual and the predicted address in the corresponding entry of the
BOQ, since an error could have occurred either in the primary block branch prediction or
in the calculation of the address. A mis-match in either comparison indicates the pres nce
of an error. CRBs do not perform branch prediction, as they use the branch addresses from
the primary block stream to access the I-cache.
Detecting Errors in Loads and Stores: The Load Value Queue (LVQ) was proposed
for ensuring that the primary and the redundant loads get the same value during redundant
execution, even in the presence of intervening stores in multiprocessor systems, which oth-
erwise would lead to false errors [19]. Similarly, the Store Buffer (StB) was proposed to
buffer the primary stores temporarily, until they can be compared with the redundant stores,
after which they can be committed to permanent storage [19]. Since the StB contains data
that is potentially older than the the LSQ, but younger than the caches, the primary loads
must access the StB in addition to the LSQ and the caches to compute the return loadvalue.
We augment the TRIPSload-store queueLSQ to perform the functionality of the
LVQ and the StB, thus eliminating the need for the extra structures and reducing the area
overhead. As a brief review, the TRIPS LSQ in the baseline microarchitecture holds all
pertinent information relating to in-flight loads and stores. The main functionsof the LSQ
are to ensure correct ordering between program loads and stores, and detect any load-store
dependence violations. The TRIPS LSQ is also statically block-partitioned, and contains
eight partitions to support the simultaneous execution of eight primary blocksduring normal
operation.
We propose a solution that requires no extra LSQ entries, and dynamically divides
the existing block partitions allotting up to four partitions to the primary and the redundant
blocks at any time. A primary block records its load and store addresses and data in the LSQ
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block partition it was allocated at block allocation time. When the primary block completes
execution, its LSQ partition is reassigned to the CRB. CRB loads use the data stored by
the primary block in the LSQ partition during execution, and match their computed load
addresses against the addresses stored by the primary block for faultdetec ion. Similarly,
CRB stores compare the computed address and data against the values stored by he primary
block for fault detection. An error in either comparison indicates the presence of a fault.
The LSQ partition is freed upon successful completion of the CRB, and canbe allocated
to another primary block. This solution allows the primary block to complete execution
and deposit its values in the LSQ from where the CRB can access them later,providing
slack between their execution which is attractive both from a performance and a reliability
perspective. Similar, to the Store Buffer (StB) described above, primaryblocks must also
search the LSQ partitions of older primary blocks that were reassigned to CRBs to correctly
satisfy program load-store dependences.
Isolation of Register File Errors: The primary blocks and the CRBs use two distinct
copies of the register file for fault isolation. With modest extra reconfiguration logic, the
redundant blocks can use one of the other four register files provisioned for use in multi-
threaded mode. Of course, this would mean that the processor can support fewer threads in
redundant execution mode. Since register file errors are isolated, detecting rrors in control
flow, load addresses, and store addresses and data is sufficient forerror detection. This
is similar to the largerSphere of Replicationproposed in [19]. The CRBs implement full
fledged register renaming, and register bypassing similar to primary block execution for
higher performance.
System Calls, Exceptions, Timeout: System calls and exceptions act as synchronization
points between primary and CRB execution. On a primary block exception, CRB execution
is allowed to catch up to that point. If there is no error detected (due to store or branch
comparison) until that point, and the CRB also reports the same exception, theexception is
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treated as atrueexception and is reported to the exception handler. On the other hand, if an
error is detected before the CRB reaches that point, or if the CRB does not report the same
exception, it indicates the presence of a transient fault. System calls are also handled in a
similar fashion. If CRB execution reaches the same point without any fault detected, then
the system call is serviced. The TRIPS baseline microarchitecture containslog c to raise a
timeout exception if a block’s lifespan exceeds a pre-determined maximum threshold value.
While timeout can occur due to functional errors in the hardware or software, they can also
be caused by soft errors that prevent a block from producing all its outputs.
7.1.1 Evaluation of Redundant Execution
As described in Section 6.6, silent data corruption (SDC) is more severe than detected unre-
coverable errors (DUE), and the acceptable SDC rate is at least 40X smaller th n the target
for DUE. For example, IBM targets 114 SDC FIT, and 4566 system-kill DUEFIT for its
Power4 systems [2]. Hence, a DUE ACE cycle is at least 40X less malicious than an SDC
ACE cycle. Therefore, adding fault detection using redundant execution converts the origi-
nal SDC ACE cycles into DUE ACE cycles which are at least 40X less malignant. However,
while each instruction accumulates SDC ACE cycles once in the original execution, DUE
ACE cycles are accumulated both by the original instruction and its redundant copy during
redundant execution. Based on this observation, we compute a conservative estimate for
the overall ACE cycles for redundant execution by adding the ACE cycles of the primary
and the redundant blocks together and derating the total by 40X to convert it to DUE ACE
cycles.
As described, while the baseline TRIPS microarchitecture in normal execution mode
can execute up to eight speculative blocks, the redundant execution model statically limits
the speculation depth of the primary and redundant execution to four blocks. Hence, two
factors contribute to the performance overhead: halving the speculation depth and adding
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Figure 7.3: Impact on execution cycles and ACE cycles if the maximum number of spec-
ulative blocks is reduced from eight to four. The average results are shown for all the four
benchmark categories. SPEC floating point benchmarks and hand-optimized benchmarks
exhibit high sensitivity to speculation depth.
cution and ACE cycles for each benchmark category. Just restricting program execution to
use only four instead of eight blocks, without triggering redundant execution, reduces ACE
cycles by 38.1% with 8.6% performance overhead for the EEMBC benchmarks. SPEC
integer and floating point benchmarks exhibit 30.9% and 22.5% reduction in ACE cycles,
at 14.2% and 36% performance overhead. Similarly, the hand-optimized EEMBC bench-
marks show 26.6% decrease in ACE cycles at 33.2% performance overhead w n executing
using four blocks without redundant execution. SPEC floating point benchmarks and the
hand-optimized benchmarks shows higher overhead because of the great r inherent par-
allelism. In summary, while just halving the speculation depth decreases ACE cycles by
reducing the amount of vulnerable state on the processor, it is not a desirbl technique for
benchmarks with high parallelism because of the poor performance-reliability tradeoff.
Figures 7.4, 7.5, 7.6, and 7.7 present the combined impact of the reduced spec-
ulation depth and redundant execution on execution and ACE cycles for the SPEC inte-
ger, SPEC floating point, EEMBC, and hand-optimized benchmark categories respectively.
Adding redundant execution increases the performance overhead to 20.2% and 49.7%,
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while achieving higher reduction in ACE cycles of 83.9% and 87.8% for the SPEC in-
teger and floating point benchmarks. The EEMBC benchmarks exhibit a reduction in
ACE cycles by 85.8% at a performance overhead of 20.8%. Finally, the hand-optimized
EEMBC benchmarks incur a large overhead of 61.1% to achieve a reduction in ACE cycles
of 82.8%. As observed above, the floating point and hand-optimized benchmarks incur the
highest overheads due to their greater inherent parallelism. In particular, SPEC floating
point benchmarks such as171.swim and172.mgrid, and hand-optimized benchmarks
such asa2time01, basefp01, andbezier02 possess a significant amount of paral-
lelism and achieve IPCs between 3-6 in the baseline TRIPS microarchitecture. Hence, they
incur a correspondingly high overhead due to the smaller speculation depth, and redundant
execution. Mukherjee et al. performed a detailed evaluation of redundant multithreading
in an aggressive eight-wide SMT processor resembling the Alpha 21464, and observed
an average performance loss of 32% for a suite of SPEC integer and floating point bench-
marks [19]. Our results show a slightly higher performance loss of 36% across the 18 SPEC
benchmarks. This is not surprising since benchmarks with inherent parallelism exploit the
sixteen-wide issue, and the larger instruction window in TRIPS to achieve high r baseline
performance, and experience correspondingly higher overhead due to redundant execution.
Sections 7.1.2 and 7.1.3 explore some key optimizations to this baseline redundant
execution model to potentially improve the performance overhead. The proposed tech-
niques have so far re-executed the entire primary block to achieve fault detection. We make
the observation that the results of primary execution can be used to speed-u r undant
execution without sacrificing reliability. In this spirit, we propose two simple techniques to
reduce performance overhead without affecting reliability.
7.1.2 Accelerating Dataflow Execution in the Redundant Block
Figure 7.8.a illustrates the current order of events for delivering the redundant load data
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Figure 7.4: Impact on execution and ACE cycles for SPEC integer benchmarks with full
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Figure 7.5: Impact on execution and ACE cycles for SPEC floating point benchmarks with
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Figure 7.6: Impact on execution and ACE cycles for EEMBC benchmarks with full redun-
dant execution. There is variation in the performance overhead due to thevarying degree of
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Figure 7.7: Impact on execution and ACE cycles for hand-optimized EEMBCbenchmarks
with full redundant execution. The performance overhead is high becaus of the high pro-


























4 and 2’. Load value dataflow propagation





a) Serial Execution of
Load Value Delivery (3,4)
Fault Detection (1,2) Fault Detection (1,2)
Load Value Delivery (1’,2’)
b) Parallel Execution of
Figure 7.8: Decoupling fault detection and load value delivery in the CRB
pling the load value delivery to the target instruction, and the address comparison for fault
detection. Since the instruction physical locations in the TRIPS architecture are known a-
priori, the primary block load values residing in the CRB LSQ entries can be delivered to
the target instructions as soon as the CRB is mapped. When the redundant load address is
computed it is sent to the CRB LSQ entries for comparison. Figure 7.8.b showst e two
steps of the decoupled operation, allowing the parallel execution of the two parts of the
dependence chain one leading up to the formation of the load address (1 and 2), and the
other beginning from the use of the load value (1’ and 2’). Austin et al. proposed a similar
decoupled mechanism for concurrent value delivery and output comparison to improve the
performance overhead of fault detection in conventional superscalarprocessors [17].
Since value delivery can occur earlier than fault detection due to this optimizaon as
show in Figures 7.8, the block register and store outputs can arrive before fault detection has
been completed. Although this normally indicates successful block completion,to achieve
fault coverage we must wait for fault detection to complete also. This is ensur d by waiting
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for exactly as many redundant loads as produced by the corresponding primary block before
signalling CRB completion. If there are either greater or fewer loads from the CRB, it
indicates the presence of an error.
7.1.3 Predication Model Optimization
TRIPS blocks employ predication at the leaves of the dataflow graph to achieve higher per-
formance by allowing multipath execution within the block, and enabling better utilization
of the abundant execution resources [165]. On the other hand, predication at the top of
the dependence chains may be more power efficient since it executes fewr instructions.
However, for redundant execution we are concerned with the combinedperformance and
power efficiency of both the primary and the redundant blocks. In order to improve this, we
propose that the primary block employ predication at the bottom, whereas the CRBs use
predication at the top, as shown in Figure 7.9. Redundantly executing fewer instructions
saves power, and potentially improves the performance by reducing issuecontention.
Since the primary and redundant blocks were identical and fetched fromthe same
address in the baseline redundant execution model, CRB fetch was overlapped with primary
block execution to improve performance. Using different predication models in the primary
and the redundant block requires them to be stored as separate blocks.To achieve this
same overlap between primary block execution and CRB fetch when they arediffe nt, the
CRB address must be encoded as part of the primary block. Alternatively, a special branch
instruction pointing to the CRB can be added to the primary block. This branch instruction
will have no dependences and hence can execute immediately, and be interpreted by the GT
to trigger the fetch of the CRB. Both these approaches can be equally effective, and while
one involves changes to the assembler, and the linker, the other is dependent o at least one
spare slot being available for adding the special branch instruction. Thistechnique increases
the static size of the program since the CRB’s are now different from the primary blocks.
The increase in program size can be configured by selectively applyingthe predication
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Figure 7.9: Using predication at the bottom in primary blocks for higher performance, and
predication at the top in the CRB for redundantly executing fewer instructions.
model optimization to only those blocks that are expected to benefit from it.
7.1.4 Evaluation of Redundant Execution Optimizations
We model these two optimizations to evaluate their benefits. A real implementation of
the predication model optimization would require support in the compiler to build primary
blocks with predication at the bottom, and redundant blocks with predication athe top.
Further, a true implementation would also incur extra memory and cache overhead du to
the larger program size. In our simulator implementation of the optimization, we record
instructions in the primary block that are not executed either because they are directly or
transitively predicated-false, and use this information to invalidate these instructions in the
CRB so that they do not contend for resources in any of the pipeline stages in the ET. We
use this abstract model, that does not require compiler support and ignores the memory and
cache overheads, to measure the potential of this technique. Further, we also ev luate an
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extension to this optimization that uses decoupled verification of the predicate values using
a predicate value queue (PVQ). Similar to decoupled verification of load values, the CRB
must wait until the number of predicate values match those produced by the primary block
in the PVQ before signalling block completion.
Figure 7.10 presents the results of the optimizations for the compiler-generated
benchmarks. For each benchmark category, the graph presents foursets of results: baseline
full redundant execution (FRE), decoupled load value delivery and fult detection (see Sec-
tion 7.1.2), predication model optimization (see Section 7.1.3), and combined predication
model optimization and decoupled predicate value verification. Decoupling load value de-
livery and verification increases the average overhead in execution time over FRE by 0.4%
for EEMBC benchmarks, and provides benefits of 0.75% and 1.75% for the SPEC integer
and floating point benchmarks. Since this optimization does not directly reduce contention,
and the LVQ already provides a low load-to-use latency for the redundant blocks, it does not
provide much benefit. Further, prior research that used decoupled verification and achieved
significant reduction in performance overhead applied it to all the redundant instructions
and not just the loads [17].
The predication model optimization reduces overhead of FRE by 1.72%, 0.7%and
1.9% for the EEMBC, SPEC integer, and SPEC floating point benchmarks respectively.
Adding the PVQ provides slightly greater benefits of 2.5%, 1%, and 2% for the EEMBC,
SPEC integer, and SPEC floating point benchmarks. Adding the PVQ improves the benefit
slightly because predicate value delivery and fault detection are done in parallel. Thus,
none of the optimizations reduce performance overhead by more than 2.5% for any of the
benchmark categories. Our analysis reveals that the predication model optimization is only
able to reduce the total number of instructions redundantly executed on the average by
9.1%, 10.8%, and 10.1% for the EEMBC, SPEC integer and floating point benchmarks.
As a result, the average number of instructions executed per block reduces by 4.5% for the
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Figure 7.10: Effect of optimizations applied to redundant execution
reduction in performance overhead (≃10%), used branch and value prediction confidence
estimates to eliminate between 30-50% of redundant instructions [117, 118].While this
optimization only filters the small percentage of predicated-false instructions that anyway
do not contribute to program outcome, Section 7.3 explores more aggressive mechanisms
that trade performance overhead for fault coverage.
7.2 AVF Throttling
We propose AVF throttling as a class of microarchitectural fault evasion techniques that
improve soft error reliability by efficiently reducing the amount of vulnerable processor
state without significantly extending the execution time. Mukherjee et al. provided the
original insight that the cycles that contribute toarchitecturally correct execution(ACE
cycles) can be used as an accurate measure of the amount of vulnerable state [123]. As
a foundation for studying performance-reliability tradeoff as the interaction between the
amount of vulnerable state and the execution time, we present a classificationof ACE cycles
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into key source components that have a one-one relationship with executionycles. This
classification exposes the reliability bottlenecks in the processor, analogous to execution
bottlenecks, and can be used to design the AVF throttling mechanisms.
In general, execution cycles can be divided into three components. Staticallydeter-
minable cycles including but not limited to functional unit latencies and static communica-
tion latencies add up to a certain minimum execution time for the program. Dynamic events
such as resource contention and bandwidth constraints build up more latency lo g program
paths and increase the overall program execution time. Slack is the third component, and
can be formally defined as the number of cycles an instruction or program path can be de-
layed without affecting the execution time [159]. Since only the longest path throug the
dynamic execution of the program or the critical path determines execution time,all paths
shorter than the critical path possess slack, and can tolerate greater delay corresponding to
the degree of slack. Based on this, we identify three analogous components i to which ACE
cycles can be broken down into: Min, Slack, and Contention.
Min ACE Cycles: Min ACE cycles is the vulnerable ACE cycles accumulated due to
the minimum time useful program state must reside in a structure before it can beused.
For instance, if an instruction that contributes to useful program output reads data from the
register file, the data must have resided there for at least one cycle before it is read. This
cycle during which time it is vulnerable to an error, contributes to the Min ACE cycles of
the program. However, it is possible that the instruction does not read its operand from
the register file, and instead receives it from the operand bypass network. Of course, in
this case the register file does not accumulate any ACE cycles due to this operand. Min
ACE cycles can be computed for many structures in conventional processors including the
physical register file, the instruction window and the reorder buffer. Italso naturally applies
to TRIPS processor structures such as the register file, read and write queu s, instruction
and operand buffer, LSQ structures, and the operand router buffers.
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Slack ACE Cycles: While slack cycles do not affect the execution time of the program,
the useful processor state associated with that slack accumulates ACE cycles during this
period. Fields et al. identified two primary flavors of slack: local and global, e ch with
different scope.Local slack of a dynamic instructioni, is the number of cycles it can be
delayed without delaying any subsequent instruction. They analyzed theSPEC 2000 bench-
marks, and showed that approximately 20% of the instructions have local slak greater than
five cycles.Global slack of a dynamic instructioni, which is more aggressive, is the num-
ber of cycles it can be delayed without extending the execution time of the program. They
showed they approximately 40% of instructions have global slack greater than 50 cycles.
Local slack is easier to analyze than global slack, since analyzing globalslack typically
needs a critical path model of the whole program [159]. In this dissertation, we focus on
studying the interaction between local execution slack and ACE cycles, butwe recognize
that global slack can also have a substantial impact on ACE cycles and is worth exploring
in the future.
There are numerous scenarios wherelocal slackACE cycles are accumulated in
both conventional superscalar processors, and distributed architectures such as the TRIPS
processor. Slack ACE cycles are accumulated when are d, write, or a normal in-
struction arrives ahead of its operand, and waits in the read queue, writequeue, or in the
instruction buffer until it is ready to be executed. Of course, the entry in the write queue,
read queue, or operand buffer that stores the operand accumulates slack ACE cycles, if the
operand arrives ahead of the instruction. Techniques such as front-end throttling during
periods of low utilization may be effective in reducing these slack ACE cycles. Similarly,
a register value that is available in the register file, or in the write queue, before it is read
by an instruction accumulates slack ACE cycles in that duration. Compiler or hardware
instruction scheduling techniques can delay register writes and advance registe reads to
compress the vulnerable window, and reduce slack ACE cycles in the register file and write
queue. Architectural constraints such as in-order commit of block register writ s from the
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write queue, and stores from the LSQ can also force younger blocks to accumulate slack
ACE cycles while waiting for older blocks to commit. In all these examples, the ACEcycles
accumulated over and above the minimum are grouped under slack ACE cycles. However,
there are structures such as the OPN router where packets in the bufferhave no local slack,
and are ready to leave as soon as they enter. Hence packet occupancy in the buffer con-
tributes only to Min, and Contention ACE cycles which is described next. As mentioned
before, the contribution to slack ACE cycles will be different and will increas if we take
into account global execution slack also.
Contention ACE Cycles: Resource contention can delay events that are already ready to
trigger, and the extra cycles incurred due to contention are classified undr Contention ACE
cycles. Using the same example, an instruction which has received all its operands and is
ready for execution, but is not issued for execution due to contention at the instruction se-
lection stage, accumulates Contention ACE cycles during that period. Similar oppo tunities
for Contention ACE cycles exist in each ET that implements single instruction issue per
cycle, in each RT that may issue exactly one read and one write instruction every cycle, in
each DT that can support up to one load and store access every cycle,and in each OPN
router that can send up to one control and data packet in each direction.In all of these
cases there is potential for resource contention and adding Contention ACE cycles, when
the number of contenders exceeds the supported bandwidth.
Baseline Distribution of ACE Cycles: Figure 7.11 first presents the breakdown of each
component of ACE cycles into the relative contributions from the individualhardware struc-
tures. These results represent the average across all the four benchmark categories. The read
and write queues, OPN buffers, and the instruction buffers, in that order, are the top three
contributors to the Min ACE cycles. Contention ACE cycles are distributed moreevenly
with the OPN buffers contributing the maximum. Finally, the instruction buffers account
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Figure 7.11: Graph presents the breakdown of each ACE cycle component: Min, Slack,
and Contention among the different processor structures. These results present the average
across all the benchmark categories. Graph also shows the breakdownof the total ACE
cycles among the three components: Min, Slack, and Contention for each ben mark cate-
gory.
Figure 7.11 also presents the relative contribution of the three components:Min,
Slack, and Contention to the total ACE cycles. The graph clearly indicates that lack con-
stitutes between 80-90% of the total ACE cycles for all the benchmark categories. The
dominant contribution from Slack ACE cycles emphasizes the nature of ACE cycles as
a cumulative property that is accumulated across all paths of program execution, unlike
execution cycles which is determined only by the length of the longest path throug the
dynamic program execution. On the average across all the benchmark categories, Min ACE
cycles contribute 11.1%, Slack ACE cycles contribute 84.7%, and ContentionACE cycles
contribute 4.2% to the total ACE cycles. The results in Table 6.6 showed that theins ruction
window contributes 63.5% to the total ACE cycles across all the three components (Min,
Slack, and Contention). Based on the analysis here, we find that a dominant fraction of
59% (70% x 84.7%) of this contribution comes just from Slack ACE cycles.
Our result corroborates prior research using more conventional process rs, which
have also demonstrated the high vulnerability of the instruction window [123].The large
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1024 entry instruction window, together with the block-atomic execution model inthe
TRIPS architecture further increases its vulnerability. Unlike a conventional processor, the
block-atomic execution model fetches all the instructions of the block together, taking into
account the delay due to pipelining, and hence instructions, especially those at the bottom
of the dataflow graph, are fetched much ahead of their operands substantially increasing the
local slack ACE cycles. Further, since eight such blocks can be speculatively mapped on
the large instruction window, block instruction slack ACE cycles increases with speculation
depth (blocks lower in the control flow graph), because their execution may be delayed due
to control and/or data dependences with the older blocks.
Based on these results, we propose and evaluate AVF throttling techniquesfoc sed
on reducing the slack ACE cycles in the instruction window. The techniques exploit slack
to defer instruction fetch and reduce the amount of vulnerable state withoutextending exe-
cution time. There have been several prior techniques proposed to estimateslack:
Delay and observe: A simple approach that estimates instruction slack by delaying its
execution by n cycles, and observing if the overall execution time is affected. Srinivasan et
al. used this approach to compute the latency tolerance of program loads [166].
Static slack estimation: Compilers generally use static estimates of instruction slack
to perform efficient instruction scheduling within region boundaries (e.g.,hyperblock) to
achieve higher performance [115,167].
Profiling using a dependence-graph model: Fields et al. proposed an off-line profiling
methodology based on constructing a dependence-graph model of dynamic program execu-
tion and analyzing the graph to determine execution slack [159]. Muthler et al. stimated
slack using this methodology and used it to improve performance [161].
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Dynamic slack prediction: Fields et al. also implemented a dynamic hardware slack
prediction mechanism to achieve processor energy reduction [159].
In this study, we explore a modified version of the first two techniques for reducing
instruction slack, and thus the Slack ACE cycles, while recognizing that the remaining
two techniques are also equally applicable. The first technique operates at the inter-block
granularity and attempts to spread the fetch and execution of successive speculative blocks
to reduce slack ACE cycles. On the other hand, the second technique functions at the
intra-block level, and orchestrates the relative timing of block instruction fetch and block
execution to lower the instruction slack ACE cycles. The two techniques are complementary
since they operate at different granularities (intra- and inter-block), and can naturally be
used together to achieve greater benefits.
7.2.1 Dynamic Speculation Control (DSC)
Speculative execution is a mainstream technique used to exploit concurrency in high per-
formance microprocessors. The efficiency of speculative execution depends on the inherent
parallelism available in the program and the capacity to correctly predict the pat that will
be taken by the program in the future. Even if the processor succeeds in correctly predicting
the execution control flow, speculation can be very inefficient if there is littleinh rent par-
allelism in the application. In this case, while the application sees very little performance
improvement, program state is unnecessarily brought into the processes much before it is
required degrading the reliability of the data when it is actually used.
Figure 7.12 shows the incremental impact of instruction window size on execution
and ACE cycles, averaged across the compiler-generated EEMBC benchmarks. For in-
stance, while the first set of bars measure the relative change in ACE andexecution cycles
going from 128 to 256 instructions, the second set considers 256 instructions as the base-
line and measures the relative change going from 256 to 512 instructions. While execution
time shows diminishing returns of 38%, 23% and 8% as window size increases,ACE cy-
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Figure 7.12: Impact of speculation depth and increasing instruction windowsize on execu-
tion and ACE cycles. Graph shows that while execution cycles shows diminishing returns,
ACE cycles exhibits accelerated growth with increasing window size.
cles exhibits the opposite trend of accelerated growth going from -23% to 50% to 63%.
Increasing the instruction window from 128 to 256 instructions benefits bothperformance
and reliability by 23% and 38% respectively. Programs are able to use the larger window
to achieve higher parallelism and and hence reduce execution time, which inturn reduces
the total ACE cycles accumulated. However, at higher window sizes the smaller execution
time is outweighed by the accelerated increase in the amount of processor state leading to
an overall increase in ACE cycles. Based on this result, we propose a dynamic technique
that uses an adaptive algorithm to determine the optimum size of the instruction window
for each program interval. Dynamically exploring different discrete sizes of the instruction
window to determine the optimal capacity is similar in concept to the delay and observe
scheme. The instruction fetch engine will be throttled in a particular cycle if the instruc-
tion window reaches this threshold, to maintain this optimal capacity. We first describ the
adaptive algorithm before presenting the results.
The algorithm basically uses gradient descent to arrive at the optimal setting. The
execution of a program is divided into multiple intervals. The IPC and the ACE cycles
accumulated during each execution interval are computed using two hardware performance
counters. Currently, we use the simulator to measure the ACE cycles in each interval, as
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described in Section 6.5. We assume that in a real implementation, ACE cycles can be
measured accurately using hardware performance counters. Using performance counters to
measure ACE cycles was also suggested in prior work [123], and we thinki is a promising
area for future work. The first interval is used to determine the baseline performance in
instructions-per-cycle (IPC), and ACE cycles for the program in that interval. In subsequent
intervals, the instruction window size is varied in pre-determined discrete amounts and
the resulting IPC and ACE cycles are measured for each new setting. The RPR for each
window size is also measured as the ratio of the percentage improvement in ACEcycles to
the percentage drop in IPC (as described in Section 6.3). To be eligible, a new instruction
window setting must meet two conditions: 1) the performance overhead should be within
a specified threshold, and 2) the RPR should meet or exceed the input RPRspecification.
The optimal setting is the window size that meets these two conditions and maximizes
RPR. The window size is left at the baseline capacity if there is no setting that meets th se
conditions, although there is still some performance overhead due to this sampling process.
The program then continues execution with this optimal setting for the next 20 intervals,
after which this entire process is repeated to account for changes in program behavior.
We chose the interval size to be 50K cycles to react quickly to changes in program
behavior without letting the tuning mechanism cause a high overhead. The baseline TRIPS
architecture has a distributed instruction window that can accommodate a total of 1024
instructions. The algorithm is allowed to examine four different instruction window sizes:
1024, 768, 512 and 256 instructions, corresponding to 8, 6, 4, and 2 speculative TRIPS
blocks, and the algorithm chooses a size dynamically. The algorithm was constrained to be
within a maximum performance overhead of 15%, and meet an RPR of 1 ie. the benefit in
reliability should at least be comparable to the performance overhead.
Figures 7.13, 7.14, 7.15, and 7.16 present the results of this scheme for thSPEC in-
teger, SPEC floating point, EEMBC, and hand-optimized benchmarks respectively. Again,
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Figure 7.16: Impact on execution and ACE cycles for hand-optimized EEMBC benchmarks
with dynamic speculation control.
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cution mode using all the resources. The technique is reasonably effective for the SPEC
integer benchmarks reducing ACE cycles by 22.5% at a performance overhead of 15% re-
sulting in an RPR of 1.5. Across the ten floating point benchmarks, the technique achieves
an improvement of 17.25% in ACE cycles at a cost of 15% in execution time, with only
wupwise, mesa, art, sixtrack, andapsi showing real benefits. Since the majority
of SPEC floating point benchmarks are structured as tight loops with high inhere t paral-
lelism and good predictability, they can very effectively exploit speculative execution and
are very sensitive to instruction window capacity. The technique is very effective for the
EEMBC benchmarks, and reduces ACE cycles by 28.6%, at a cost of 8.2% in execution
cycles, with an average RPR of 3.5. On the other hand, the technique is least eff ctive for
hand-optimized benchmarks achieving only 16.4% reduction in ACE cycles at7.4% per-
formance overhead. As expected, the technique performs less well forthe floating point
and hand-optimized benchmarks which use the speculation depth effectively. Overall, it
emphasizes the potential of efficient speculation in improving soft error reliability.
7.2.2 Fetch-on-Demand (F-o-D)
Dynamic speculation control trades performance for reliability in a coarse grained fashion
by placing hard limits on instruction window size. The goal of fetch-on-demand (F-O-D)
is to further reduce the performance overhead by allowing the full windowcapacity, and
achieve reliability improvement by exploiting instruction slack to trigger instructionfetch
just when it is required, thus minimizing the slack ACE cycles in the instruction window.
As described in Section 4.2.5, instruction fetch for the entire block is triggered immediately
upon block allocation, leading to the high slack ACE cycles observed in Figure 7.11. We
build fetch-on-demand using the simple observation that execution of the current instruction
block effectively commences when its data dependences with older blocks inthe program
are satisfied through the data forwarding logic. In particular, we use the iner-block reg-
ister dependences, delivered through the register forwarding logic from one of the other
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concurrently executing blocks, as a natural indicator for the beginning ofblock execution.
The goal here is to overlap the time the register value takes to travel from the register file
interface to the consumer instruction at the destination execution unit, with the time the
instruction takes to travel from the instruction cache interface to the same execution unit, to
minimize instruction slack.
We first perform a preliminary analysis to explore the potential of this observation,
based on which we design a specific technique. We examine two fixed choices f r r gister
inputs for triggering block instruction fetch. The first trigger that we investigate, is the
arrival of the first register input to the instruction block through the regist r forwarding
logic in the write and the read queues, from one of the other concurrently executing blocks.
If all of the register inputs are already present in the register file, block fetch is triggered
only after sending all the register inputs. The second scheme we examine is totrigger
block instruction fetch only after sending all the block register inputs, regardless of whether
they are available from the register file or the register forwarding logic. While t e baseline
TRIPS processor pipelines the instruction fetch of multiple blocks so that theyare sent back
to back if they are available, we augment the fetch logic to begin the block fetchonly on
the occurrence of the trigger event.
We performed the preliminary evaluation for all the benchmark categories. Fig-
ure 7.17 presents the summary results for the first trigger, fetch-on-demand on arrival of the
first register input on the left; and the second trigger, fetch-on-demandon sending all the
block register inputs on the right. Triggering instruction fetch on arrival of the first regis-
ter input performs well for all the four benchmark categories. EEMBC benchmarks show
28.2% benefit in ACE cycles at 4.4% overhead, SPEC integer benchmarksprovide 29.4%
benefit in ACE cycles at 3.5% overhead, SPEC floating point benchmarksexhibit 10.7%
benefit in ACE cycles at 1.1% overhead, and hand-optimized benchmarksshow 10.7% re-
duction in ACE cycles at 4.5% overhead, with RPR significantly greater in comparison
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Figure 7.17: Exploration of potential performance-reliability tradeoff with fetch-on-
demand.
has greater potential than dynamic speculation control as it provides comparable reliability
improvement, at much smaller performance overhead.
Triggering instruction fetch only after sending all the block register inputs show
dramatically different results. Interestingly each of the four benchmark ctegories exhibit
different behavior. EEMBC benchmarks show greater reliability improvement of 41% at
a correspondingly high overhead of 37%. On the other hand, SPEC integer b nchmarks
achieve a favorable tradeoff with a larger 47.5% reduction in ACE cycles at only 10.1%
overhead, exposing the lower inherent parallelism due to data dependences in these pro-
grams. SPEC floating point benchmarks which have very high parallelism expectedly show
the opposite trend with a reduction in ACE cycles of only 4.8% at a large performance cost
of 54.5%. The worst performance-reliability tradeoff is exhibited by the hand-optimized
benchmarks which achieve a reduction in ACE cycles of only 1.6% at an unacceptable per-
formance overhead of 113%. In summary, this preliminary evaluation demonstrates that
substantial savings in ACE cycles can be obtained, if the processor intelligently uses spe-
cific microarchitectural events as triggers to expose execution slack. Based on this result,
we explore a compiler-based technique for implementing fetch-on-demand.
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Compiler-based Static Slack Estimation
Prior research has shown that estimating global slack is quite complicated andrequires a
detailed critical path model [168,169]. In this dissertation, we limit our analysis and evalua-
tion to local execution slack to simplify the problem, but we recognize that global slack can
also have a substantial impact on ACE cycles and is worth exploring in the futur. F ther,
prior work has also demonstrated that exploiting slack dynamically, and in a timelyfashion,
requires complex hardware slack predictors [159]. We make the key observation that the
block-atomic execution model provides an inherent advantage, as the exist nce of slack can
be detected at the block boundary allowing enough time for it to be exploited during the
lifetime of the execution of the block. Further, we propose that the instructionscheduler
(described in Section 4.2.2), which has detailed models for the critical path and the slack
associated with each primary block register input, can be used for estimating slack at the
block boundary, without using hardware slack predictors. As described in Section 4.2.2,
the TRIPS compiler performs instruction scheduling for each instruction block. While the
scheduling region is limited to a single block, the algorithm also accounts for inter-block
(global) critical paths (such as loop-carried dependences) to model theblock register input
arrival times, which is critical in estimating the slack of register inputs [115].
Based on these observations, we propose a compiler-based static estimationof slack
associated with each block register input, to identify a specific block registerinput trigger to
maximize reduction in ACE cycles, and minimize execution time overhead. The technique
identifies the appropriate block register input to trigger just-in-time instruction fetch of the
block, holding the instructions until that time in ECC or parity protected instructionaches.
If the register input trigger is too early then there is not much reduction in the slack ACE
cycles. On the other hand, if the register input trigger is too late, it can significa tly extend
execution time, and hence also lead to an overall increase in ACE cycles.
At the end of scheduling the block, the same algorithm is used to compute the
critical path length and slack of each block register input. The register input with the longest
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critical path length has no slack, and if used to trigger block fetch will most likely extend the
execution time. As described earlier, the goal is to overlap the time the register valu takes
from the register file interface to the consumer instruction, with the time the instruction
takes from the instruction cache interface. The compiler approximates this byannotating
each block with the register input that has an estimated arrival time just smaller thn that
of the register input with the longest critical path length. The TRIPS hardware records the
register input annotation for each block, observes the OPN for the arrival of the specific
register input, and upon its arrival takes advantage of the independentcontrol over the
different on-chip networks to trigger instruction fetch for the block on theGDN.
Figures 7.18, 7.19, 7.20, and 7.21 present the results of this scheme for thSPEC in-
teger, SPEC floating point, EEMBC, and hand-optimized benchmarks respectively. Again,
these results are with respect to the baseline TRIPS processor operatingin normal execu-
tion mode using all the resources. To summarize the results, the technique is very effective
for the SPEC integer benchmarks, and reduces ACE cycles by 30%, at acos of only 4.5%
in execution time, with an average RPR of 6.7. The floating point benchmarks are ag in
difficult, and the technique only achieves an improvement of 9% in ACE cyclesat a cost of
11.2% in execution time, with onlywupwise, ammp, equake, andsixtrack showing
real benefits. For the EEMBC benchmarks, the technique is able to reduceACE cycles by
27.5% with 7.8% overhead in execution time. It performs poorly for the hand-optimized
EEMBC benchmarks and reduces the ACE cycles only by 3.6% but incurs 15.8% per-
formance overhead. On the average, the technique performs better or at least as well as
dynamic speculation control for the SPEC integer and EEMBC benchmarks.On the other
hand, it is less effective than dynamic speculation control for the SPEC floating point and
hand-optimized benchmarks which have lesser slack available.
An interesting thing to note is that, some benchmarks including thea2time01
anddither01 hand-optimized benchmarks, andswim andapsi SPEC floating point
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Figure 7.18: Impact on execution and ACE cycles for SPEC integer benchmarks with fetch-
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Figure 7.19: Impact on execution and ACE cycles for SPEC floating point benchmarks with
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Figure 7.20: Impact on execution and ACE cycles for EEMBC benchmarkswith fetch-on-
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Figure 7.21: Impact on execution and ACE cycles for hand-optimized EEMBC benchmarks
with fetch-on-demand using static slack estimation.
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over-estimates the slack, and the resulting increase in execution time outweighsthe benefits,
and leads to an overall increase in ACE cycles. Similarly, the hand-optimized benchmark
rspeed01 also shows a large increase in execution time relative to the reduction in ACE
cycles, again indicating that the technique over-estimates the slack for this benchmark.
While the floating point and hand-optimized benchmarks have less slack and thus require
more accurate slack estimation in general, we identify two primary causes for this over-
estimation. First, while the technique is attractive for its simplicity in using the compiler
for estimating slack, the lack of dynamic knowledge limits its accuracy. Combining static
slack estimation with dynamic feedback about the quality of the static decision, similar to
delay and observe, can compensate for the over-estimation. Second, thetechnique in its
present form only considers the local slack of program paths within a block originating
at a block register input. Although the scheduler accounts for global critical paths in a
limited form, detailed analysis of global slack can potentially improve the accuracy of this
technique albeit at higher complexity.
7.2.3 Comparison of Dynamic Speculation Control and Fetch-on-Demand
Figure 7.22 presents the comparison between the two AVF throttling techniques. For each
benchmark category, the graph first shows the reliability improvement and performance
overhead from using each of the techniques individually and then in combination. Since the
two techniques operate at complementary intra- and inter-block granularities, combining
them promises even higher benefits. Further, the results in Sections 7.2.1 and7.2.2 show
that for some benchmarks such asart andammp one technique performs better than the
other, suggesting that using them together can achieve improvements for both. Overall,
the fetch-on-demand performs better or at least as well as dynamic speculation control for
the SPEC integer and EEMBC benchmarks. On the other hand, it is less effectiv than
dynamic speculation control for the SPEC floating point and hand-optimized benchmarks
which have lesser slack available. In combination, they provide greater average reduction in
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ACE cycles than either of them used individually, but at higher performance overhead. This
comparison for the individual benchmark categories is analyzed in greater detail below.
Figures 7.23, 7.24, and 7.25 present the results for SPEC, EEMBC, andthe hand-
optimized benchmarks when the two techniques are used together. In summary, SPEC in-
teger and floating point benchmarks show ACE cycles reduction of 37.5% and 25.7%, with
execution time overhead of 15% and 25.8% respectively. Further, bothart andammp now
show a considerable decrease in ACE cycles. EEMBC benchmarks display ACE cycles re-
duction of 42.7% at a higher execution time overhead of 16.8%. Finally, the hand-optimized
benchmarks achieve 23% reduction in ACE cycles at 24% performance overhead.
Overall, the results show greater reduction in ACE cycles from combining the
techniques, improving over both dynamic speculation control and fetch-on-demand for all
the benchmark categories, albeit at a higher performance overhead. Inparticular, for the
hand-optimized benchmarkstblook01, rspeed01, andbezier02 the combination
achieves greater reduction in ACE cycles by accepting a higher performance overhead. On
the other hand, while the combination incurs higher overhead it achieves less improvement
in reliability than just using dynamic speculation control for the hand-optimized benchmark
dither01. Similarly, fetch-on-demand performs better in isolation forautocor00 than
the combination. This emphasizes the differences in benchmark characteristics; while some
are very sensitive to the degree of speculation they have slack within the block, and others
have little slack within blocks but do not use the full speculation depth effectively.
7.2.4 Measuring Actual Reduction in Instruction Slack ACE Cycles
Although these techniques were motivated by the dominant contribution of the local slack
ACE cycles in the instruction window (see Figure 7.11), the overall ACE cycles reduc-
tion achieved by each technique accounts for the cumulative effect in ACEcycles observed
across all of the TRIPS processor structures tracked in Table 6.1. Figure 7.26 measures how
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DSC: Dynamic Speculation Control
F-o-D: Fetch-on-Demand
BOTH: DSC and F-o-D
EEMBC SPEC INT SPEC FP Hand-optimized
Figure 7.22: Comparison of AVF throttling mechanisms for all the benchmark categories.
Graph confirms that the combination of the two techniques provide greater ben fits that the
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Figure 7.23: Impact on execution and ACE cycles for SPEC benchmarks with fetch-on-
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Figure 7.24: Impact on execution and ACE cycles for EEMBC benchmarkswith fetch-
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Figure 7.25: Impact on execution and ACE cycles for hand-optimized EEMBC benchmarks




































% reduction in instruction slack ACE cycles relative to baseline
% decrease in overall ACE cycles 
% contribution from decrease in instruction slack ACE cycles 
DSC: Dynamic Speculation Control
F-o-D: Fetch-on-Demand
BOTH: DSC and F-o-D
EEMBC SPEC INT SPEC FP Hand-optimized
Figure 7.26: For each technique, the first bar shows the reduction in instruction window
slack ACE cycles relative to the baseline slack ACE cycles in the instruction windo , the
second bar shows the overall reduction in ACE cycles, and the third bar shows the contri-
bution of just the reduction in instruction slack ACE cycles in the instruction window to the
reduction in total ACE cycles. Graph demonstrates that the techniques are very ffective in
reducing the slack ACE cycles in the distributed instruction window
each benchmark category it shows the reduction in ACE cycles for all the thre echniques.
Further, for each technique it presents three bars. The first bar shows t e percentage reduc-
tion in the instruction window slack ACE cycles relative to the baseline instructionw ndow
slack ACE cycles, isolating the effectiveness of the technique in reducingslack ACE cycles
in the instruction window. The second bar shows the overall reduction in ACE cycles as
before, and finally the third bar shows the contribution of just the reductionin the slack
ACE cycles in the instruction window to the overall reduction in ACE cycles.
The first bar shows that all the techniques are able to significantly reducethe in-
struction window slack ACE cycles from the baseline. Combining both the techniques
achieves 55% reduction for EEMBC benchmarks in instruction window slackACE cycles
relative to the baseline slack ACE cycles in the instruction window, 62% reduction for
SPEC integer benchmarks, almost 40% reduction for the SPEC floating pointbenchmarks,
and 31% reduction for the hand-optimized benchmarks. The second and third bars together
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clearly show that, in all cases, the reduction in instruction window slack ACE cycles con-
tributes a significant fraction to the reduction in total ACE cycles. In fact, thecontribution
of the instruction window exceeds the overall reduction in ACE cycles in the cas of fetch-
on-demand for SPEC floating point and hand-optimized benchmarks. For some of these
benchmarks, while there is a reduction in the instruction window ACE cycles, some of the
other processor structures exhibit an increase in ACE cycles, thus redcing the overall ben-
efit. Overall, this analysis proves that the techniques are effective in reducing the slack ACE
cycles in the instruction window, and are thus able to significantly reduce the overall ACE
cycles to improve reliability.
7.2.5 Using Reliability Performance Ratio to Tune AVF Throttling
As described in Chapter 6, RPR provides the foundation for a systematic approach where
designers work to achieve the reliability target, at the same time optimizing the RPR to
achieve low overhead. The optimal RPR is not the same for all designs as it depen s on the
relative importance of performance and reliability for the application and market segment.
RPR can be used as an input parameter to AVF throttling to tune its performance-reliability
tradeoff. While it is equally applicable to both dynamic speculation control andfetch-on-
demand, we present an example experiment using dynamic speculation control to show the
value of RPR in tuning the performance-reliability tradeoff.
We use the input RPR specification to the adaptive algorithm to tune dynamic spec-
ulation control to two possible scenarios, and Table 7.1 presents the average r sults for all
the benchmark categories. While an RPR of 1 represents a design that considers reliabil-
ity and performance to be equally important, an RPR of 4 models a system that is very
performance-centric and will accept a performance overhead of 1% only f r a reliability
improvement of at least 4%. A system with an RPR of 1 is analogous to a systemop i ized
for energy-delay, and an RPR of 4 corresponds to a system optimized for nergy-delay4.
We make three key observations based on an analysis of the EEMBC results. Firs ,
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Dynamic Speculation Input ∆EXEC% ∆ACE% Actual
Control RPR Cycles Cycles RPR
EEMBC 1 8.2% 28.6% 3.5
4 3.3% 18.6% 5.6
SPEC INT 1 15.0% 22.5% 1.5
4 6.7% 16.6% 2.5
SPEC FP 1 15.0% 17.25% 1.2
4 6.1% 11.0% 1.8
Hand-optimized 1 7.4% 16.4% 2.2
4 6.6% 13.5% 2.1
Table 7.1: The table shows that RPR can be effectively used to regulate ther liability
improvement and performance overhead of dynamic speculation control tomeet the input
RPR specification.
the actual RPR is substantially larger than the input RPR specification. This is consistent
with the goal of the adaptive algorithm that tries to maximize RPR, and is an indicator
of the degree of slack available in the program execution that can be exploit d by using
this specific technique. Second, the actual RPR for an input RPR specification of 4 is
substantially greater than for an input RPR of 1, clearly demonstrating the effectiveness of
the RPR metric in being able to adapt to specified design requirements. Finally, as expected
the absolute reduction in ACE cycles achieved with RPR 4 is lower than with RPR 1since
the algorithm must meet a tighter constraint.
The results for SPEC integer benchmarks are similar, except that dynamic specula-
tion control is unable to meet the input RPR specification of 4, suggesting thatwe need more
efficient techniques such as fetch-on-demand. As mentioned, dynamic speculation control
examines four different instruction window sizes for each program interval and chooses the
one that meets the input RPR specification, and maximizes the actual RPR. This sampling
process incurs performance overhead, and the technique reverts to the baseline window
capacity if none of the sizes are able to meet the RPR requirement. The RPR is 2.5 be-
cause while some benchmarks (or benchmark phases) are able to meet this RPR target of 4,
there are other programs (or program phases) where the adaptive algorithm incurs the per-
formance overhead of sampling but finally chooses to use the baseline instruction window
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capacity since none of the other settings satisfy the RPR constraint. This behavior is even
more evident for the SPEC floating point and hand-optimized benchmarks where the results
basically reflect the sampling overhead of the algorithm when the input RPR specification
is equal to 4.
7.3 Selective Redundant Execution (SRE)
Full redundant execution, which redundantly executes all the instructions, and AVF throt-
tling, which completely eliminates redundant execution and instead attempts to carefully
reduce the amount of vulnerable state are at two ends of the spectrum of redundant execu-
tion. The goal of selective redundant execution (SRE) is to achieve higher reliability than
AVF throttling by using redundant execution, while improving the performance overhead
over FRE by using redundant execution selectively. Further, our design of selective redun-
dant execution is built upon the previously proposed AVF throttling technique, dynamic
speculation control.
We use dynamic speculation control, described in Section 7.2.1, to trigger redundant
execution during periods of low single-thread performance [119]. Redundant execution is
triggered for those program phases for which the instruction window size, and hence num-
ber of speculative blocks, determined by dynamic speculation control fallsbelow a certain
threshold. The algorithm takes this as an indication of low single-thread performance, and
the potential existence of idle resources that can be cost-effectively usd by redundant ex-
ecution. The advantage of using dynamic speculation control is that even ifthe number
of speculative blocks does not fall below the threshold for redundantexecution, there is
still some reduction in ACE cycles from just dynamic speculation control. The decision
to trigger redundant execution is coupled with the sampling phase of dynamic speculation
control, which is repeated every 20 intervals as described in Section 7.2.1.We set the
threshold for redundant execution at a speculation depth of 4 TRIPS blocks, which is half








Dynamic Speculation Control Redundant ExecutionOriginal Execution
If (Number of Speculative Blocks <= 4) => Trigger Redundant Execution
(Regulate speculation depth)(Up to 8 speculative blocks)
Figure 7.27: Dynamic speculation control based selective redundant execution
trates this two-step mechanism. While we set the threshold at four speculativeblocks, the
performance-reliability tradeoff of this technique can be varied by appropriately configuring
this threshold.
Figures 7.28, 7.29, 7.30, and 7.31 present the results for the SPEC integer, SPEC
floating point, EEMBC, and the hand-optimized benchmarks respectively. The technique is
very effective for all the benchmark categories. SPEC integer benchmarks exhibit 40.7% re-
duction in ACE cycles at 10.4% execution time overhead, SPEC floating point benchmarks
achieve 26.7% reduction in ACE cycles at 10.2% overhead in execution time, EEMBC
benchmarks on the average show 58.7% reduction in ACE cycles at 13.7% execution time
overhead, and hand-optimized benchmarks achieve 30% reduction in ACEcycles at 13%
overhead. More analysis reveals that SRE is able to achieve substantial improve ent in per-
formance overhead because it eliminates between 40-55% of the redundant instructions in
comparison with full redundant execution across the different benchmark categories. This is
consistent with other approaches for SRE which also eliminate between 30-50% of redun-
dant instructions and achieve comparable improvement in performance overhead [117,118].
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Figure 7.31: Impact on execution and ACE cycles for hand-optimized EEMBC benchmarks
with selective redundant execution.
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it adds very little complexity to full redundant execution since it reuses the dynamic spec-
ulation control framework. Some prior hardware-based approaches have explored other
opportunities for skipping redundant execution, but require dedicatedstructures for mea-
suring the confidence of branch and value prediction and add more complexity [118].
7.4 Summary
This chapter evaluated the performance-reliability tradeoff of techniquesfrom three soft
error reliability regimes. In this section, we summarize the insights gained from the evalua-
tion. We not only compare the performance-reliability tradeoff of the different egimes, but
also comment on the overheads in power consumption, area, and complexity which sepa-
rate these different regimes. Table 7.2 presents the results of this comparison. While we
perform this analysis at the architectural level, Mitra et al. performed a similar an lysis for
circuit-level techniques [150]. Finally, we end with a discussion on how these t chniques
can be applied in conventional architectures.
Performance-Reliability tradeoff: Figure 7.32 shows the comparison of the performance-
reliability tradeoff of the three regimes: full redundant execution (FRE),selective redundant
execution (SRE), and AVF throttling. The AVF throttling results are basically the results
from using the combination of dynamic speculation control and fetch-on-demand presented
in Section 7.2.3. For all the benchmark categories, FRE achieves the maximum red ction
in ACE cycles followed by SRE, followed by AVF throttling. However, the reduction in
ACE cycles achieved by AVF throttling is competitive with SRE. The scenario foperfor-
mance overhead is slightly different. While SRE and AVF throttling significantly improve
the performance overhead over FRE, AVF throttling uniformly incurs slightlygreater per-
formance overhead than SRE leading to the smaller RPR in all the benchmark categories
(eg: 2.5 vs 4.3 for EEMBC benchmarks). While the RPR of SRE is greater than FRE
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FRE: Full Redundant Execution
SRE: Selective Redundant Execution
AVF throttling: DSC and F-o-D
EEMBC SPEC INT SPEC FP Hand-optimized
Figure 7.32: Comparison of the three soft error reliability regimes: full redundant execution
(FRE), selective redundant execution (SRE), and AVF throttling. Graph shows that the
reliability improvement from AVF throttling is comparable to selective redundantexecution.
SPEC integer benchmarks, because they incur lower overhead with FRE due to their lower
inherent parallelism.
Table 7.2 presents the percentage reduction in ACE cycles and the percentage i -
crease in execution cycles for the three regimes averaged across all thebenchmark cate-
gories. The results for the compiler-generated EEMBC and SPEC benchmarks, and the
hand-optimized EEMBC benchmarks are listed separately. It also presentsth se results
for error correcting codes. Parity adds fault detection capability to a structure, and with-
out adding any extra ACE cycles converts the already exisiting SDC ACE cycles into DUE
ACE cycles. As mentioned, since DUE ACE cycles are at least 40X less malicious than
SDC ACE cycles, parity achieves a 97.5% reduction in ACE cycles. Since ECC also adds
recovery, it improves upon parity and achieves near 100% reduction in ACE cycles for
the specific structure. However, as discussed before, adding parity or ECC to timing and
performance-critical structures on the datapath can be quite complex.
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Regime ECC, Parity FRE SRE AVF
Throttling
Description Incrementally add Full Redundant Selective Reduce
ECC, Parity to Execution Redundant Vulnerable
on-chip structures Execution State
Percentage Near 100% Compiler-generated Compiler-generated Compiler-generated
decrease in for structures benchmarks benchmarks benchmarks
ACE cycles that are protected 85.9% 47.6% DSC: 24.7%
F-o-D: 23.6%
Parity:≃ 97.5%
ECC:≃ 100% BOTH: 37.6%
Hand-optimized Hand-optimized Hand-optimized
benchmarks benchmarks benchmarks
82.8% 30.2% DSC: 16.4%
F-o-D: 3.6%
BOTH: 22.9%
Percentage 8-10 FO4 Compiler-generated Compiler-generated Compiler-generated
increase in gate delays benchmarks benchmarks benchmarks
Execution 27.6% 12.2% DSC: 11.1%





61.1% 12.9% DSC: 7.4%
RPR: 1.4 RPR: 2.3 F-o-D: 15.8%
BOTH: 24.4%
RPR: 0.9
Power Low High Medium Low
Consumption ≃ 2X
Overhead
Area 11-13% of ≤ 5% ≤ 5% ≤ 5%
Overhead storage area (BOQ, LVQ, (BOQ, comparison (Performance
Store Buffer) logic, performance counters etc.)
counters etc.)
Complexity Low High High Low
Overhead
Reference [21], [2] [19] [119], [118], [117] [2]
Table 7.2: Comparison of the reliability improvement and design tradeoffs between the
different regimes
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The average results for the other three regimes basically agree with the conclu-
sions above for the individual benchmark categories. All the three regimes, FRE, SRE,
and AVF throttling, shows less reliability improvement with more performance overhead
for the hand-optimized benchmarks. This is not surprising as benchmarkswhich have a lot
of parallelism and which utilize the processor resources efficiently will experience greater
overhead. Prior research that investigated fault tolerance techniquesfor highly parallel
scientific benchmarks in a streaming supercomputer arrived at a similar conclusion [170].
Further, since the TRIPS compiler is still in development, it will be interesting to re-evaluate
the gap in performance and the gap in the benefits of these reliability techniques between
compiler-generated and hand-optimized benchmarks as the compiler matures.
The scaling analysis in Section 6.1 presented four scaling scenarios eachrequiring
a different reduction in AVF every generation from architectural reliability techniques: a)
scenario 1: technology scaling, needing 50% AVF reduction, b) scenario 2: device/circuit
techniques, needing 25% AVF reduction, c) scenario 3: error correcting odes, needing
38% AVF reduction, and d) scenario 4: multi-layer reliability, needing 5% AVFreduction.
These results corroborate the scaling analysis as they clearly show that the three regimes
represent different points on the performance-reliability tradeoff spectrum. Further, these
results also suggest that the techniques are appropriate for the different scenarios in the
scaling analysis. While FRE is required in Scenario 1, and SRE may be needed in Scenario
3, AVF throttling techniques may be applicable in Scenario 2, and are certainlyapp icable in
Scenario 4. Tackling soft error reliability at multiple layers of the design using device and
circuit techniques, and error correcting codes in on-chip structures,allows us to employ
AVF throttling techniques which provide reliability improvement competitive with SRE.
Although the performance overhead of AVF throttling is slightly greater than SRE, they
have many important design advantages over FRE and SRE that are explaind below.
Power consumption: FRE incurs at least 2X overhead in power consumption because
it redundantly executes all instructions. Recent research has explored c mbining dynamic
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Performance EPI Throttling Reference
Technique Technique
Scheduling Low power scheduling [172]
Speculation Adaptive processing, [133], [173]
Pipeline gating
Multiprocessing Asymmetric cores [174], [105]
Table 7.3: Synergy between AVF and EPI throttling techniques
voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS) with other microarchitectural techniques to reduce
the power consumption of redundant execution [128,171], albeit at slightly higher complex-
ity. Since SRE reduces the extent of redundant execution it significantly lowers the power
consumption overhead, and can further be combined with the above techniques.
While FRE and SRE increase the power consumption, AVF throttling can poten-
tially reduce the baseline power consumption. We make the important observation that the
core mechanisms of many microarchitectural techniques proposed in prior research for im-
proving the energy-per-instruction (EPI) of processors, have important synergies with the
AVF throttling mechanisms proposed in this dissertation. Thus these class of techniques
can reduce both the power consumption and the vulnerability to soft errors. Similar to AVF
throttling that trades concurrency for improving reliability, Table 7.3 presents some EPI
throttling mechanisms that trade concurrency to reduce power consumption.Schedulers
exploit their knowledge of static instruction slack to maximize concurrency. While power-
aware scheduling policies trade concurrency for power consumption [172], the algorithms
can be extended to exploit static slack information to reduce the ACE cycles. Adaptive pro-
cessing [133], and pipeline gating [173] which reduce energy consumption by tuning the
processor resources to application needs, effectively also eliminate unnecessary but error
prone processor state. Asymmetric cores in a CMP, which perform this tuning in a more
coarse-grained fashion, have been shown to be more effective in reducing power consump-
tion by minimizing unnecessary state and computation [105].
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Area overhead: As described in Section 6.4.1, the overhead of adding ECC to storage
structures is between 11-13% of the array area. Simultaneous multithreadingprovides an
opportunity for eliminating fixed area overhead by adding reconfigurationlogic that allows
the processor to either operate in normal mode, or in reliable mode where the two threads
are dynamically coupled to form a redundant execution pair [19,127]. The area overhead of
these and other similar redundant execution techniques are due to the syncronizing queues
for input replication and output comparison (described in Section 7.1) all of which occupy
less than 5% of the processor area. In addition to these queues, the SRE mechanism evalu-
ated in this chapter also requires modest extra state for performance count rs to measure the
ACE and execution cycles to implement dynamic speculation control. The AVF throttling
techniques further economize on the hardware support to reduce areaoverhead. Dynamic
speculation control only needs performance counters and some controll gic for throttling
speculation, and fetch-on-demand places almost the entire burden on the scheduler.
Complexity overhead: The synergy between AVF and EPI throttling promises an econ-
omy of mechanisms, and is critical in reducing the implementation, and verification com-
plexity of AVF throttling. Section 6.4.1 discussed prior work in extending parityprotection
to filter false positives due to errors that will eventually be masked [2], andco cluded that
while a subset of them including ex-ACE and mis-speculated state can be detecte using
modest support at instruction issue and commit time, catching false positives inpredicated-
false and dynamically dead state can be fairly complicated and requires dedicated hardware
support. By demonstrating the potential of AVF throttling to improve reliability, we corrob-
orate the observation in [2] that designers can take advantage of the complementary nature
of AVF throttling that reduces vulnerability, and parity protection that implementsde ec-
tion to improve the overall reliability. Further, we propose that the effectiveness of AVF
throttling provides an opportunity to limit the complexity of extended parity protection to
a subset of the false positives that do not need the complex hardware support (ex-ace state,
and mis-speculated state), and still achieve considerable reliability improvement.
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Applicability to conventional architectures: While we use the TRIPS processor for our
analysis, FRE and SRE have been investigated in more conventional architectures. Fur-
ther, speculation throttling and adaptive instruction fetch have also been applied in more
conventional processors in prior research with modest modifications to thefetch, decode,
and selection logic to improve energy efficiency [173]. While fetch-on-demand operates on
compiler generated TRIPS instruction blocks, it can be naturally extended tobasic blocks
or hyperblocks in conventional processors by using the register rename logic to track the
arrival of the register inputs. Alternatively, a compiler based fetch-on-demand scheme has
been proposed in prior research for conventional processors to imprve erformance [161].
In that scheme, a compiler or a profiler is used to annotate each static instruction as crit-
ical or deferrable based on the instruction’s slack. Deferrable instructions are placed into
a deferred queue for later processing, and either use the idle slots in the fetc pipeline or
are fetched-on-demand into the processor when their results are needed, similar to what
we propose. Fetch-on-demand uses areactivetrigger based approach, and is applied at a
coarse-grained instruction block granularity. Reactive schemes have also been proposed in
earlier work for efficient energy and thermal management [175]. Further, prior research on
conventional processors have also exploredpredictivetechniques for estimating slack, and




Aggressive technology scaling, rising on-chip integration, and the continued increase in mi-
croprocessor power and thermal density threaten both the hard and soft error reliability of
future microprocessor designs. Designers must consider processorr liability as a key tech-
nology challenge in all market segments, along with performance, and power c nsumption,
and look for efficient solutions at multiple levels of the system design to achieve igh relia-
bility at low overhead [4]. While techniques at the device and circuit level have finer control
over the susceptibility of individual circuits to errors, architectural solutions are amortized
over larger sections of the processor and may have lower overhead. Tchnology constraints
of wire-delay and power consumption, and limits on deep pipelining, have impelled a shift
to distributed architectures that rely on modularity in design, and on-chip interconnection
networks for communication, and place a greater burden on software forexploiting concur-
rency from the application to achieve high performance on the distributed substrate [1]. In
this dissertation, we make the key observation that these underlying principles of distributed
architectures have important synergies that can be exploited to improve proc ssor hard and
soft error reliability at low overhead.
231
8.1 Hard Error Reliability
In this dissertation, we show that the random defect limited yield of chip multiprocessor
architectures reduces significantly from 85% at 250nm to 60% at 50nm, sugge ting that
just having array redundancy in the caches will be insufficient at future echnologies to
provide us the maximum yield we can hope to achieve at that technology generatio . The
key idea we propose is to exploit the abundant inherent microarchitectural redundancy in
modern and future processor architectures, perhaps with some performance degradation,
to achieve significant yield improvement. Exploiting microarchitectural redundancy using
mechanisms that mostly already exist in dynamic superscalar architectures improves yield
to 99.6% at 50nm, with a maximum reduction in performance in any chip of less than
20%. Recognizing that fault reconfiguration in static architectures also requires the defec-
tive configuration to be exposed to the software, we propose a novel compiler-assisted yield
enhancement technique and evaluated its potential using the TRIPS architecture. Our re-
sults show that the fault-aware scheduling heuristics exploit the redundancy in the TRIPS
hardware to successfully reschedule the full set of SPEC and EEMBC benchmarks with
less than 4% impact on performance.
The three principles of distributed architectures change the philosophy ofdesign for
hard error reliability in three significant ways. Traditionally, techniques prima ily focused
on providing explicit spares for yield enhancement. While traditional techniques similar to
array redundancy (redundant rows and columns) will still be applicablein on-chip caches
and queues, the majority of processor components in future distributed architectures will
have abundant redundancy, obviating the need for explicit spares. The use of well defined
multi-hop, routed, on-chip networks will provide inherently more path redundancy than
global wires, with the degree of path redundancy depending on the routing f nction. The
challenge here will be to quantify the defect tolerance for each network based on the rout-
ing function, and decide on the appropriate methodology for routing around faults using
one of three techniques, addition of explicit routers or links, improving the adaptivity of the
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hardware routing function, and software-assisted fault reconfiguration. Finally, depending
on the extent to which the software is used to exploit concurrency, and theexecution-model,
future reliability techniques will need to increasingly use software assistance for maintain-
ing the integrity of the execution model in the presence of a variable number offunctional
and defective components at different granularities. Further, using software assistance may
also help achieve lower overhead.
While future chip multiprocessor architectures will contain substantial redundancy
at the processor level [140], that can be exploited using a combination of hardware and
software techniques [28,126], we explore two key advancements in this dissertation. First,
we exploit intra-processor redundancy that significantly improves yield ifthe defect density
is large, or if the cores that compose the chip are large. Second, we demonstrate how execu-
tion resources within a processor can also be virtualized using software toimpr ve yield at
low overhead. We perform fault reconfiguration completely in software,using fault-aware
instruction scheduling heuristics that take advantage of the block-atomic execution model
in the TRIPS architecture to virtualize the processor resources. While traditional purely
hardware based schemes and the fault-aware scheduling heuristics areat two extremes, a
hybrid approach that takes advantage of the block-atomic execution modelbut performs
fault reconfiguration using on-chip networks with virtual channels and adaptive routing al-
gorithms is worth exploring in the future. Though we focus primarily on improving chip
yield, we recognize that many of the techniques discussed will also help in enhanci g the
graceful degradation of fail-in-place systems.
8.2 Soft Error Reliability
This dissertation quantitatively demonstrates through detailed modeling that soft error rate,
especially that of combinational logic, increases substantially at future technologies. This
result emphasizes the need for innovative solutions that extend soft errr protection to
latches, and combinational logic, and achieve the reliability requirement for that particular
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system (or market segment) while appropriately balancing the power consumption, area,
and complexity overhead.
Prior approaches have examined using the redundancy, and the software infr struc-
ture (eg: threads) available in distributed architectures for improving softerror reliability
at low overhead [19, 127, 128]. In this dissertation, we propose a newbetter-than-worst-
case technique called AVF throttling for improving soft error reliability, and demonstrate
its applicability and potential for reducing soft error rate. AVF throttling is baed on fault
avoidance rather than fault detection, and trades concurrency for theamount of processor
state vulnerable to soft errors to improve reliability. It is based on the key observation that
future architectures that increasingly rely on exploiting concurrency for achieving high per-
formance, may also provide correspondingly greater opportunities for exploiting execution
slack to reduce the amount of vulnerable state. We show that in the TRIPS architecture
around 90% of the vulnerable state is due to slack, and AVF throttling mechanisms are
able to achieve significant reliability improvement comparable to selective redundant exe-
cution of 25-40% for a set of EEMBC and SPEC benchmarks. While AVF throttling incurs
a slightly higher performance overhead than selective redundant execution, it has the po-
tential for considerably smaller area, power consumption, and complexity overhead when
compared to full and selective redundant execution.
Our results indicate that exploiting slack has significant potential to improve soft
error reliability. While we limit our analysis to local slack, we expect that accounting for
global slack will provide even greater benefits and is worth exploring in the future. Our
current methodology integrates estimation ofMin, Contention, andLocal SlackACE cycles
into the ACE analysis framework, for estimating reliability and studying the interaction
between performance and reliability early in the design cycle. In the future,we believe that
the critical path analysis framework can be elegantly extended to perform ACE analysis, and
compute theMin, Contention, andSlack(both local and global) ACE cycles [159,168,169].
This comprehensive unified framework will enable architects to study the trad off between
234
concurrency and slack, and its impact on soft error reliability in greater detail.
In this dissertation, we explore two complementary techniques for exploiting slack
in the TRIPS architecture, dynamic speculation control at the inter-block granularity, and
fetch-on-demand at the intra-block level. We show that fetch-on-demandwhich exploits
a more detailed knowledge of the TRIPS microarchitecture to achieve finer cotrol ver
slack, in some cases provides greater reduction in slack than dynamic speculation control
that operates at a higher level. We conclude that a similar approach can beused to arrive at
efficient techniques for exploiting slack in other processor structures and architectures also.
Of course, the degree of slack available depends both on the application and the architecture,
and well-tuned specialized architectures for applications with abundant parallelism may not
contain much slack to begin with [170].
While prior techniques proposed for exploiting slack are quite complex [159], Fetch-
on-Demanduses two key techniques to reduce complexity without sacrificing the benefits:
a) slack estimation at the block granularity that provides a favorable compromise between
complexity and timeliness, and b) a hybrid approach using the compiler for slack estima-
tion, and the hardware for exploiting slack based on information from the compiler. The
design space for estimating and exploiting slack warrants more investigation in the future.
Further, sophisticated techniques using software and hardware cooperati n for exploiting
slack at coarse-grained block-, function-, or transaction-level canform the building block
for achieving multiple technology objectives including reliability, and power effici ncy.
8.3 Final Thoughts
Due to limitations in further scaling of clock frequency, power-efficient exploitation of con-
currency is presently the primary design constraint for achieving performance gains in com-
puter systems. However, in this dissertation we demonstrate that hard and soft error relia-
bility are key emerging technology challenges that must be considered to maintain system
reliability at acceptable levels. In the future, analysis of the performance-reliability trade-
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off will be an important component of the design process along with studyingthe power
consumption, area, and complexity tradeoffs.
We demonstrate that the principles of distributed architectures provide a solidfoun-
dation for improving hard error reliability at low overhead. The reliability enha cement
techniques proposed successfully take into consideration both the opportunities and the ex-
tra demands placed by important new features of future distributed architectures including
on-chip interconnection networks, and the greater reliance on software, to achieve signifi-
cant improvement in reliability at low overhead.
Performing performance-power consumption tradeoff analysis has become a stan-
dard component of mainstream processor design, and no more can microarchitectural wid-
gets be included in a processor based on the performance improvement alone. In this dis-
sertation, we propose Reliability Performance Ratio (RPR), a new metric for performing
similar analysis of the performance-reliability tradeoff which will become a critical compo-
nent in the future. Chapter 6 provides a concrete example in the TRIPS architecture where
the larger capacity of the instruction window and the register operand storage hierarchy in-
crease their soft error vulnerability by 2-4X over conventional architetur s. Based on prior
research that demonstrates average performance improvements of 3X onhand-optimized
benchmarks, this results in an RPR of approximately 1 for this design decision.
At a high level, power consumption is a function of the number of transistors, and is
a problem that approximately scales with the Moore’s law increase in on-chipintegration.
However, there is no such silver bullet like full redundant execution forsolving this prob-
lem, and power consumption and the performance-power consumption tradeoff have been
successfully tackled using configurable mechanisms at multiple levels of the design from
the device level all the way up to the architecture and the software. Due to thec nstant or
even increasing soft error rate(SER)-per-individual circuit shown in this dissertation, soft
error reliability will also become a problem of Moore’s law proportions at thetransistor
level. However, the critical difference from power consumption is that circuit, microarchi-
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tecture, architecture, and program-level masking factors can significantly reduce this raw
vulnerability. In spite of this, history points towards adopting full redundant execution for
solving this problem, and we argue that designing flexible and configurablemechanisms
will be a key requirement to achieve low overhead. While selective redundant execution
add this configurability it still comes at the cost of higher complexity and powerconsump-
tion. This emphasizes the need for innovative techniques such as AVF throttling which have
the potential to improve reliability, power consumption, and complexity.
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